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Abstract
Strategies of Prevention:
Expanding the Concept of Preventive War
And
Understanding Its Implications
Steven T. Walker
This dissertation contributes to the literature on prevention in two specific ways. First, it
broadens the concept of preventive war, developing the idea that dominant states have a choice
when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. The choice is not a dichotomous variable of
either war or no war. Instead, there is a range of choices that decision makers within the
dominant state have at their disposal. This dissertation examines the relationship—over time—
between two conflictual states, one in relative decline and the other in relative ascendance, and
studies the response of the dominant but declining power. Second, I focus more than others have
on the perceptions of decision makers and the workings of domestic politics in determining how
dominant states respond to rising challengers. I use three broad historical case studies to
empirically test my ideas about the extended concept of preventive action. Using components of
the method of structured, focused comparison, I examine the internal domestic decision making
processes of the cases. Finally, I utilize a foreign policy analysis approach and develop a model
that illuminates nuances that have been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature.
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Chapter One
Introduction
This dissertation contributes to the literature on prevention in two specific ways. First, it
broadens the concept of preventive war, developing the idea that dominant states have a choice
when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. The choice is not a dichotomous variable of
either war or no war. Instead, there is a range of choices that decision makers within the
dominant state have at their disposal. This dissertation examines the relationship—over time—
between two conflictual states, one in relative decline and the other in relative ascendance, and
studies the response of the dominant but declining power. Second, I focus more than others have
on the perceptions of decision makers and the workings of domestic politics in determining how
dominant states respond to rising challengers. I use three broad historical case studies to test
empirically my ideas about the extended concept of preventive action. Using process tracing, and
other elements of the method of structured, focused comparison, I examine the cases, studying
the internal domestic decision making process regarding whether to initiate preventive action
against a rising challenger. Finally, I utilize a foreign policy analysis approach and develop a
model that illuminates nuances that have been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature.1
Preventive war, as a concept, is rooted in antiquity, has evolved over the ages, and
remains a prominent perspective in international relations literature on the origins of war. The
idea of preventive war can be traced back to Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War. The
actual term “preventive war” was first used by Thomas Fuller in his 1639 book The History of
the Holy War, which examined the Crusades. More recently, a rich theoretical literature on
preventive war has emerged in contemporary international relations beginning with the works of
Hans Morgenthau (1948, 1967), A.F.K. Organski (1958, 1968), and Robert Gilpin (1981). Jacek
1

The title of this dissertation was inspired by John Lewis Gaddis’ influential book Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.
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Kugler (1980), Jack Levy (1987), and Dale Copeland (2000) contributed to this literature by
further refining the theory of preventive war.
A basic concept of preventive war revolves around the idea of a conflictual pair of states
(or dyad) containing a dominant but relatively declining state and a rising but still relatively
weak challenger. Fear, on the part of the dominant power, is a key aspect of this dyad, and the
literature suggests it may take several forms.2 There may be a fear that military conflict, while
not imminent, is highly likely or inevitable in the end. Alternatively, the fear may be of a less
critical sort, perhaps a more vague perception that the status quo will get worse if no action is
taken. There may also be the concern that an adversary may cross some precarious threshold of
military or technological capability—such as attaining weapons of mass destruction. Much of the
literature suggests that any one or a combination of these fears will spark a preventive war
designed to stop the relative ascendance of the challenger or to lessen the impact of an eventual
conflict.3
This dissertation questions the inevitability of war given the international situation in
which one state is rising vis-à-vis another state over time. I will explore whether the dominant
state will react militarily to the challenger. In contrast to much of the established literature, my
perspective is that, given such circumstances, dominant states do not necessarily initiate military
action. Instead, I suggest that over time, dominant but declining states have choices regarding
2

The other side of this equation is that of the aspirations of the rising power, which may also result in war.
However, the focus of this dissertation is on the dominant power, and the actions it may take to stop the rise of a
challenger.
3
It should be noted that prevention is very different from preemption. Prevention occurs over a relatively large
expanse of time in which conflict is not seen as imminent. Prevention anticipates that sometime in the future—
perhaps even somewhat distant future—a rival will gain some capability that will put one’s state at risk. Preventive
action is a strategic response to a long-term threat that may even be years in the making. It is designed to preclude
the development of new military assets or other strategic capabilities, or prevent the possible use of existing, but not
yet mobilized, capabilities. Preemption, on the other hand, is a tactical response to a threat of an attack that is
perceived to be imminent. Any action to lessen an imminent attack’s impact would be preemptive. Such an action is
designed to thwart an enemy who is mobilizing or otherwise clearly preparing to use an existing military force. See
chapter 2.
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how they respond to rising challengers. They may react in a variety of ways, manifested by
different policy strategies. These responses take alternative forms of what I will call “preventive
action.”4 At the benign end of the spectrum, dominant states may choose not to respond or be
unable to respond in any substantial way to a rising challenger. They may also acquiesce to the
demands of the challenger. Alternatively, a dominant state may choose to confront or contain the
rising challenger using carrots and sticks, hoping to achieve the best possible outcome for itself
without provoking the challenger. Moving to the more coercive end of the preventive action
spectrum, a dominant state may engage in sustained coercive or militant diplomacy with the
challenger. Finally, the dominant state may initiate the most severe form of preventive action,
preventive war, against the challenger.
In this project, I will try to explain why a state chooses a particular type of preventive
action. Much of the literature on preventive war has focused on systemic and structural
components in determining whether the dominant state will initiate preventive war. This project
focuses more closely on decision makers’ perceptions, choices, and interactions at the domestic
level. I suggest there is an element of choice that plays a key role in determining the policy of a
state. In essence, I focus more than others have on the domestic dimension of preventive action
initiation.
Inherent in the idea of preventive action is a relationship that evolves between states over
time—not simply the immediate origins of war. This insight shapes the empirical part of my
dissertation. In order to capture this relationship, my case studies are rather extensive and
4

I use the term “preventive action” in this project to encompass the entire range of responses a dominant state may
undertake regarding a rising challenger. The term, as used here, should be understood in a different context than
some other uses of the same term. For example, some authors have used “preventive action” to mean economic and
diplomatic policies aimed at preventing war from occurring. Examples of such work include Michael S. Lund,
Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 1996). and Barnett R. Rubin, ed., Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action (New York: The Century
Foundation Press, 1998). My use of the term is quite different from these authors. As used in this dissertation,
“preventive action” refers to an attempt on the part of the dominant state to stop the further rise of the challenger.
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encompass broad historical time frames. In the empirical sections of my dissertation, I will
examine three major historical episodes in which dominant states dealt with rising challengers.
These three cases are as follows:
1) How the United Kingdom coped with relative decline from 1816 to 1914.
2) How Russia coped with relative decline from 1816 to 1997.
3) How the United States dealt with relative decline from 1816 to 1996.
Regarding the cases, my goal is not to present a narrative, but instead to isolate key
policies that states employed over decades if not centuries. In order to capture, in a systematic
way, how the dominant state sought to respond to the rise of the challenger, I utilize the method
of focused, structured comparison and its various components as proposed by Alexander George
and Andrew Bennett.5 Process tracing and the development of a typological theory, two
components of structured, focused comparison, assist in the explanation of why dominant states
react to rising challengers the way they do. This methodology teases out relevant material and
key theoretical elements that illuminate individual and domestic level decision making regarding
preventive action.
When examining our case studies, several things must be kept in mind. First, it is
essential to determine objectively if there is a declining dominant power and a rising challenger,
and which state is which. This is not easy, but using the National Materials Capabilities data set
from the Correlates of War project simplifies this matter.6 Fortunately, this data is available

5

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, BCSIA
Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005).
6
In order to make the data comparable across cases, I use the Composite Index of National Capability data from the
National Material Capabilities v. 3.02 data set. This data can be found at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
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starting in 1816, which meshes nicely with our focus on modern states. Using this dataset, I am
able to determine objectively when a state is in relative decline vis-à-vis other states.7
Second, we must determine the policy strategies of the declining dominant power, and
determine whether these policies were targeted at a rising challenger. To do this we can look at
the level of fear shared by policy makers in the declining dominant state regarding the rising
challenger. We must also ask ourselves the question, “What do these policy makers fear?” For
example, if policy makers in our declining dominant power (state A) are concerned that our
rising challenger (state B) is developing a military capability that will render A’s military
obsolete, and then launches a war against B, we can with some confidence suggest that this was
preventive action. In our analysis then, we must bring these elements together to determine the
validity of our model.
In looking at the cases in this study, I am essentially trying to fill a gap in deterministic
structural theories such as neorealism, hegemonic stability theory, and power transition theory.
One way to do this is to examine the political leaders who are actually making the decisions and
determining policy. Through process tracing, I accomplish this goal, and provide a better
explanation of why states experiencing relative decline have pursued the policies they have.8
The cases in this study reveal complex and varied responses to relative decline by
dominant powers. What the cases show is that declining states tend to prefer non-militarized
preventive action when facing a rising challenger. Only on rare occasions did the declining

7

See Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 - 1905 (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). One important question I am trying to answer here is to what extent
political leaders are successful in gauging their own states relative decline vis-à-vis other nations. The Material
Capabilities Index I use presents an objective way to gage this, but do political leaders at the time perceive this
relative decline? I hope to discover this by looking at individual leaders and groups in the domestic sphere. See
Friedberg 4-17 for a discussion regarding the ability of political leaders to gage this decline, and different models
that address this issue. On the issue of perception of decline by political leaders, Friedberg seems to disagree with
Kupchan’s argument that the political elite are quite perceptive and willing to accept and react to these changes.
8
Ibid., 18.

5

dominant state engage in behavior that was likely to result in militarized conflict. For example,
the United States after the Second World War enjoyed military superiority over the rest of the
world’s nations. By the end of 1947 or 1948 it was clear to American decision makers that the
Soviet Union was going to constitute a serious challenge to American global leadership in the
years and perhaps decades to come. Nonetheless, President Harry S Truman and his successors
did not engage in preventive war, but instead chose a form of non-militarized preventive action
to contain the communist bloc. In another example, facing relative decline vis-à-vis Japan in the
second half of the nineteenth century, Britain chose to ally itself with the Japanese, and not
confront them in any way.
It is clear from the cases presented in this dissertation that dominant states have a choice
when it comes to dealing with rising challengers. It is not simply a decision of war or no war, but
instead we find that decision makers within the dominant state have at their disposal a range of
options. By focusing more than others have on the perceptions of decision makers and the
workings of domestic politics in determining how dominant states respond to rising challengers,
this study builds on the work of other scholars to develop a model of preventive action that better
explains why national leaders choose the policies they do when faced with relative decline.

6

Chapter Two
Literature Review
I define a preventive action1 as one in which a dominant but relatively declining state
takes some action against a rising but still inferior challenger2 with the primary goal of
forestalling the continued ascendance of the challenger.3 Given these general circumstances, two
things may be viewed by the dominant state as likely or inevitable: 1) its continued relative
decline, and 2) the possibility of eventual conflict, whether militarized or otherwise, with the
challenger. In such an instance, the dominant state will see action taken now as providing an
advantage over waiting for the situation to deteriorate further. “Preventive motivation” is the
term Jack Levy has given this “perception that one’s military power and potential are declining
relative to that of a rising adversary, and…the fear of the consequences of that decline.” 4 The
presence of this preventive motivation is essential in defining any action as preventive in nature.
Before discussing the manner in which the concept of prevention has evolved, it is
prudent to differentiate between prevention and preemption. The two can be separated primarily
in terms of urgency and the time frame in which the conflict occurs.5 The element of immediacy,
or more importantly, the absence thereof, is essential when discussing preventive action.
Prevention anticipates that sometime in the future—perhaps even somewhat distant future—a
rival will gain some capability that will put one’s state at risk. Preventive action is a strategic
1

From this point on, I use the terms “preventive action” and “prevention” synonymously.
For the purpose of readability, I will use the terms “dominant” and “dominant state” to refer to a dominant but
relatively declining state and the term “challenger” to refer to a relatively weak but rising challenger. It is important
to recognize that dominant states experiencing relative decline might not be declining in absolute terms. The key
here is looking at differential rates of growth between states. If the dominant state is growing, though at a slower
rate than a rising challenger, it is still experiencing relative decline.
3
Some scholars suggest that prevention can also be seen in the form of a declining state that might not be superior,
if that declining state believes that militarized conflict with the dominant state is inevitable, and that a war fought
now would be fought under better conditions than a war fought later. This latter part is the common thread in all
preventive action, and I do not deny the possibility of initiation by a declining non-superior state, but my focus is on
a dominant state’s initiation of preventive action.
4
Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987).
5
Levy suggests that the two can be differentiated along several dimensions. I do not find this more helpful than the
simpler element of time advanced here. Ibid.
2
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response to a long-term threat that may even be years in the making. It is designed to preclude
the development of new military assets or other strategic capabilities, or prevent the possible use
of existing, but not yet mobilized, capabilities.6 For the preventive scenario, failure to act
immediately risks future geo-political, economic, or military uncertainty, and perhaps a higher
risk of a more costly conflict or an increasingly deteriorating status quo. While, in the case of a
militarized threat, attack is not imminent, it is believed that conflict with the challenger is
ultimately likely and perhaps inevitable. In contrast, if conflict were imminent or perceived as
imminent, any action would be tactical and not strategic in nature. Such a response falls under
the rubric of preemption. Stephen Van Evera suggests that a preemptive attack is designed to
thwart an enemy who is mobilizing or otherwise clearly preparing to use an existing military
force. In the instance of a preemptive situation, failure to act right away risks immediate attack
by an aggressor. A preemptive attack is “mounted to seize the initiative, in the belief that the first
mover gains an important advantage…”7
While militarized threats have been the focus of much of the literature, non-militarized
threats, usually in the form of economic competition, can also lead to insecurity on the part of the

6

Ibid.
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1999), fn. 18, 40. A word should be said about the relationship between preventive action and
deterrence/compellance. The connection between the two concepts is a complex one. Deterrence and compellance
both involve the threat to use force either in order to prevent an adversary from taking some action, to stop an
adversary from continuing an action it is already taking, or to get an opponent to initiate some action it is not
currently taking. See Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
especially 1-25. The key with both deterrence and compellance is that these are threats that force may follow. If
these threats are issued by a dominant state against a rising challenger, with the hope that such threats will stop the
development of strategic capabilities, this may in fact be a form of preventive action according to the guidelines I
have outlined above. This is not to say, however, that all deterrence falls within the purview of preventive action.
During the Cold War when both the United States and the Soviet Union exercised Mutually Assured Destruction,
they were using deterrence but not preventive action. There was no attempt to prevent the rise of a challenger, only
the threat that any use of already available assets would result in annihilation. However, if the Soviet Union during
the 1980s had issued a threat to the United States that if the U.S. went forward with the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) it would automatically result in a Soviet invasion of Europe, and this threat had been issued with the hopes
that such a threat would stop the U.S. from developing SDI, then such a threat would be both deterrence and
preventive action. I would like to thank Dr. Robert Duval for bringing this to my attention.
7
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leadership and populace of the dominant state. Instances of these non-militarized threats are just
as important as militarized threats, and are an essential element in this study. One hypothesis of
this study is that dominant states will react differently to a non-militarized threat than they would
to a militarized threat. We might ask, for example, “How did the United States react to a
militarized threat (the Soviet Union) in contrast to a non-militarized threat (Japan) after World
War II?” We might also ask, “Was the nature of the threat the key element in the foreign policy
outcomes of the United Sates in these cases?” This study answers these questions.

International Systems Theory and Preventive War
Now that we have highlighted the distinction between prevention and preemption, we can
explore the evolution of preventive action itself. The origin of prevention lies in antiquity and
can be traced back to at least Thucydides and his study of the sources of the Peloponnesian War.
He notes, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made
war inevitable.”8 Later, he suggests, “Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a
superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made.”9 Though he never uses
the term, the conflict between Athens and Sparta as portrayed by Thucydides can be described as
a preventive war. The actual term “preventive war” was first used by Thomas Fuller in 1639, in
his book The History of the Holy War, while explaining the legality of the Crusades. He
suggests, “A preventive war, grounded on a just fear of an invasion…is warranted by reason and
the practice of all wise nations…It is the most advised way not to wait for the enemy, but to seek
him out in his own country.”10 The concept of prevention was further articulated by Otto von

8

Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New
York: Touchstone, 1996), 16.
9
Ibid., 372.
10
Thomas Fuller, The History of the Holy War (London: William Pickering, 1639/1840), 15-16. For the etymology
of the term see the Oxford English Dictionary (Online Version) (Second) (Oxford University Press, 1989); available
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Bismarck who suggested that “No government, if it regards war as inevitable even when it does
not want it, would be so foolish as to leave to the enemy the choice of time and occasion and to
wait for the moment which is most convenient for the enemy.”11 The concept has been used
contemporaneously by the Bush administration in “The National Security Strategy of the United
States” in which President Bush, discussing terrorism, stated, “America will act against such
emerging threats before they are fully formed.”12 The idea of prevention, in an international
relations context, is thus a well-established concept.

Balance of Power Theory and War
Prevention as a general theory of international relations is a much more recent
phenomenon and is a product of some of the most important research in the field over the past
fifty years. This research has yielded a rich theoretical literature dealing primarily with systemic
and structural variables. The theory of preventive war in the post World War II era has been a
topic of interest for many scholars including Hans Morgenthau (1948, 1967), A.F.K. Organski
(1958, 1968), and Robert Gilpin (1981). Morgenthau, Organski, and Gilpin address the issue of
prevention as part of a larger framework designed to explore international politics or causes of
war in general and not specifically preventive war. Furthermore, Morgenthau and Organski are
primarily concerned with power; whether in the former’s case of a balance of power or in the
latter’s case of a hierarchy of power.

from http://80dictionary.oed.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/cgi/entry/00188322/00188322se4?single=1&query_type=word&queryw
ord=preventive+war&edition=2e&first=1&max_to_show=10&hilite=00188322se4.
11
Bismarck was ambivalent about his feelings regarding preventive war for he also stated, “Preventive war is like
suicide from fear of death.”
12
Introductory letter, signed by President George W. Bush. "The National Security Strategy of the United States,"
(2002).
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Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, discusses prevention only in passing in the
development of his theory of international relations, but he suggests preventive war is a
necessary means of maintaining equilibrium in the international system:
Since in a balance of power system all nations live in constant fear lest their rivals
deprive them, at the first opportune moment, of their power position, all nations have a
vital interest in anticipating such a development and doing unto the others what they do
not want the others to do unto them…. Preventive war, however abhorred in diplomatic
language and abhorrent to democratic public opinion, is in fact a natural outgrowth of the
balance of power.13
Morgenthau suggests in his balance of power theory, that war is least likely in an
international system in which multiple states have roughly equal amounts of power. According to
this theory, if states are able to balance against an aggressor, either through their own power or
with the combined power of allies, no state is likely to initiate war since it would be able to see
that the balance of power would shift against it. In such a system, aggression is futile because
such action would result in a counterbalance that would defeat any aggressor and restore balance
to the system. Traditional balance of power theory thus paints a picture of a relatively static
system.14
More recently, Paul Kennedy and John Mearsheimer have added an element of
dynamism to balance of power theory. Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,
views the international system through an economic lens and suggests that states grow at
different rates. He argues that the international system is essentially one of shifting power, based
largely on economic forces. According to Kennedy, economic power shifts from the most
powerful states to rising challengers. He suggests that the nation most likely to gain military
power is that nation that is most able to gain economic power. Essentially, he argues that large
13
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and powerful militaries require massive amounts of financial capital. He also suggests that as
powers grow, they tend to overreach their natural abilities. It is this overreach that strains a
countries military and economic capacities and eventually forces great powers to pull back from
their goals of global dominance.15
John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, focuses much more on
military power. While he does not directly address the issue of preventive war, his theory of
offensive realism implies that preventive war, or at least some form of preventive action, should
be a normal tool of statecraft. He suggests that domestic politics and governmental structure play
a negligible role in determining whether a state will initiate war against another state. Instead, he
argues it is the structure of the international system that determines the level of war proneness.
He argues that major variations of balance in the international system can affect a nation’s
calculations regarding the efficacy of war. He suggests that multipolar systems with a potential
hegemon are the most war prone, with multipolar systems of roughly equal states as second most
war prone, and bipolar systems as the least war prone. According to offensive realism, a potential
hegemon in a multipolar system will likely initiate war to become a true hegemon. Implicit in
this argument is that the potential hegemon, or a true hegemon if it reaches that status, would
also initiate preventive war against any challengers. Like Kennedy, Mearsheimer suggests that
major powers jockey for position in the international system.16

Power Transition Theory and the Hierarchy of the International System
Not all international relations scholars, however, agree with the balance of power
theorists’ portrayal of the international system, nor their conclusions regarding preventive war. In
15
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particular, Organski, in World Politics, criticizes Morgenthau on the basis that he does not take
into account the fundamental problem of differential rates of growth. In response, Organski
develops his own theory of international relations—power transition theory.17 Organski
examines preventive war in more depth than Morgenthau does; but it is still a tangent in a larger
theoretical framework. Power transition theorists see an international system that is hierarchical
in nature with a “dominant power” at the top of the hierarchy.18 They suggest that a powerful
state—once it ascends to the dominant position—configures the international system to serve its
own long-term interests. Kugler and Organski (1980, 1989) argue that the maximization of net
gains is the goal of the dominant power.19 Beneath this dominant power are other “great” or
“major” powers that have a significant proportion of the power of the dominant state. The great
powers “share in the allocation of resources and…help maintain the international system.”20
Below the great powers are “middle powers” and “small” or “minor” powers that, though they
might be dissatisfied with the status quo, do not play an important role in the international
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system. However, they may play a supporting role in any struggle between the dominant power
and a dissatisfied major power.21
In contrast to balance of power theory, power transition theory suggests that
confrontation is most likely when the dominant power and an unsatisfied state are roughly equal
in power. Such a rough equilibrium of power comes to pass because the dominant state, which
has already gone through industrialization with the accompanying growth spurt in such
determinants of power as population, political efficiency, and economic development, has since
slowed in its overall growth. The rapidly rising challenger, however, is going through its own
power transition, which brings it closer to the power of the dominant state and may catapult it
ahead of the dominant. This view of dynamic change within the state that results in a new
distribution of power is in contrast to balance of power theorists who suggest that the main
mechanism for a state to increase its power is through increasing armaments, conquering new
territory, or winning new allies.22
It is also this element of dynamic change and power differentials within the state that
places power transition at the heart of the preventive war literature. Though power transition
theory predicts that in most cases it is the challenger who starts wars in an attempt to change the
status quo, the theory does contribute to the development of preventive war theory by suggesting
that there have been instances in which the dominant state attempts to halt a challenger’s rise
using preventive war. Organski addresses this issue by attempting to answer the broader question
of why power differentials sometimes result in war, and at other times do not. He suggests that
war is likely if the following conditions are present:
1) If the challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal the dominant
nation in power
21
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2) If the rise of the challenger is rapid
3) If the dominant nation is inflexible in its policies
4) If there is no tradition of friendship between the dominant nation and the challenger
5) If the challenger sets out to replace the existing international order with a competitive
order of its own23
Power transition theory predicts that if the dominant power is going to initiate a preventive war,
it is likely to do so in the beginning stages of the power transition when its military power is at
its zenith vis-à-vis the challenger. It will do so because the leadership of the dominant state will
realize that the longer it waits, the less its chances of winning a conflict. In fact, by the time the
challenger enters the power transition, the dominant state may fear that it will lose its power to
control its own foreign policy. Such fear may spark a preventive war against the challenger.24
Power transition theory’s major contribution to a strong theory of preventive action lies mainly
in its emphasis on the internal growth of states. It provides a mechanism by which power
transformations occur, without which it would be difficult to discuss the preventive motivation.
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Hegemonic Stability Theory and Prestige
Robert Gilpin, in War & Change In World Politics, further develops the concept of
prevention by using power transition theory’s hierarchy, but at the same time introducing the
element of prestige. He suggests that a preventive war waged by a declining dominant power
against a rising challenger may be the “most attractive response” available to the dominant
state.25 Contrary to balance of power and power transition theories, however, Gilpin argues that
prestige and not power may be the most important aspect of the international hierarchy. Gilpin
segregates power and prestige as follows: “Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and
related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with
respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power.”26 The prestige
of a state rests on its ability and willingness to use military and non-military force to achieve its
objectives. In other words, are the promises and threats of a state credible? A state that is
powerful—and willing and able to use that power—will have more prestige than a state that is
weak, or is powerful but unwilling to use its power. Gilpin goes so far as to argue that the
international system is actually based on prestige, not power.27

Perception and Preventive War
Jack Levy (1987) contributes to the evolution of preventive war theory by suggesting that
perception is the key to understanding why preventive actions sometime occur and at other times
do not. As I have noted above, Levy develops his concept of “preventive motivation,” which
revolves around the dominant state’s perception that it is declining and the fear of the
consequences of that decline. He was also the first scholar to pursue a research program that
25
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isolated preventive war from more general theories of international relations or world politics.
Levy suggests that the preventive motivation is best viewed as an intervening variable between a
power shift and the decision to initiate war. He attempts to understand how preventive
motivation fits in with other variables in determining whether a state in relative decline will
initiate war against a rising challenger. He incorporates elements of prospect theory, suggesting
that states become risk acceptant when faced with losses, and argues that this fact goes a long
way in explaining why declining states are likely to initiate preventive war.28
In an update of the 1987 article, Levy and Joseph Gochal (2004), suggest that preventive
war initiated by a declining state has been a “fairly common” event in history. In their view,
states in relative decline, who anticipate that a rising adversary will “either surpass it in military
strength or cross a critical threshold of military capabilities,” have frequently launched
preventive wars.29 Levy and Gochal argue that dominant powers may also be motivated to take
preventive action if they think the status quo will get worse for them if the rising challenger is
allowed to continue its ascendancy. This might reflect a general fear of a loss of bargaining
power or fear of what the rising state might do once it gains a certain level of power, even if war
is not necessarily seen as inevitable.30 For example, the globally dominant state, which is also the
major power in a specific region, will not want to be replaced at the regional level by a new
regional power. In such a scenario, if it is clear that the global dominant power will remain
dominant on the world stage as a whole, but that it will be replaced within a particular region as
the dominant power, the global dominant state might strike at the challenging regional state. The
rising challenger does not necessarily need to have the potential of matching the dominant power
28
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in every aspect to be threatening.31 Such a situation may be enough to spark a dominant initiated
preventive action.32 Similarly, the threat that an adversary may cross some threshold of military
technological capacity—such as attaining weapons of mass destruction—may be enough to
prompt a dominant state to initiate preventive action.33

Empirical Work
A number of scholars have utilized preventive war theory to explain empirical cases. For
example, Richard Ned Lebow, Stephen Van Evera, and Jack Snyder, among others, have used
preventive war theory to explore the origins of World War I.34 In these cases, they have used the
theory to examine whether challengers take advantage of opportunities that arise from power
shifts, or whether dominant states take advantage of “windows of opportunity” to strike at
challengers that have not yet reached their full potential.35 There have also been many
quantitative tests for balance of power theory and power transition theory. Some of these tests
shed light on the utility of a theory of preventive war.36
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Dale Copeland, in his important book The Origins of Major War, contributes to the
development of preventive war theory by arguing that, in contrast to power transition and
hegemonic stability theories, it is not the rising state but the dominant state that initiates war. He
suggests that balance of power, power transition, and hegemonic stability theories are all
inadequate in explaining under what conditions a declining state is likely to engage in preventive
war. He argues that while many scholars recognize that preventive wars are a significant problem
in history, they have failed to develop an adequate theoretical basis explaining the conditions
under which preventive militarized action is initiated.37 He also argues that, contrary to power
transition and hegemonic stability theory, most of the major wars in world history have been
started by the declining dominant power. Furthermore, he notes, even if the dominant power did
not start a war, it often engaged in risk acceptant behavior that brought about crises that raised
the chances of war. His “dynamic differentials theory” integrates many of the concepts found in
the other theories addressed above. Power differentials, polarity, and fear of decline are brought
together under the umbrella of his theory. Furthermore, he takes into account the expected speed,
depth, and type of decline being experienced by the dominant power. He grapples with the
theoretical puzzle of preventive action by developing a rigorous theory that focuses mainly on
structural aspects of the system, but also includes some elements of the domestic sphere.
Nonetheless, he takes a much more deterministic approach to the subject than does Levy. In a
sense, Copeland returns to the traditional approaches of Gilpin and Organski in that he focuses
mainly on material and systemic determinants of power.38
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One of Copeland’s most significant contributions is his acknowledgement that preventive
action need not necessarily result in armed conflict. He suggests that a declining state becomes
risk acceptant and is willing to initiate a crisis if it believes that by doing so it might stem relative
decline. A declining state is willing to do this because it does not fear war in the short term. In
Copeland’s view, if a state believes war is likely or inevitable in the future, and that such a war
will be fought under increasingly worsening conditions, it has nothing to lose by initiating a
crisis in the short term. According to this logic, if the crisis is managed successfully, relative
decline will be slowed or reversed. If the crisis spirals out of control, then a war will be fought
under the best possible conditions. Doing nothing will result in further deterioration of the
declining state’s power position. Copeland, however, does not go into detail about what types of
preventive action a declining state might initiate. Other than initiating crises in order to forestall
relative decline, he does not explore the types of preventive action a state might initiate.39

State Level Theories and Preventive War
As is evident, most of the literature dealing with preventive war does not take more than
a cursory look beyond systemic factors. However, in recent years a number of scholars have
begun to examine the topic of prevention in terms of domestic factors. These scholars have
focused on such wide-ranging topics as the effect of ruling groups, the internal structure of
states, and what role belief systems play in preventive war decisions. Perspectives that focus on
the state level allow us to move beyond systemic explanations that quite often fail to explain why
a state sometimes does not choose to engage in preventive war.
Randall Schweller was one of the first scholars to examine some of these domestic
factors. He is interested in the domestic political structure of states and asks the question, “Do
39
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democracies fight preventive wars?” He also wonders why “some power shifts result in
preventive war while others do not.” Schweller argues that it is the internal domestic structure—
whether democratic or not—that determines how a declining dominant power responds to a
rising challenger. He concludes that when faced with a democratic rising challenger,
democracies do not initiate preventive war, but instead accommodate the challenger. When it
comes to non-democratic challengers, however, democratic states attempt to form defensive
alliance systems. Also of interest, though, is that he leaves open the possibility that a democracy
may initiate preventive war against a non-democratic challenger if the dominant democratic state
believes that such a war would not be long or costly. Meanwhile, non-democratic states, when
faced with a challenger (whether democratic or not), will either form a defensive alliance or will
initiate preventive war. Accommodation is not in their nature. In all, Schweller suggests that
there are four possible responses by a dominant state facing a challenger: 1) accommodation, 2)
internal balancing—which is difficult for democracies because of the costs involved in building
up military power, 3) alliance formation, and 4) preventive war.40 In sum, Schweller’s article is
important both because he examines the internal structure of states, and because he suggests a
range of responses by the dominant state.
Jack Snyder, in The Myths of Empire, contributes to the literature on domestic factors of
preventive war by examining the internal political dynamics of rising powers, as well as material
components of power. The essence of Snyder’s arguments is that the origin of a state’s foreign
policy is not the external environment, but the domestic one and the structures that develop
within the domestic realm. This is not to say that events and structures in the international system
do not play a part in shaping a nation’s foreign policy, but he suggests that the key ingredient in

40

Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?," World Politics
44, no. 2 (1992).

21

understanding the foreign policy is domestic affairs and structures. Snyder also suggests that
within the domestic sphere, myths of bandwagoning and the paper tiger can arise. These myths,
if not counterbalanced by a more rational system of conceptualizations of the international
system, can lead a state to overreach. This imperial overreach, in turn, can lead to war and the
eventual contraction or destruction of the state.
Though he is largely interested in rising powers, he reiterates the argument that a state is
tempted to engage in preventive action if its chances of winning victory in a later war are less
than its chances of winning a war now. Other considerations that must be examined, according to
Snyder, include the domestic political costs and operational disadvantages of being the
aggressor. Furthermore, the stronger state must look at the alternative of the costs of appeasing
the rising power. Snyder also points out that leaders calculate both short and long-term shifts in
power and resources. If the stronger state perceives the rising state as a future threat that has not
fully developed or mobilized its war making capabilities, it might be inclined to attack sooner
rather than later.41
Snyder is also interested in how states develop and the role of elites in that development.
For example, he examines development in Germany and Japan prior to the Second World War.
In both of these cases, Snyder suggests that their late industrial development allowed a narrow
number of powerful elite groups to set the strategic agenda for the countries. These elite groups
were tied closely with the military and the military had a strong influence on the foreign policy
of both countries. The power elites and the military had no real checks on their power. Instead,
they would work together, in what he terms “logrolling,” which allowed each interest group to
achieve their main goals, but inevitably pushed their states into empire and overextension.

41

Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, ed. Robert Jervis, Robert J. Art, and
Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 25-26, 80.

22

Furthermore, he suggests that because of their late industrial development and the concentration
of power within a limited number of elite groups, democracy never had a chance to develop.
Snyder compares this lack of democracy to Britain, which developed earlier and along more
democratic lines. He demonstrates how democratic institutions prevented strong military elites
from hijacking British foreign policy.42
Charles Kupchan is perhaps the leading scholar on internal elements dealing with
preventive war. In his The Vulnerability of Empire, he examines elite beliefs and the rise of
hardliners, domestic politics, and options of the declining state. Kupchan suggests that both
military and civilian leaders have an incentive to take hard-line stances. However, as the ill
effects of hard-line policies mount, elites begin to realize that their policies are coming to
jeopardize the security of their state. After a certain time lag, they come to appreciate that their
beliefs are inconsistent with incoming information. Elite beliefs are fairly sensitive to incoming
and disconfirming information, and decision makers eventually become aware of the need to
adjust grand strategy. Unfortunately, elite beliefs, which are relatively malleable, run into public
opinion, or what Kupchan calls “strategic culture,” which is more resistant to incoming
information and to change.43 Kupchan demonstrates how hard-liners can become entrapped by
the strategic culture which they, at least in part, helped manufacture. He suggests that even
though strategic images may be created primarily for public consumption, they gradually spread
through the elite community. Over time, individual members of the elite community come to
believe in the strategic images that they repeatedly articulate before the public. This is especially
true when decision makers pursue policies consistent with the images they are propagating. In
essence, they come to believe their own rhetoric, and internalize the images they are producing.
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New members of the elite community, and those not in the inner circle, unaware that prevailing
strategic conceptions were originally crafted for propaganda purposes, become indoctrinated in
the strategic culture. Over the longer term, elites may find it costly in political terms to refute
precisely those images that they had previously been championing. Because strategic culture can
infuse the elite community and its institutions with powerful images that override strategic logic,
elites may not even accept that they must reverse course despite incoming information pointing
to the need to do so. Furthermore, because elite beliefs adapt faster to new information than
strategic culture, the same images that once shaped public opinion and empowered decision
makers eventually can come to constrain them.44 All of these factors have important implications
when it comes to the decision of whether to initiate preventive action.
Kupchan’s emphasis on “vulnerability” is also of importance when discussing the
probability of preventive war. Kupchan suggests, “Should elites believe that conflict with the
rising state is unavoidable, they may even resort to preventive war in order to defeat the
adversary while they still have the capability to do so.”45 In Kupchan’s view, high vulnerability
means, “elites operate under conditions of strategic deficiency. They calculate that their own
resources and those of their allies are insufficient to enable them to prevail against the likely
adversary or adversarial coalition.” Because of this, declining states will attempt to avoid war, if
possible. They will do so, even if it means making concessions to the rising challenger. He
suggests, “It might be possible to avoid conflict altogether by meeting the demands of the
adversary. At a minimum, accommodation will postpone conflict and buy time for the defender
to seek added resources and improve the military balance.”46 Kupchan thus runs counter to the
rest of the preventive war literature by suggesting that time is on the side of the declining state.
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He suggests that adding allies or military resources over the long term will benefit the decliner.
On the other hand, he suggests time is not on the challenger’s side and thus provides an incentive
for an attack against the dominant state. Despite these controversial hypotheses regarding which
side is favored by the passage of time, Kupchan’s insight into the domestic sphere is extremely
valuable.

Conclusion – Expanding the Concept and Examining Domestic Factors
In sum, much of the past fifty years of international relations literature has dealt with
preventive war directly or indirectly. However, there has been much discussion of whether the
dominant or challenger state in a given dyad is most likely to initiate war. There are also serious
deficiencies in much of the literature, though some scholars have begun to address some of these
issues. Of particular importance are the issues of degrees of preventive action and the
determinants of that action.
On the first front, most scholars have treated the issue of prevention as an either-or
proposition: either states initiate war, or they do not. I suggest that this is an overly simplistic
view of a complex subject. Like Schweller, and to a lesser extent Copeland, I suggest that there
is a range of possible responses by the declining power. By looking at a variety of forms
prevention may take, we can better understand the utility of the concept and build a more refined
theory of preventive action. On the second front, by examining more closely domestic factors
such as elite belief systems, domestic political constraints, and the choices elites make; we can
better understand the dynamics of the preventive motivation. We may then be in a position to
explain better why power shifts sometimes lead to war and other times do not.
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All scholars stand on the shoulders of those who have come before us, and I am no
different. On the one hand, this research fits in with that of scholars such as Levy and Copeland
who suggest that it is the dominant state that is likely to initiate preventive action. On the other
hand, I join scholars like Schweller, Snyder, and Kupchan by emphasizing domestic level
factors. I also agree with Gilpin that prestige plays a part in explaining why states act the way
they do, and I explore this element in my case studies. I also explore Levy’s ideas of decision
makers’ perceptions regarding the domestic atmosphere, the international system, and the
adversary. I use Snyder’s insights about domestic politics and the literature on belief systems, as
well as Kupchan’s concept of strategic culture, to shed light on preventive action initiated by
dominant powers. This study, then, contributes to the literature by recognizing a wider range of
preventive actions and by focusing more closely than others on domestic factors.47
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Chapter Three
The Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
As mentioned above, I am arguing that preventive action can take different forms, from
diplomatic actions, to sanctions and embargoes, to one-time military strikes, to general war. I
suggest that our traditional instruments for detecting preventive action have not been sensitive
enough. By looking only for preventive war, most scholars have failed to see other forms of
preventive action. Even those scholars who have acknowledged different types of preventive
action have not sufficiently developed a typological theory of the phenomenon. The theoretical
puzzle that has not been addressed in the literature is why a particular preventive action takes the
form it does. Why in one case is an economic and military embargo levied, while in another case
an invasion initiated?
My answer is that the form preventive action takes is largely determined by domestic
factors. Despite the contributions of hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory, the
preventive war literature has essentially disregarded non-structural aspects and, with the
exception of scholars such as Copeland and Schweller, has largely ignored variation in the scope
of preventive action. My Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP), as outlined below,
addresses the shortcomings of systemic structural theories by suggesting that domestic factors
are largely responsible for determining when a state will initiate a preventive war, and when it
will initiate less extreme forms of preventive action. In developing hypotheses that posit answers
to this question, and testing those hypotheses, I develop a rigorous first cut at a typological
theory of preventive action that explains the form preventive action ultimately takes. I create a
model of preventive action, which demonstrates the utility of a broader conceptualization. This
project contributes to the intellectual discussion by developing a model of preventive action
grounded in domestic level factors. In so doing, I utilize some basic assumptions and findings of
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prospect theory. More fundamentally, I use the method of structured, focused comparison to
examine the interaction of domestic elements as well as systemic phenomena, and how that
interaction shapes the form preventive action takes. However, by using a limited number of
historical case studies I do not anticipate finding definitive proof of my hypotheses. Instead, I
suggest that if I find evidence to support my concepts, it will provide an incentive for continued
research in an area that has been underdeveloped by scholars.

Assumptions of the DPMP: Prospect Theory
Prospect theory provides a basis for understanding how states in relative decline might
respond to rising challengers. Prospect theory suggests that actors are more fearful of losing what
they have—what is termed loss aversion—than they are hopeful of gains.1 Actors will take risks
to preserve what they have, whereas they will not take a similar risk to gain a similar objective.
Prospect theory demonstrates that actors tend to overvalue what they have, and tend to favor the
status quo. In other words, states will fight to protect what they have, whereas they may be less
willing to fight to achieve conquest.2 Accordingly, if there is a possibility that taking preventive
action will result in a loss, a state should not engage in such activity. However, if it is probable
that a loss will be suffered if nothing is done, the state will take preventive action. Similarly, if it
is likely that a state’s situation vis-à-vis another state will only worsen if no action is taken, it
will likely take preventive action to slow or stop the deterioration.3 In short, declining states are
security maximizers while rising challengers are “cautious” power maximizers. These aspects of
prospect theory are integrated into the model as outlined below.
1

Prospect theory is quite complex, and not all elements apply to preventive action. Only the relevant aspects are
included here.
2
Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 41
(1997).
3
Ibid.

28

Components of the DPMP
Having briefly examined prospect theory above, it is now possible to develop a model of
preventive action focused on domestic factors and the actions of domestic elements—by which I
mean elites, decision makers, leaders, ruling coalitions, political opposition, and influential
interest groups. I test this model against two other models—one composed of systemic structural
causal mechanisms and one composed of domestic structural causal mechanisms. I do this in
order to test whether preventive action occurs as suggested by structural theories, or whether a
model based on other factors might perform better. I argue that the form preventive action takes
is primarily determined by the three causal mechanisms in my model, and that the DPMP will
perform better than a purely structural model.4

Causal Mechanism 1: Internal Power Constraints
The first causal mechanism in the DPMP is the level of internal power constraints,
measured by whether the state has an offensive or defensive military doctrine. If a state has not
prepared for offensive warfare, it cannot initiate militarized preventive action, or at least it would
be foolhardy to do so. Defensive military postures, then, act as an internal power constraint on
the leadership’s ability to exercise this form of preventive action.5 However, non-militarized
preventive action is still a viable option for a state with a defensive military doctrine.

4

George and Bennett define a causal mechanism as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer
energy, information, or matter to other entities. In so doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s
characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.” See
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Bcsia
Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 137.
5
Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914, ed. Robert Jervis,
Robert J. Art, and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1984).
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Jack Snyder’s study of the role of military doctrine in the outbreak of war in 1914,
demonstrates how offensive doctrines are propagated among domestic elites, and the military in
particular.6 He suggests that France, Germany, and Russia all had offensive strategies that
prompted them to initiate war, even though there was real reason to believe that defensive
strategies were more prudent. Snyder suggests that organizational biases and doctrinal
oversimplification on the part of military planners were the primary sources of offensive
doctrines. Snyder finds that institutional bias was greatest when the core values of the
organization were threatened. These organizations developed overly offensive doctrines in order
to ensure that the institutions were indispensable.7
In essence, military planners create offensive doctrines because those doctrines ensure
that the military has a mission. This is even more effective when they are able to make the
argument that the best defense is a strong offense, meaning that if war becomes inevitable, it is
better to be in a position to strike first and win a quick victory than to wait to be attacked and get
bogged down in a long defensive struggle. Snyder argues that such simplifications of a complex
reality, in which defensive strategies often hold the advantage, introduce biases into strategic
analysis.8
These biases can manifest themselves in the military doctrines of states. Snyder suggests,
“As a rule, the weaker power is usually the defender and the stronger is the attacker. This rule
tacitly recognizes the advantages of the defense…”9 When the balance of power is more equal,
however, states tend to forget the advantages of defensive strategies. Instead, states look for
6

Ibid.
Ibid., 16.
8
Ibid., 16-19. Snyder is quite concerned with motivational bias in determining whether offensive strategies are
proper given reality. I am much less concerned with the presence of bias. I am not interested in whether a particular
policy or doctrine was correct, but whether it led to a particular type of preventive action. Nor am I concerned with
the normative issue of how historical actors should have acted, but instead in how they did act.
9
Ibid., 22.
7

30

trends of power shifts and “windows of opportunity” through which they might be able to initiate
preventive action. One problem, as noted by Snyder, is that strategists tend to see windows when
none exist or overrate their importance. Furthermore, Snyder suggests that a rational calculus can
yield an offensive strategy when some or all of the following conditions are met: “(1) the state is
expansionist, (2) technology either favors the attacker or at least does not strongly favor the
defender, (3) geography does not strongly favor the defender, (4) the military balance is
favorable, (5) the anticipated trend of the balance is unfavorable.”10
The current project is primarily concerned with Snyder’s fourth and fifth conditions.
First, I am interested in the actions of the militarily dominant state in a given dyad. Second, if the
status quo is seen as getting worse if nothing is done, preventive action is a rational response. In
this sense, then, internal power constraints in the form of offensive-defensive military strategies
are linked to domestic elements’ perceptions about the future. This is an example of the
interdependence of the causal mechanisms, and leads one to the conclusion that equifinality is
likely in this study.11
The real issue regarding internal power constraints for this project is to what extent
military doctrines hinder those domestic elements who favor preventive action. I suggest that
defensive military doctrines constrain the initiation of militarized preventive action, while such
doctrines probably have little or no effect on non-militarized preventive action. I would add just
one caveat to this statement. If domestic elements fear a downward spiral from non-militarized
preventive action to militarized preventive action, and they recognize that they are particularly
weak militarily, they may be constrained even non-militarily. However, this should be a

10
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relatively rare phenomenon since I am assuming that the dominant state is superior militarily and
in a position to at least defend itself against the rising challenger.

Causal Mechanism 2: Domestic Political Constraints
The second causal mechanism I examine is the level of domestic political constraints,
measured by the level of domestic opposition and regime fragmentation. It should be noted that
my theory shares certain aspects with Hagan’s concepts of domestic political oppositions.12 This
issue is important in understanding to what extent a given regime is able to pursue its preferred
foreign policy.13 For the purposes of this study, domestic political constraints play an important
role in determining whether domestic elements favoring preventive action will be successful in
promoting their foreign policy agenda. As suggested in the opposition and war literature, and as
emphasized by Hagan, “domestic political pressures [have been] very much the norm in foreign
policy making.”14 The dialogue and political struggles between different domestic elements are
analyzed in the case studies. We find both cooperation, in the form of logrolling between
domestic elements that, though they may otherwise be contentious, share a particular common
goal; and conflict, in the form of competition between domestic elements with opposing goals.
Ultimately, this dialogue results in a foreign policy that, in part, determines the particular form of
preventive action, if any, that is eventually initiated.

12

See Joe D. Hagan, "Oppositions, Ruling Strategies, and the Domestic Road to War: Political Explanations of
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Domestic political opposition external to the regime can also affect foreign policy. Hagan
suggests that of particular importance “is the strength and intensity of organized opposition
immediate to the regime—i.e., dissenting actors within the ruling party, the legislature, the
military, and regional governments. These are arenas for formal opposition to the regime, and the
ability of the regime to retain power over the long term necessitates support of these
institutions.”15 Special interests outside the government may also play an important role in
opposing foreign policy initiatives of the ruling regime.
Hagan also suggests that “regime fragmentation” is the primary regime property affecting
a leader’s ability to initiate a preferred foreign policy. He notes, “This concerns the extent to
which the central political leadership has persisting internal political divisions in the form of
competing personalities, bureaucracies/institutions, faction, parties, or other kinds of autonomous
political groups.”16 Hagan also suggests that there are five types of regimes, ranging from highly
cohesive to highly fragmented. These can be broken down as follows: 1) single party regimes
dominated by a single, individual leader; 2) regimes fragmented solely by the existence of
established, autonomous political institutions/bureaucracies; 3) regimes controlled by a single
party/group which is itself internally divided by established political factions; 4) regimes ruled
by a coalition of autonomous political groups in which one actor has clear predominance; and 5)
regimes ruled by a coalition in which there is no clear, single dominant actor.17
The current study will examine how domestic political constraints shape or distort the
foreign policy implementation of the ruling domestic elites in each of my cases. I argue that
states characterized by severe domestic political constraints, either because of regime
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fragmentation or political opposition, will be more acquiescent in the face of decline. States with
minimal political constraints will be more likely to initiate militarized preventive action.

Causal Mechanism 3: Ruler Belief Systems
The third causal mechanism I examine is the belief systems of decision makers. Belief
systems manifest themselves by how rulers perceive threats. For this project, I am interested in
the rise of hard-liners, and the extent to which they are able to affect national policy. In order to
specify whether a regime is hard-line, I use Hagan’s typology of regime orientation. Hagan
categorizes regimes as moderate, pragmatic, militant, or radical, with hard-liners falling into the
last two categories. He suggests that these two political orientations are the most war prone and
notes, “Leaders with a militant orientation perceive the international system as so hostile that
interaction with adversaries is essentially zero-sum . . . Adversaries are viewed as having goals
that directly threaten the security, well-being, and international status of one’s own nation . . .
Confrontation . . . is meant to contain the threat and maintain the credibility of the nation’s
deterrent.” The radical orientation, according to Hagan, is one in which “Leaders . . . consider
adversaries to be evil actors who have a non-rational aggressiveness grounded in an expansionist
ideology, unrestrained nationalism, and/or severe domestic crises.”18
In understanding the importance of hard-liners, it is helpful to understand how they come
to play an important role in the decision making process. Vasquez defines hard-liners as
“…individuals who have a personal predisposition (due to their beliefs) to adopt a foreign policy
that is adamant in not compromising its goals and who argue in favor of the efficacy and
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legitimacy of threats and force.”19 Hard-liners are more willing to take risks than are
accommodationists. They are also more nationalistic, hold a militaristic view of the world, are
hostile toward and distrustful of other nations, and feel unable to control events.20 Vasquez
suggests that hard-liners exaggerate the nature of threats in order to gain the support of other
domestic elements and the public. He argues, “From the point of view of a decision maker facing
a crisis, it is certain that strong actions will be supported domestically, while anything less will
be criticized as being soft . . . In order to keep domestic support, leaders try to placate hardliners.” 21 Hagan adds to this discussion by suggesting that hard-liners may attempt to confront
domestic opposition by amplifying foreign threats. They do this with the intent of diverting
attention away from failing domestic policies, shoring up their political base, and mobilizing
wider public support.22 Hagan further argues that the ruling leadership may employ a strategy of
“political accommodation” by incorporating “the preferences expressed by the opposition…”23 If
the opposition is hard-line, this may be another avenue through which they can gain influence.
Either of the scenarios, diversionary theory or political accommodation, may help hard-liners
come to play an important role in the decision-making process.24
Hard-line policy is eventually codified into military doctrine and a set of war plans that
can be used when needed. The connection between hard-line policies and the military is an oftenstated relationship in the literature. For example, Scott Sagan argues that military leadership is
19
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more predisposed, than is civilian leadership, to viewing militarized preventive action as a viable
option. He argues that military leaders are socialized to see war as inevitable in the long run and
therefore desirable in the short term if it will result in fewer casualties or more certain victory.
They are, he suggests, less likely to seek nonmilitary solutions to international problems. In his
view, military leaders prefer offensive strategies to defensive strategies, and would much rather
be proactive on the battlefield than reactive. All of these factors, he suggests, should lead
military leaders to be in favor of militarized preventive action.25
Similarly, Alfred Vagts suggests that military officials are suspicious of an adversary’s
military capability and have a propensity to see danger as increasing. These calculations tend to
produce military solutions that favor the use of militarized preventive action. Civilian leadership,
on the other hand, is inclined to view military danger as not necessarily increasing, and subject to
neutralization through diplomacy. Vagts argues that civilian decision makers may be reluctant to
take any action designed to counter-balance a perceived threat for fear of triggering a war
initiated by the adversary.26
For this reason, I examine the policy making role of the military in each of my cases, and
in those cases where it is extreme, I look for evidence of hard-line policies. In this way, I search
for a correlation between the two. Ultimately, I predict that domestic elements that exhibit either
militant or radical orientations will advocate militarized preventive action, and the more militant
or radical the orientation, the more drastic the recommended action.
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I also suggest that as domestic elements within the dominant state evaluate a rising
power, they go through several phases. These phases are not necessarily sequential and may
occur simultaneously. In the first phase, domestic elements perceive some threat, in whatever
form, from a rising challenger. I argue that a diligent declining power will monitor all other
states to the best of its ability. Domestic elements may come to believe that the status quo will
get worse for their state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy. This may
be true even if the likelihood of conflict is low. They may perceive that their power and potential
is in relative decline vis-à-vis a particular rising challenger. I suggest that a challenge to a state’s
position in the international hierarchy can be enough to begin moving it down the road to
preventive action. Because states are risk acceptant when it comes to possible losses, according
to prospect theory—whether those losses are something tangible such as territory or whether
they are less tangible such as international ranking or prestige—states will likely engage in
preventive action.
In the second phase, domestic elements evaluate the nature of the threat and determine
their state’s level of vulnerability. By looking at the nature of the threat, domestic elements
attempt to determine whether the threat is of a military nature. Kupchan suggests, “Should elites
believe that conflict with the rising state is unavoidable, they may even resort to preventive war
in order to defeat the adversary while they still have the capability to do so.”27 I suggest,
however, that countering rising threats does not necessarily mean military action. If conflict is
perceived as likely, though the challenger is unlikely to initiate militarized action, nonmilitarized preventive action may be preferred by domestic elements in the dominant state. This
is not to say that non-militarized preventive action may not be used against a military threat, or
that militarized preventive action may not be used against a non-military threat. I am only
27
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suggesting that in most cases, military threats will be met with military action while non-military
threats will be dealt with in a non-military way.
I suggest that in determining the vulnerability of the state, domestic elements not only
look at the current power balance, but also the projected power balance. Even if the current
balance is favorable, if the projected balance is unfavorable, there will be a feeling of high
vulnerability.28 Domestic elements experience feelings of vulnerability if they perceive the future
as worse than the present. I assume that the dominant state still has superior power, but is fearful
that it will lose that superiority in the future. The level of vulnerability, therefore, refers to the
extent of that fear. Feelings of vulnerability increase as the future looks increasingly dim. If
domestic elements in the dominant state predict that the status quo will continue to worsen if
nothing is done, they will likely push for some type of action. If a challenger state were
perceived by the dominant state to be a threat, we would expect the dominant state to entertain
the notion of initiating preventive action.29 In essence, for the purposes of this research project,
the question that must be asked is whether the dominant state perceives a threat, and what form
that threat is likely to take.
For instances of non-militarized vulnerability, that is, instances of vulnerability that are
deemed by the domestic elements in the dominant state to most likely not result in military
28
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action, my predictions are similar to Kupchan’s predictions about low vulnerability. I argue that
under such conditions, domestic elites will favor non-militarized preventive action. They will not
feel the pressure to engage in military activity, and will not see the need for unnecessarily
provocative behavior. Diplomatic and economic incentives will be seen as a first step in reducing
threats. Kupchan suggests,
At low levels of vulnerability, elites . . . focus on strategic and economic considerations
in setting priorities; concern about reputation and resolve is far less prominent . . . Elites
believe that they have at their disposal the resources necessary to deal with external
threats. Strategic sufficiency enables them to respond relatively promptly to rising
external dangers . . . Elites believe that they will be able to attain their international
objectives. Even if war breaks out, elites believe that victory is likely; they are operating
in the realm of gains. They will therefore [in accordance with prospect theory] behave in
a risk-averse manner and pursue policies that ensure continued strategic sufficiency
and…security.30
However, my disagreement with Kupchan’s interpretation of what constitutes high
vulnerability (see footnote 28) leads to very different conclusions about what action domestic
elements will favor. In Kupchan’s view, high vulnerability means that the military balance of
power is perceived as having already shifted in favor of the challenger. Because of this, domestic
elements in declining states will attempt to avoid war, if possible. They will do so, even if it
means making concessions to the rising challenger. He suggests, “It might be possible to avoid
conflict altogether by meeting the demands of the adversary. At a minimum, accommodation
will postpone conflict and buy time for the defender to seek added resources and improve the
military balance.”31
While Kupchan is focused on how domestic elements perceive the current military
balance of power for explaining feelings of vulnerability, I suggest that feelings of military
vulnerability have a more nebulous origin. In my view, domestic elements feelings of military
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vulnerability stem not only from the current balance of military power as they perceive it, but
also from the anticipated balance of military power at some point in the future. If domestic
elements feel that they currently enjoy a favorable balance of military power, but that in the
future that balance may tip in favor of the challenger, they are likely to experience feelings of
high military vulnerability and are more likely to initiate militarized preventive action.
There are several problems with Kupchan’s interpretation of high vulnerability. The most
serious problem is that he views the balance of power as having already shifted and the
challenger as militarily superior to the dominant state. He, however, fails to answer the question
of why the dominant state would allow the challenger to gain superiority in the first place, even
though he acknowledges that elites have a good understanding of the balance of power.32 If that
were true, why would elites allow their state to be eclipsed by a threatening challenger? The
answer is that they would not. They would take some kind of preventive action in an attempt to
stop that from happening. Therefore, Kupchan’s premise that the challenger state is dominant is
flawed.
Another problem with Kupchan’s interpretation of high vulnerability is that he does not
address what happens if domestic elements perceive the future as being worse militarily. A
related issue is that he does not take into account the likelihood of conflict as perceived by
domestic elements. If conflict and decline are seen as inevitable, waiting until one’s position is
even weaker makes no sense. Kupchan tries to get around this by suggesting that in the time
bought through concessions to the challenger, the dominant state might build up or strengthen its
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alliance system. This is unconvincing since the possibility exists that any alliance formed by the
declining state could be countered by alliance building on the part of the challenger.33
Furthermore, I suggest that domestic elites can feel high vulnerability in either a military
or non-military dimension. Domestic elements examine both the nature of the threat, whether
military or non-military, and the anticipated balance of power. Level of vulnerability deals with
the latter.34 In the third phase of evaluating the rising power, conflict (either non-militarized or
militarized) may be seen increasingly as inevitable. Preventive action is particularly attractive to
domestic elements if conflict with an adversary is seen as highly likely or inevitable. I suggest
that the greater the likelihood of future conflict, as perceived by the dominant power, the greater
the likelihood that preventive action will be initiated. However, because of the decline of the
dominant state which serves as a crisis and the growing fear of inevitable conflict, the likelihood
increases that hard-liners with a militant political orientation will become the primary decision
makers or have privileged access to decision makers and will become influential in the formation
of policy.35
As the ill effects of hard-line policies mount, elites may begin to realize that their policies
are coming to jeopardize the security of their state. After a certain time lag, they may come to
appreciate that their beliefs are inconsistent with incoming information. Elite beliefs are fairly
sensitive to incoming and disconfirming information, and decision makers may eventually
33
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become aware of the need to adjust grand strategy.36 Unfortunately, elite beliefs, which are
relatively malleable, run into public opinion, or what Kupchan calls “strategic culture,” which is
more resistant to incoming information and to change. In fact, Kupchan suggests, “Vivid events,
such as war and crisis, can alter strategic culture relatively rapidly. Otherwise, shifts in collective
self-image and identity take place much more slowly than shifts in elite beliefs.”37 These
domestic elements then may become caught up in their own rhetoric, and may be unable to break
free of their self-destructive policies.
The concept of strategic culture is one of Kupchan’s more valuable ideas. He defines the
concept as:
The set of images that shapes a polity’s collective disposition toward the behavior of its
state in the international arena. It refers to the realm of national identity and consists of
the image and conceptions that determine how the polity understands . . . the nation’s
position in the international hierarchy . . . The images that constitute strategic culture
manifest themselves in and are propagated by numerous structures and mechanisms such
as speeches, governmental institutions, popular literature, educational curricula, and local
organizations. Strategic culture . . . provides a deeply embedded notion of what
constitutes national security.38
Kupchan demonstrates how hard-liners can become entrapped by the strategic culture
which they, at least in part, helped manufacture. He suggests that even though strategic images
may be created primarily for public consumption, they gradually spread through the elite
community. Over time, individual members of the elite community come to believe in the
strategic images that they repeatedly articulate before the public. This is especially true when
decision makers pursue policies consistent with the images they are propagating. In essence, they
come to believe their own rhetoric, and internalize the images they are producing. New members
of the elite community, and those not in the inner circle, unaware that prevailing strategic
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conceptions were originally crafted for propaganda purposes, become indoctrinated in the
strategic culture.
Over the longer term, elites may find it costly in political terms to refute precisely those
images that they had previously been championing. Because strategic culture can infuse the elite
community and its institutions with powerful images that override strategic logic, elites may not
even accept that they must reverse course despite incoming information pointing to the need to
do so. Furthermore, because elite beliefs adapt faster to new information than strategic culture,
the same images that once shaped public opinion and empowered decision makers eventually can
come to constrain them.39 In my case studies, I will examine the extent to which hard-liners are
prevented from changing course because they cannot break away from the strategic culture.
In the third phase, domestic elements, out of necessity, come to believe their own rhetoric
that war would not be costly, that war now would be less costly than war later, or that the
chances of winning a war now would be greater than the chances of winning a later war. The
expected relative costs of action are essential to understanding what, if any, preventive action a
state might initiate. Essentially, if preventive action is seen as not costly, it becomes more likely.
If the expected costs of a particular action are high, that action is less probable. However, even if
conflict now is seen as costly, but less so than conflict later, some sort of preventive action is
preferable to doing nothing. Because of these calculations, the state becomes risk acceptant and
advocates a strong offensive posture that can lead to militarized preventive action.40 This applies
to both war and preventive actions short of war. Similarly, if war is perceived as inevitable, and
war now is seen as inexpensive for the dominant state, it is likely to initiate preventive war in
39
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order to forestall any future threat from the rising challenger. If a limited military action will
reduce the future threat, such action might also be considered. A peripheral war will be an option
if domestic elements in the dominant power see such a sign of resolve as deterring the
challenger. General war against the challenger, on the other hand, may be seen as costly.
Therefore, this form of preventive action may be the last option, other than doing nothing, which
the dominant state will wish to take.
The perceived chances of favorable outcomes are also essential to understanding what, if
any, preventive action a state might initiate. Vasquez suggests, “All other factors being equal, the
side that thinks it will win will tend to be the initiator. It makes sense that, once a war is likely,
the side with the greater capability and commitment from allies will try to initiate the war, and
the side with less capability and weaker commitment from allies will try to delay the start of
war.”41 This would suggest that the dominant state should consider militarized preventive action
as soon as it perceives a rising challenger and determines that war is likely.
If military victory is likely, but less so in the future, some sort of militarized preventive
action would be logical. The ultimate form this takes depends on some of the other factors
discussed in this project. If military victory is uncertain at the present time, actions short of war
may be a more desirable option.
In essence, what is of importance for this project is to attempt to understand the extent to
which hard-liners are able to influence foreign policy, determine to what extent domestic
elements see threats as inevitable and/or military in nature, and to examine to what extent they
are constrained by the strategic culture. Strategic culture becomes important if previously
militant or radical hard-liners see evidence of a change, and try to move away from previous
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hard-line positions, but are unable to do so because they are constrained by the strategic culture
that they, in part, helped create.
Finally, the strength of some of these factors determines the form of the likely preventive
action. For example, the lower the costs of military action in the short term, the higher the
probability of militarized preventive action in the short term. Similarly, the higher the perceived
chances of success, the more likely the initiation of preventive action. The decision-making
process as outlined above can be broken down as shown in Appendix A.

Dependent Variable: Form of Preventive Action
As mentioned earlier, a real deficiency in the preventive literature is the lack of attention
scholars have paid to preventive action short of war. By conceiving preventive action as a series
of categories, it is possible to develop a model that questions why preventive action takes a
particular form in a given case. The form of the preventive action then becomes the dependent
variable in the DPMP. Below is a discussion outlining the possible responses by a dominant state
to a rising challenger.
The first category, that of acquiescence (doing nothing), is not really a form of preventive
action. In this case, the dominant state simply allows the power shift to occur. Nonetheless, it is
included here because it is a possible outcome of a power shift, and one that occurs in my case
studies. The United Kingdom’s response to the rise of the United States—removing the Royal
Navy from the Western Hemisphere and turning over security of the hemisphere to the U.S.—is
an example of this kind of behavior. The United State’s acquiescence to the rise of Japan in the
1860s and 1870s also is a demonstration of this category. Both of these examples are explored in
detail in later chapters.
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The second category, accommodation, is a mixed strategy of carrots and sticks on the part
of the dominant state. The dominant state takes actions to stymie the rise of the challenger, but it
is not willing to confront the challenger with overly coercive instruments. This category includes
economic and diplomatic overtures, but of a relatively benign nature. An example of this type of
action might be if a dominant state promoted the signing of treaties that prevent the spread of a
particular type of military capability. The 1930 London naval disarmament agreement between
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan is an example of this. It can also include
attempts to appease or negotiate a settlement between the dominant state and the challenger. For
example, the Soviet Union negotiated a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany while Germany
was rising but still inferior in terms of power.42
The third category is that of sustained coercive/confrontational diplomacy. This can
include the threat or actual use of embargoes and blockades to prevent a state from achieving
some military capability. It also includes the formation of alliances against a particular
challenger. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, would fall
within this category. It also includes the use of actual military resources to send a signal to the
challenger that any continued unfriendly action will result in militarized conflict. When the
United States sent three warships to Samoa in 1888 to respond to perceived German aggression
there, the United States was sending a signal to Bismarck.
The final category is that of militarized preventive action. This category entails several
sub categories such as limited military action where military violence is used, but on a limited
basis. The goal here is to prevent the challenger state from achieving a specific military
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capability.43 A second sub category of preventive war is peripheral war. This type of war is
similar to preventive diplomacy in that it is a signal, but in this case, it can be a signal to allies as
well as the challenger. In this case, many military resources are utilized, but the target is not the
challenger itself. Instead, a proxy target or third party country is used to demonstrate resolve.
One goal, as seen by the dominant state, is to ensure that resources on the periphery are not
accessible to the challenger. A second and perhaps even more important motive is that the
demonstration of resolve will deter opponents and shore up allies. These peripheral areas often
become significant not so much because of their actual military or economic importance, but
because their “loss” to the challenger would represent a loss of prestige for the declining state
that could open the possibility of defection of allies. Kupchan suggests, “Elites believe in the
need to demonstrate resolve because they reason that they can offset insufficiency of material
resources by bolstering reputation and prestige. Elites seek to rely on these intangible
components of power to compensate for the relative loss of the material components of power.”44
As a result, peripheral areas, and the wars fought over them, tend to become more important than
their material worth would suggest. The U.S.’s involvement in Korea and Vietnam during the
Cold War are examples of this classification of preventive action.45
The final sub category is that of general war. General wars are much less limited in scope
than the other forms of war and are targeted directly at the challenger. General war is likely to be
much more costly than other types of preventive action.46 It involves the targeting of multiple
sites where research and development, production, and storage of a particular capability are
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being conducted. It may involve a land invasion or substantial air and sea bombardment. General
war often has as its goal broader implications than other types of war, possibly including the
eradication and replacement of the rival government.47
With the initial proposed typology in mind, the case studies are scored on a scale from
acquiescence to general war, using the criteria outlined above. I then examine each case, using
the method of process tracing, to determine to what extent each causal mechanism exists, or what
form each causal mechanism takes. The validity of my hypotheses and model are then based on
the assessment of the cases.48

Testing the DPMP
In order to test my model, I have generated eleven hypotheses and eleven corresponding
standardized questions to ask of each case.49 The last two hypotheses and the last two questions
help compare the DPMP’s predictions against those of two other models. The first of these
models tests the predictions of offensive realism, a systemic structural model. The second model
tests the predictions of a democratic peace model focused on the domestic structure of both states
in a dyad. I suggest that the DPMP outperforms both of these models.
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My research did not reveal any outbreaks of preventive general war. This suggests that these instances may be
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Hypotheses
In order to answer my research questions and test the DPMP, eleven hypotheses have
been generated. These are as follows:
H1. The greater the constraints on internal power, the less likely the initiation of militarized
preventive action.
H2. The stronger the domestic political constraints, the lower the likelihood of militarized
preventive action.
H3. The more militant or radical the ruler belief system, the higher the probability of militarized
preventive action. States in which hard-liners emerge and gain dominance over the decision
making process are more likely to engage in preventive action.

The following six hypotheses evaluate different aspects of ruler belief systems, primarily
in terms of perception.
H4. Threats that are perceived as militarized in nature are more likely to result in militarized
preventive action than are threats that are perceived to be non-military in nature.
H5. The greater the perception that conflict is likely or inevitable, the greater the likelihood of
preventive action.
H6. States that believe that conflict will not be costly are most likely to initiate preventive action.
H7. States that believe that militarized conflict now, while costly, will be less costly than
militarized conflict later, are still motivated to initiate preventive action, though they may be
more likely to choose non-militarized preventive action.
H8. States that believe that the chances of winning a war now are greater than winning a war later
are more likely to initiate preventive war than states that do not hold this belief.
H9. The greater the perception of a deteriorating status quo, the greater the probability of
preventive action.
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These last two hypotheses address the two models against which the DPMP is being
tested.
H10. Offensive realism predicts that unbalanced multipolar systems are more likely to generate
instances of militarized preventive action than are any other type of system.50
H11. According to Schweller, democracies are unlikely to initiate militarized preventive action,
but may choose accommodation or may form a defensive alliance against rising challengers.
Non-democracies are likely to engage in militarized preventive action against rising
challengers.51

From these hypotheses, the following standardized questions have been generated and will be
applied to the cases:
1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained?
2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained?
3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system?
4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)?
5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable?
6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly?
7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war later?
8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would be greater
than the chances of winning a later war?
9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their state if
the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy?
10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system? I will use this question to
determine what the offensive realist model predicts about the states’ behavior.
11) What type of government exists in each state, i.e., are either or both democracies? I will
use this question to determine what Schweller’s model predicts about the states’
behavior.
50
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These eleven hypotheses and standardized questions allow me to test my cases in order to
answer the basic research questions of this project. I am not suggesting that my hypotheses and
questions are the only conceivably valid ones. I readily concede that many more hypotheses and
questions are possible and perhaps desirable. I do hope, however, that the reader will approach
this work with an open mind, recognizing that this is a first cut at forming a new understanding
of the initiation of preventive action. If evidence supporting these hypotheses is found in the
cases, it will suggest that the theory is credible. Furthermore, such findings would validate my
conceptualization of preventive action as taking different forms. The research regarding the case
studies will constitute the bulk of this project.
It is also necessary to address whether alternative models make the same or different
predictions on processes and outcomes in a given case. In general, the strongest possible
supporting evidence for a model is a case that is least likely for that model but most likely for all
alternative models, and one where at the same time the alternative models collectively predict an
outcome very different from that of the least likely model. In such a case, if the least likely
model turns out to be accurate, it deserves full credit for a prediction that cannot also be ascribed
to other models (though it could still be spurious and due to an as-yet undiscovered theory). This
might be called a toughest test case.52
The strongest possible evidence weakening a model is when a case is most likely for that
model and for alternative models, and all these models make the same prediction. In such a case,
if the prediction proves wrong, the failure of the model cannot be attributed to the countervailing
influence of variables from other models (again, left-out variables can still weaken the strength
of this inference). This might be called an easiest test case. If a model and all the alternatives fail
in such a case, it should be considered a deviant case and might prove fruitful for looking for an
52
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undiscovered causal path or variable that might be worthy of theoretical elaboration. Cases
usually fall somewhere between being most and least likely for particular models.53
I will test my Domestic Politics Model of Prevention against two other models derived
from the literature. The first of these models is suggested by offensive realism.54 A real weakness
of this model is that it only predicts preventive action in binomial terms: either war or no war. To
supplement this model, I also utilize a second model derived from the democratic peace
literature, particularly Schweller’s article “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are
Democracies More Pacific?” In this seminal article, Schweller suggests a typology of when
states are likely to engage in preventive war, and when they are likely to take actions short of
war.55 I suggest that my model does a superior job at predicting when states are likely to engage
in preventive action, and what form that action is likely to take.

Alternative Model 1: Offensive Realism as a Structural Model of Preventive War
In order to test the DPMP, I compare its predictive power to that of two other models.
The first of these models examines the structure of the international system. The balance of
power within the international system—whether it is bipolar, balanced multipolar, or unbalanced
multipolar—has long been considered the primary factor in determining whether preventive war
will occur. I test whether it is able to predict whether preventive action occurs, and if it is able to
predict what form any preventive action takes. If it is able to do so, the importance of the DPMP
will be weakened. On the other hand, if this model proves inadequate in its predictions, and the
DPMP proves more accurate, my ideas are given more importance.
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John Mearsheimer, with his theory of offensive realism, presents a refined picture of the
international system. He suggests that major variations of balance in the international system can
affect a nation’s calculations regarding the efficacy of war. Mearsheimer proposes a variety of
systemic possibilities ranging from balanced bipolar systems to unbalanced multipolar systems.56
He suggest that war is most likely to occur in a system in which a potential hegemon is
emerging, what he calls an unbalanced multipolarity. On the other hand, war is least likely in a
bipolar system in which two powers have roughly equal amounts of power. In between these two
extremes is what he calls balanced multipolarity in which several states have roughly equal
power, and there is no superior state. He suggests that in such a case, war is more likely than in a
bipolar system, but less likely than in an unbalanced multipolar system.57
I use Mearsheimer’s conceptualization of the polarity of the system in order to test my
model. If preventive wars are initiated at a higher rate during periods of unbalanced
multipolarity, less so during balanced multipolarity, and still less during bipolarity, the offensive
realism model will be strengthened. Mearsheimer lists the polarity of the system as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 (1 year), balanced multipolarity
Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815 (22 years), unbalanced multipolarity
Nineteenth century, 1815-1902 (88 years), balanced multipolarity
Kaiserreich era, 1903-18 (16 years), unbalanced multipolarity
Interwar years, 1919-38 (20 years), balanced multipolarity
Nazi era, 1939-45 (6 years), unbalanced multipolarity
Cold War, 1945-1990 (46 years), bipolarity58
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I suggest that a model based on domestic factors will yield better predictions than one
based on systemic mechanisms alone. One serious drawback of the offensive realism model is
that it is not concerned with preventive action short of war.

Alternative Model 2: Schweller’s Democratic Peace as a Model of Preventive War/Action
The second alternative model I use to test the DPMP is based on Schweller’s predictions
about the domestic structure of states and proclivity to initiate preventive war. Schweller argues
that it is the internal domestic structure—whether democratic or not—that determines how a
declining dominant power responds to a rising challenger. He concludes that when faced with a
democratic rising challenger, democracies do not initiate preventive war, but instead
accommodate the challenger. When it comes to non-democratic challengers, however,
democratic states attempt to form defensive alliance systems. Also of interest, though, is that he
leaves open the possibility that a democracy may initiate preventive war against a nondemocratic challenger if the dominant democratic state believes that such a war would not be
long or costly. Meanwhile, non-democratic states, when faced with a challenger (whether
democratic or not), will either form a defensive alliance or will initiate preventive war.
Accommodation is not in their nature. In all, Schweller suggests that there are four possible
responses by a dominant state facing a challenger: 1) accommodation, 2) internal balancing—
which is difficult for democracies because of the costs involved in building up military power, 3)
alliance formation, and 4) preventive war.59 In sum, Schweller’s model is important both because
he examines the internal structure of states, and because he suggests a range of responses by the
dominant state. If Schweller’s model accurately predicts the behavior of states in my cases, the
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importance of my model will be weakened. I predict, however, that my DPMP will outperform
both Schweller’s model and the offensive realism model.

Methodology
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett have devised a set of interrelated methods that
are useful in dissecting the causal mechanisms of preventive action.60 The method of structured,
focused comparison utilizes case studies, process tracing, and typological theory. These tools are
examined in this section and explanation is given as to how they will be utilized in this project. I
examine several cases of power shifts, both shifts that resulted in preventive action of different
stripes, as well as cases that did not result in preventive action at all. These case studies are
examined using the process tracing method within a structured-focused comparison framework,
with a final goal of developing a typological theory of prevention that explains why preventive
action sometimes occurs and other times does not, as well as explaining why preventive action
takes the form it does in any given case.

The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison
George and Bennett suggest that comparative case studies can use within-case analysis of
individual cases as well as case comparisons to assess and refine existing theories, and more
generally, to develop empirical theory. The method of doing so is “structured” in that the same
standardized, general questions are asked of each case in order to guide data collection, thereby
making possible systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases. The
method is “focused” in that it deals with only certain aspects of the cases; that is, a selective
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theoretical focus guides the analysis of the cases. Not all the theoretically interesting aspects of a
case can be usefully addressed in a single study.61 In response to these methodological demands,
I have developed a standardized set of questions that focus on the theoretically important aspects
of my cases.

The Case Study Method
George and Bennett suggest that the case study method is particularly useful in
specifying and measuring complex qualitative variables. Complex causal relations involve
interacting causal variables that are not independent of each other. This method provides useful
tools with which researchers can inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, and complex
interaction effects. The case study method allows the researcher to develop contingent
generalizations or typological theories. When done correctly, case studies allow the researcher to
identify and test “causal mechanisms”—the social or political processes through which variables
exert causal effects.62 I use this method because the causes of preventive action are complex, as
will be demonstrated in this study.
In examining preventive action, a power shift is a necessary but not sufficient condition.63
Without a power shift, an action cannot be described as preventive. As Levy suggests, a power
shift is an independent variable, but not all power shifts lead to war. I argue that not all power
shifts even lead to preventive action. Some power shifts are met with inaction. For example,
Russia and then the Soviet Union often chose to take no action against rising powers. The United
States also allowed the United Kingdom and Japan to rise in relative power after World War II.
61
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These are only two examples of several presented in this research where the dominant declining
power took no action against a rising challenger.
There are causal mechanisms that determine whether, in the presence of a power shift,
preventive action will be initiated, and what form that preventive action will take. These causal
mechanisms, and the resulting outcomes, are the subject of this study. Because of the complexity
of these causal mechanisms, this study is necessarily concerned with the probability of a given
form of preventive action. My model, therefore, is not deterministic in that if conditions A and B
are present, outcome C will occur. Instead, I am suggesting that if A and B exist, there is a
probability that C will occur, and that probability is higher than outcome D.
George and Bennett note that case study methods can address the issue of equifinality—
where the same outcome can arise through different causal paths in which there may be no single
non-trivial necessary or sufficient condition. In other words, different mixes of causal variables
can have the same effect. Case studies can also address the issue of multifinality—where
contingent generalizations explicitly outline the differing background conditions under which the
same value of a causal mechanism can have different effects.64 Both conditions occur in my case
studies. For example equifinality is demonstrated by the fact that both the United Kingdom and
Russia engaged in non-militarized preventive action when faced by militarized threats. The UK
engaged in a naval buildup and then a redeployment of naval forces to contain the Russian threat
at the turn of the twentieth century. The Russians, on the other hand, chose to develop closer ties
with France in the 1890s to balance against a rising Germany. Both of these are examples of nonmilitarized preventive action, but they come about along different causal pathways. To
demonstrate multifinality, we can examine the American reaction to the militarized threats posed
by the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s versus its reaction to the militarized threats from the
64
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Soviet Union after the Second World War. In looking at the causal paths in the models in
Appendix A, we can see that the causal paths are the same until we get to the question of status
quo. At this point, the models diverge. Nonetheless, for the variables “nature of threat” and
“likelihood of conflict” the values are the same but ultimately different policy prescriptions are
reached.65
When choosing any method for research, the researcher must answer the question of why
one method is chosen over another. One advantage of the case study method is that the
likelihood that relevant variables will be left out is lower than for statistical methods. This is
particularly important in the early stages of theory development, which I believe preventive
action studies are in. Case study methods allow for the inductive identification of variables as
well as their deductive specification. Indeed, one of the most visible and important contributions
of case study methods has been to identify causal variables that have been left out or
insufficiently examined by studies relying on purely deductive theories or statistical methods.
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the variables that play a part in the initiation
of different forms of preventive action.66 I approach this research project from the standpoint that
prior theories of preventive war/action have focused almost exclusively on systemic or structural
variables, and have not taken an inductive approach. In this dissertation, I identify alternative
causal mechanisms that will explain preventive action in a more comprehensive way.
Having settled on the case study method, then, the next task is to select the case or cases
which the researcher will examine. George and Bennett suggest that case selection is an
opportunistic as well as a structured process. Researchers should look for whether the addition of
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one or a few cases to a study might provide useful comparisons or allow inferences on additional
types of cases. The primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research
objective of the study, whether it includes theory testing and/or heuristic purposes. The research
objective must be integrated into decisions on whether the research strategy should include one
or a few case studies, case comparisons and/or within-case analysis, and so on. The cases must
be selected to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem.67
The case study method is sensitive to the manner in which cases are selected. A single
crucial or nearly crucial case can strongly support or undermine a theory. A crucial case is one
that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or conversely,
must not fit equally well with any rule contrary to that proposed. In a crucial case it must be
extremely difficult to dismiss any finding contrary to the theory as simply “deviant”—due to
chance, or the operation of unconsidered factors. Studies of deviant cases are particularly useful
for identifying new variables or causal mechanisms. By definition, deviant cases have outcomes
that existing theories do not anticipate. George and Bennett note that truly crucial cases rarely
occur in nature or the social world and suggest the alternative of studying “most likely” and
“least likely” cases.68
In a most likely case, the independent variable(s) posited by a theory are at values that
strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome. In a least likely case, the independent
variables in a theory are at values that only weakly predict an outcome or predict a low
magnitude outcome. Most likely cases are tailored to cast strong doubt on theories if the theories
do not fit, while least likely cases can help strengthen support for theories that fit even cases
where they should be weak. One useful means determining whether a case is most likely or least
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likely is for case study researchers to include a typological table that shows the values of
variables in the case(s) studied across competing hypotheses. It is important to consider not only
whether a case is most or least likely for a given theory, but whether it is at the same time most
or least likely for alternative theories, and a typological table helps identify which variables in a
case may favor alternative theories.69 For this project, I suggest that the British response to a
rising United States and the U.S. response to a rising Soviet Union after World War II are critical
or most likely cases. These will be outlined further in the case studies of the dissertation.
As noted throughout this dissertation, preventive action can refer to a full spectrum of
responses to a rising challenger. In order to demonstrate the full range of preventive action, I
have surveyed the historical record and chosen several cases that fit within my framework.
Necessarily, I am unable to defend the cases presented here as a scientific sample. Instead, the
cases I have chosen represent the range of preventive action in the Domestic Politics Model of
Prevention. The three cases I have chosen, I would argue, also represent three of the most
important episodes of the past two hundred years. The decline of great powers and super powers
has shaped global politics during this period. I purposefully limited my cases to the modern era,
and I limited the cases to the great powers.70 This necessarily means European states, with the
addition of the United States and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
One of the first questions that must be addressed about the case studies is “Why these
particular cases?” One answer to that question lies in my desire for precision. I wanted to use
objective data by which I could gage the rise and fall of states.71 I did not want to rely on the
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observations of historians to make this determination. A second reason I decided to limit my
cases to the “modern” great powers is because I believe, as Stephen Van Evera suggests, more is
to be learned about the current state of affairs in the international system from the more recent
past than from the ancient world. The study of modern times may provide a better understanding
of how to prevent future clashes since the causes of modern conflict are more prone to recur.72
The desire for objectivity and precision, and the belief that more applicable knowledge
was to be gained from modern examples made me immediately rule out studying ancient
civilizations such as ancient China, ancient India, the Ottoman Empire, the ancient Greeks, the
Roman Empire, the Aztecs, or the Mayans. While rough estimates of power could be derived
from historical accounts, my aim was to be as precise as possible when measuring the relative
rise and decline of states. For similar reasons I chose not to use other eras that might have made
logical sense.
For example, 1648 may have been a natural choice with the ending of the Thirty Years’
War and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. The date 1519 might also seem an apt starting
point. With the crowning of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor over all Habsburg lands; one
could argue this date would be a valid point of origin. Similarly, one could argue that the signing
of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 might be a logical starting point. With the signing of the
treaty, Spain retreated into the second tier of states, ending a push for hegemony by the
combined Habsburg forces of Spain and Austria. Nonetheless, I chose to examine states since
1816, because of the availability of objective measures of state power and the belief that more
recent examples of preventive action would provide better predictors of future preventive action.
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Since I am interested in great power preventive action, by definition any action in my
case studies must include at least one of the great powers.73 Based on a survey of historical cases
that fit my criteria, I have chosen three cases that I believe are both representative of preventive
action in the modern era and are interesting examples. These constitute chapters 4 through 6 of
the research project. Chapter 4 traces the decline of the United Kingdom and its response to
challenges from Russia, the United States, Germany, and Japan. Chapter 5 examines the decline
of Russia and the Soviet Union and its responses to rising challengers. Chapter 6 studies the
decline of the United States vis-à-vis Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom from
1849 to 1996.
I acknowledge that the historical periods under examination are complex, and that
interpretations other than those offered in this study are possible. I do ask the reader, however, to
suspend his or her preconceptions and to remain open to the evidence and interpretations
presented here. Furthermore, this project is primarily concerned with how states come to the
decision to initiate a particular level of preventive action. Therefore, the case studies presented
here focus mainly on decision-making conducted during peacetime, not on wartime planning.
The reader will doubtlessly notice that I spend very little time discussing the causes of
rising states and declining power. These elements have been covered in detail in other studies—
particularly the literature on power transition theory. The purpose of this study is not to explore
the underlying causes of decline or ascendance, but instead it is to understand what decision
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makers do with the knowledge that their state is in decline and that challengers are rising. I want
to understand why decision makers in declining states react the way they do to rising challengers.
A second issue facing researchers in the case study method, in addition to that of case
selection, is the problem of reconciling conflicting interpretations of the same cases. As
mentioned earlier, I have avoided one problem—that of interpreting state decline and
ascendance—by using objective data obtained from the Correlates of War Project. Additionally,
one remedy to this quandary includes identifying and addressing factual errors, disagreements,
and misunderstandings.74 In order to overcome these issues, I rely on standard scholarly
historical works, and where disagreements do emerge, I will acknowledge and attempt to
reconcile them.
I approach my cases in two ways. On the one hand, I compare cases with similar
outcomes, i.e., cases that end in war, in order to identify the causal mechanisms associated with
such outcomes. On the other hand, I compare dissimilar cases, i.e., cases that end in war and
cases that end in action short of militarized conflict, in order to identify the conditions and causal
mechanisms that served to account for this difference in outcome. Through these comparisons I
hope to isolate the causal mechanisms that lead policy makers to choose specific preventive
action policies.

Process Tracing
As mentioned earlier, the presence of the preventive motivation is essential in being able
to label any action as “preventive.” In order to systematically examine my cases and search for
evidence of preventive motivation, I utilize the method of process tracing. This technique is
valuable because it “link[s] theory and empirical work by using the observable implications of a
74
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theory to suggest new observations that should be made to evaluate the theory.”75 The use of
process tracing can strengthen the inferences that would otherwise have to be made on the basis
of comparative methods alone. It can permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even
a single case76
Process tracing, according to George and Bennett, is the method of looking at the
observable variables along a hypothesized causal process through which a causal mechanism
exerts an observed causal effect. It is an attempt to trace empirically the temporal and possibly
causal sequence of events within a case that intervene between independent variables and
observed outcomes.77 Stephen Van Evera explains the method of process tracing as follows:
“The investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial
case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects
independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the
investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.” Furthermore, “Evidence that a given
stimulus caused a given response can be sought in the sequence and structure of events and/or in
the testimony of actors explaining why they acted as they did.”78 It is for this reason that I will
examine the primary actors within the dominant state in each case.
Process tracing may help identify which interactions and potentially causal mechanisms
in imperfectly matched cases can be ruled out as having causal significance. In other words,
process tracing can test whether seemingly causal mechanisms are spurious and to uncover
supposedly unrelated variables that may in fact be causal. George and Bennett have laid out the
75
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criteria by which hypotheses can be tested. If all but one of the causal mechanisms that differ
between the two cases can be ruled out via process tracing, a stronger (though still not definitive)
basis exists for attributing causal significance to the remaining causal mechanism. If process
tracing shows that a single step in the hypothesized causal chain in a case is not as predicted,
then an unmodified version of the hypothesis cannot explain that case, even if it does explain
most or even all other cases. Similarly, if there is only one intervening step in the hypothesized
process, and this is observed to be untrue in the case, the hypothesis cannot explain that case. If a
complex causal hypothesis involves several steps and even one of these is observed to be
inoperative, the hypothesis cannot explain the case. If the hypothesized result does not
materialize, even though a given causal mechanism was present, this would suggest that either
the causal mechanism is not sufficient or there is a spurious relationship.79 These criteria will be
used in my cases.
Process tracing tests whether a proposed explanation, or causal mechanism, is consistent
with the evidence in a given case, and by extension whether the same causal process might apply
to a category of cases with similar causal mechanisms. It can help identify a specific causal
process that may explain an instance of a particular phenomenon. Process tracing can be
especially useful in determining whether the phenomenon being investigated is characterized by
equifinality. Process tracing can identify paths to an outcome, and can point out causal
mechanisms that were left out in the initial comparison of cases.80 Furthermore, Van Evera
suggests, “Process predictions are often unique—no other theories predict the same pattern of
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events or the same actor testimony on their motives—hence process tracing often offers strong
tests of a theory.”81
In sum, process tracing will assist me in determining to what extent each of my predicted
causal mechanisms is effecting the foreign policy decisions of domestic elements. In addition, it
will help me discard any causal mechanisms that might be spurious in relation to the type of
preventive action policies that are eventually chosen. Process tracing will also allow me to
discover potentially important causal mechanisms that I have omitted from my initial model.

Typological Theories
Case studies, through the use of process tracing, can be used inductively to develop and
refine typological theories through a “building block” approach that maps out the alternative
causal paths to the outcome of interest. A typological theory is a typology that is specified in
terms of an underlying theory or set of theories that address not only how these causal
mechanisms act singly but how they behave in specified conjunctive combinations. Each case
potentially provides a new component in the construction of a comprehensive typological theory.
Differentiated explanations of the outcomes of the cases that are all instances of the class of
events being investigated become a part of a cumulative typological theory, or a “repertoire of
causal mechanisms” of that phenomenon.82
The aim is to proceed incrementally toward the goal of developing a typological theory.
George and Bennett suggest that by opting for this more flexible strategy, the investigator may
gradually build a typology and a typological theory via empirical analysis of cases within a
theoretical framework. Concern over the risk of a premature commitment to a well-defined,
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comprehensive typology, one that may prove inadequate after much research on a set of cases
selected for that typology, plays a role in encouraging a more gradual approach. For example, an
empirical approach relying on historical explanations for different cases of preventive action
enables the investigator to discover more general types of preventive action, some of which may
encompass several cases, and to identify generic explanations for each type of preventive action.
The different causal patterns of preventive action become part of a typological theory. Such a
differentiated theory of prevention is significantly different from, and should be more useful
than, a theory that attempts to provide a single explanation for all preventive action. It should
also prove more valuable than systemic and structural theories that examine only preventive war.
Typological theories contribute to the development of a rich, differentiated theory on the
phenomenon in question, rather than a very general theory.83
Typological theories are useful in showing that different combinations of causal
mechanisms may interact to produce similar outcomes on the dependent variable. The most
appropriate form for modeling the complexity of equifinality and multifinality is often that of
typological theories. The resulting theories usually focus on interactions among combinations of
causal mechanisms, rather than causal mechanisms considered alone or isolated through means
of statistical control. Typological theorizing, as opposed to the simple use of typologies, pushes
theorists to try to anticipate and explain interaction effects, although there is no guarantee that
they will do so adequately. Typological theories address the problem of equifinality directly,
acknowledging and even taking advantage of the fact that there may be alternative causal paths
that lead to the same or similar outcomes. The development and refinement of typological
theories, as opposed to typologies, is a key goal of theorizing on social phenomena characterized
by complex interactions among numerous causal mechanisms that may be causal even though
83
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they are not necessary or sufficient conditions. They may explain how the same level of a
particular causal mechanism can lead to different outcomes depending on the values of other
causal mechanisms, if the goal is to explain the causal powers of a single causal mechanism.84
Typological theories identify generalized pathways, whether the path in question has
occurred only once, a thousand times, or is merely hypothesized as a potential path that has not
yet occurred at all. Specific pathways can be explained by known causal mechanisms. According
to George and Bennett, examples of causal mechanisms include: evolutionary selection,
socialization, emulation, collective action problems, principle-agent problems, problems of
credible commitments, two-level games and learning, and functional forms (such as linearity,
path dependency, tipping points, geometric progressions, equifinality, multifinality, and
asymptotic limits).85
Typological theories contribute to specific case study research designs and the selection
of cases in the following ways. If two cases are to be regarded as typologically similar, or are
common in the values of all the causal mechanisms and thus occupy the same cell in the
typology, then they should have similar outcomes. This offers the most basic test of the validity
of the specification of the type. If the outcomes of typologically similar cases differ, then the
researcher should check for measurement error and for the presence of probabilistic causal
processes. To the extent that these can be ruled out, a new causal mechanism (or several) in
which the cases differ may need to be added to the typology and linked to a causal theory that
can then be generalized. For example, if two states in my cases show similar values on the causal
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mechanisms, they should initiate similar preventive actions. If the outcomes are not similar, I
may need to examine other factors that might be present.86
A second research design involves two cases that occupy adjacent cells in the typology
and thus differ only in the outcome and in one causal mechanism. If exogenous causal
mechanism can be ruled out as a source of variation in the outcome (admittedly not a simple
matter), then differences in the outcome can be attributed to the one causal mechanism in the
typology on which the cases differ. This method uses a typological theory to establish a
controlled comparison of similar cases.87
For each case, I will determine which domestic elements are the most powerful inside the
dominant state and their ability to shape foreign policy, particularly if they have preventive
action leanings. I will also examine the extent to which hard-liners dominate the decision making
process of the dominant state. Furthermore, I will assess the threat or perceived threat as seen by
the leadership of the dominant state. I will also examine the domestic elements’ perceptions
regarding the timing of conflict. From this discussion, I have developed a preliminary typology
(see Appendix B) that will guide the elements I examine in my process tracing of the case
studies.
In this chapter, I have detailed the components of the Domestic Politics Model of
Prevention. I have also explored several different theoretical models, which I will use to test the
validity of my own model. In the next four chapters, I explore my cases using the theoretical
framework and methods developed in this chapter.
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Chapter Four
The Decline of the United Kingdom
This chapter examines the decline of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis several rising powers
from 1816 to 1914, with a focus on the period 1895-1905.1 The first section of this chapter is
meant to serve as a general overview of British decline. The rest of the chapter will delve into
particular aspects of Britain‘s relative decline and the specific threats to its dominance of the
international system.
In 1870, only England and Belgium could be described as ―highly industrialized.‖2 By
1900, this was no longer the case, with Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan all
embarking on the path of industrialization. In the cases of Germany and the United States,
Britain had been surpassed in many measures of industrial power. Even in the area of world
trade, in which Britain had long dominated, there was a measure of relative decline.3 This is
reflected in Britain‘s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score which trended
downward after 1816.4

1

I focus on this time period for several reasons: 1) it seems to be representative of the larger trend of British decline,
2) there is very good documentation regarding strategic decisions taken by a variety of British leaders during this
period, and 3) it became clear during the research process that covering the entire 1816-1962 time frame was simply
not practical.
2
F. H. Hinsely, ed., The Cambridge Modern History: Volume Xi Material Progress and World-Wide Problems
1870-1898, XIV vols., vol. XI, The New Cambridge Modern History (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962),
2. Unfortunately, Hinsely does not define what exactly he means by the term ―highly industrialized.‖
3
Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 - 1905 (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 24. This situation is reflected in the National Material Capabilities
index. For this chapter, I rely heavily on Friedberg‘s analysis of this time period. His book is the most concise and
yet detailed account I have found. I supplement it throughout the chapter, but his book clearly forms the backbone of
this chapter.
4
As mentioned in chapter three, in order to assess power shifts after 1816, I use the Composite Index of National
Capability (CINC) score derived from the National Material Capabilities (v3.02) index. This is part of the Correlates
of War (COW) project and can be accessed at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
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Power Relations
United Kingdom vis-à-vis the United States
From 1816 until 1892, the United Kingdom was dominant over the United States.
Friedberg notes, ―In the early 1870s Britain was averaging £230 million in exports per year,
greater than the combined total of the United States and Germany.‖5 Despite its dominant
position, the UK was declining in terms of relative power vis-à-vis the United States during this
period. The only significant exception to this was between 1865 and 1867 when the Unites States
was in the wake of its civil war. By 1868, the UK‘s downward slide was once again apparent. In
1892, the United States‘ CINC score reached parity with the United Kingdom for the first time.
From 1893 to 1896, the United Kingdom regained its position as the dominant power between
the two, but just barely. In 1897, the United States reemerged as the dominant state, and has held
that position ever since. See Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1
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United Kingdom vis-à-vis Prussia/Germany
Closer to the home island, Germany had emerged as the biggest threat to the Empire by
the early 1900s. Germany‘s CINC score first overtook Britain in 1905, and Germany held the
lead from 1905 to 1915. From 1916 to 1918, the two countries oscillated between dominant and
challenger, but it was clear that Germany was becoming a powerhouse on the Continent.
Germany‘s economy overtook that of Britain and Germany‘s population, which had been 39
million in 1870, had ballooned to 65 million in 1913. During the same period, Britain‘s
population had only increased from 31 million to 46 million. In 1870, Britain‘s GDP had been 40
percent higher than Germany‘s. By 1913, Germany‘s was 6 percent higher than Britain‘s. In
1880, Britain‘s share of world manufacturing production was 23 percent while Germany‘s was 8
percent. In 1913, the figures were 14 and 15 percent respectively. 6 In the wake of the First
World War, however, Britain retook the lead from Germany until 1934, at which time Germany
again gained dominance until the end of World War II. Germany was divided at the end of the
war, and it was not until 1990 that a unified Germany reemerged on the international scene.
When Germany did resurface, it was dominant over Britain. It has maintained its superiority
since that time. See Figure 4.2 below.

6

Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New
York: Basic Books, 2002), 240. See also Austen Albu‘s introduction to E. E. Williams, Made in Germany (Sussex,
England: The Harvester Press, 1973).
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Figure 4.2
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Britain‘s decline was apparent to the British press, and thus to British decision makers
and the British public. Friedberg notes, ―In 1896 Ernest Williams, a journalist for the New
Review, tapped a deep wellspring of anxiety over this new situation with articles and, later, a
best-selling book. Britain was pictured as being inundated with German machines, tools,
household goods, and even children‘s toys.‖ Several years later another book entitled The
American Invaders reemphasized the concern about British decline.7
In August 1896, the Board of Trade, under the leadership of Charles Ritchie, undertook a
detailed study comparing Britain with its principal competitors. This report, which focused on
France, Germany, and the United States, concluded that Britain was still ahead of the United
States and Germany in its ―power for manufacture of export,‖ but the two competitors were
gaining ground and were experiencing faster growth. Even more troubling, was the finding that,
barring the outbreak of war, Britain‘s competitors were likely to continue to continue their
7
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ascendance and Britain‘s relative position would continue to come under increasing pressure. It
was foreseeable that a structural change in the international system was in the offing.
Nonetheless, what was called for, according to the report, was a redoubling of British effort, and
if that were to materialize, Britain would be able to keep up.8

United Kingdom vis-à-vis Japan
Between 1860 and the early 1930s, Britain also declined vis-à-vis Japan. The relative
decline of British power leveled off during the Second World War, and even climbed towards the
end of the war and the defeat of Japan. However, after the war, British relative power once again
began to decline as Japan recovered from the war. By 1962, Japan was in a dominant position
over Britain. See Figure 4.3 below.

Figure 4.3
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United Kingdom vis-à-vis Russia/the Soviet Union
Russia also posed a challenge to Britain, particularly in the area of Indian security.
Russia‘s CINC score first matched or exceeded that of Britain in 1905 and 1906. Britain and
Russia continued to trade places as the dominant power between 1907 and 1926. At times,
Britain would be dominant, at other times Russia would be in the superior position. By 1927,
however, Russia gained dominance over Britain and never relinquished the lead. See Figure 4.4
below.

Figure 4.4
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This chapter examines the following instances in which the United Kingdom was in a
dominant but relatively declining position in relation to the challenger:
UK/German relations: 1816-1914
UK/Japan relations: 1860-1914
UK/Russia relations: 1816-1914
UK/United States relations: 1816-1896
75

Nature of the Threat
British decision makers often viewed the threat to Britain on two general planes:
economic and military, with the latter focusing on naval power. In this chapter, I examine the
extent to which these threats weighed on British decision makers, and the impact these perceived
threats had on foreign policy outcomes.9

Economic Threats
As early as the 1840s, some segments of the British government and the general public
became concerned that the future did not look as bright as the past, and that Prussia in particular
posed an economic threat. A select parliamentary committee on ―Import Duties and the
Exportation of Machinery‖ was concerned about Prussian efforts to imitate British machines.
Later, in 1856, a pamphlet titled The Darkening Cloud called attention to Britain‘s growing
dependence on foreign sources of food and its tendency to import more than it exported.10 For
the most part, these initial warnings of decline were dismissed.
Despite these early forebodings, the message from the government was often ambivalent.
For example, an 1885 report by a royal commission on the ―Depression of Trade and Industry‖
provided a mixed picture of the future. On the one hand, the commissioners seemed resigned to a
measure of inevitable relative decline:
We cannot, perhaps, hope to maintain, to the same extent as heretofore, the lead
which we formerly held among the manufacturing nations of the world. Various
causes contributed to give us a position far in advance of other countries, which
we were able to hold for many years; but those causes could not have been

9

Land forces were considerably less important than naval posture in British strategic planning. Planners were,
however, concerned with a possible threat by Russia to India via an invasion through Afghanistan. They were also
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expected to operate permanently, and our supremacy is now being assailed on all
sides.11

On the other hand, there was continued official optimism about trade and economic
conditions despite the ongoing battle in the press and Parliament between those who favored free
trade and those who proclaimed the necessity of fair trade. The 1885 report suggested that
Britain was getting wealthier despite the fact that profits and agricultural prices were falling.
Britain‘s export trade was increasing, even if not as rapidly as that of some of its rivals. Despite
the fact that Britain would inevitably decline relative to other countries, it could still be expected
to improve absolutely. The committee suggested, ―We have still the same physical and
intellectual qualities which gave us so commanding a lead; and we see no reason why, with care,
intelligence, enterprise and thoroughness, we should not be able to continue to advance.‖12
While there was no consensus that the status quo would continue to worsen, the debate of
whether the status quo was deteriorating centered on two primary groups of leaders. One group
favored free trade, even if trading partners sometimes cheated, while the other group wanted fair
trade. For the latter group, free trade that drove Britain into debt was no bargain. These
advocates of fair trade argued that laissez faire policies were hurting the trade balance of Britain;
and they worried that very large powers like the United States and Russia would eventually
eclipse Britain. In August 1877, the Bradford Chronicle and Mail lamented ―our trade with
America has fallen…and with Germany the fall is, if anything, greater…. Unless the nations of
Europe and the United States can be induced to treat with us on fair terms…our foreign trade, as
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regards Bradford, is doomed to decay.‖13 Similarly, an 1888 report by the Board of Trade
claimed that, between 1875-1877 and 1884-1885, British exports had increased 8 percent while
those of Germany had risen 16 percent and those of the United States had risen 35 percent.14
Herbert Asquith, the Liberal MP and future prime minister, argued that the U.S.,
Germany, and other industrializing nations would inevitably develop their resources and supply
their own domestic needs with their own manufactures. This was, in his opinion, only natural.15
He even went so far as to reassure other nations that Britain was a benign power by stating, ―We
do not covet any people‘s territory, we have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations.
The British Empire is enough for us.‖16 Meanwhile, Lord Roseberry scoffed at those who warned
that Great Britain was not rising as fast as Germany and the United States. He argued, ―Well,
they began with very little. You could not expect to keep the monopoly of the trade of the world,
because their populations swelled, and as their energy developed they naturally demanded a
share of the trade of the world, as you ought to be pleased and proud that you have kept your
position as well as you have.‖17
The most ardent of the fair traders, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, saw in the
available evidence clear signs that Britain was declining, but he questioned the inevitability of
the rise of the superstates. Chamberlain argued, ―When we…talk of the prosperity of America
and Germany, [our opponents] say, ‗yes, that is natural. Are they not greater than us, are they not
more numerous?‘ Then, in a sort of despairing fatalism they seem to say, ‗What can our little
England do but fall a victim to the inexorable decrees of fate?‘‖ Chamberlain argued that this
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was fatalistic and false logic. He did not see Britain‘s decline in crucial sectors as either
inevitable or natural. He argued, ―When I see these industries not leaving us because we are no
longer capable of attending to them, but filched from us, stolen by unfair means, then I ask
you…How long are you going to take it lying down?‖18 He suggested that Britain could
strengthen its ties with its empire and could escape the decaying situation.19 He advocated free
trade within the empire, but argued that there should be protection from outside states. He also
suggested that close cooperation with Germany might be possible, but negotiations along these
lines eventually broke down.20
Not surprisingly, the free traders disagreed with Chamberlain‘s assessment and remedies.
They believed that protection in any form was bad. Where Chamberlain saw indications of
decline, the free traders in the cabinet and the various bureaucracies of the government searched
for signs of hope or at least indications that decline was the result of natural forces beyond the
reach of governmental policy. Instead of protectionism, they proposed the same solutions that
had been on the table since at least the 1880s—―better education, better training, better methods,
larger outlook.‖21
Other free traders disagreed with Chamberlain‘s overall assessment. The Duke of
Devonshire, for example, warned against, ―making a new departure, uncalled for by any existing
evils, but based solely on abstract arguments as to evils which may possibly come into existence
in the future.‖ Nor did Robert Giffen, the chief of the Board of Trade‘s statistical department,
accept the evidence used by the advocates of fair trade or their conclusions. Giffen claimed,
―There is no weakening in the hold of the United Kingdom (in comparison with its chief
18
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competitors) upon either the import or the export trade of the world.‖ While he acknowledged
that the costs of ruling Britain and the empire increased in the years before 1900, he argued that
the gross national product of Great Britain also grew substantially during this time. It appeared to
him that the rate of overall economic growth was close to the rate at which spending increased.
The cost of ruling the empire was not, in his opinion, overly burdensome. As a result, he viewed
any possible move toward protection as potentially harmful to British interests.22
Additionally, the free traders at the Treasury Department manipulated the price indexes
in such a way that they were able to argue that Britain was in a more advantageous position than
might otherwise appear. For example, by comparing trade figures from 1882 with those of 1902,
and measuring them in constant 1882 prices, imports rose by 56.6 percent, but exports were also
up by 39.4 percent. This presented only a slightly negative picture, certainly nothing to cause
national panic. The Treasury Department‘s analysts also saw significant improvement in almost
every other economic sector including individual savings and overall coal consumption.23
In addition to concerns about trade, some British official were also troubled about
government spending. Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his fourth
budget speech in the spring of 1899, complained about the growth of spending in civil and social
services. However, he was forced to admit that the largest increases had come in the area of
defense, which he blamed on the ―increased and increasing armaments of other nations.‖24
While Hicks Beach claimed that Britain was reaching its limits in terms of national
financial power, Joseph Chamberlain argued that the limits had not yet been approached. He
argued that spending was relatively light compared to the darkest days of the struggle against
Napoleon. Furthermore, Britain‘s burdens were also relatively light compared to its competitors.
22

Ibid., 36-91.
Ibid., 59-60.
24
Ibid., 105.
23

80

―I confess that you alarm me,‖ Chamberlain wrote in response to Hicks Beach. ―No doubt the
normal expenditure on the Army and Navy has been enormous, but has it been more than is
necessary—having regard to what other nations are doing?‖ The colonial secretary argued that
the navy must remain inviolable and the army should only be cut once revised decisions about
imperial defense requirements had been reached. Chamberlain argued that tax burdens were not
as heavy as was commonly assumed, and that the public would be willing to sacrifice further to
ensure the security of the empire. He felt that public opinion and competition from other
countries would require some increases in defense spending in the short term. His predictions
proved correct as the ministers prepared their budgets for the coming fiscal year.25
Hicks Beach was not convinced by Chamberlain‘s analysis. Hicks Beach believed that
the populace would not tolerate any more taxes. He argued, ―It is true that our present burthens
are light, considering the increase of population and wealth, compared with those borne by our
ancestors one hundred years ago. But they were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with
France; we, on my assumption, will not be at war at all: the cases do not admit of comparison.‖
In his view, financial ruin and political unrest was inevitable unless the rate of growth of
spending could be cut. He suggested that the rate of growth in naval spending had been excessive
and could ―be lessened with perfect safety.‖ He also argued in favor of inducing the colonies to
―take their share in the Naval Defense of the Empire.‖ Furthermore, he believed that army
efficiency could be increased and thus the size of the army could be reduced without losing any
effectiveness. This in turn, would result in a cheaper standing army. In his final analysis, Hicks
Beach proposed cutting defense spending once the Boer War was over.26
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Charles Ritchie, Chancellor of the Exchequer after July 1902, largely agreed with Hicks
Beach‘s assessment. For Ritchie and his fellow free traders, long-term industrial decline was not
as much of a danger as protectionism. In his view, reducing taxes was the best way to return to
sound financial practices. In order to do this, and not run up additional deficits, he acknowledged
that existing spending programs would need to be cut. However, Ritchie argued that Britain
could not safely cut its own naval fleet while other countries were busy adding to their fleets.27 It
became clear that the ax would fall first on the army.
As has been alluded to earlier, in addition to the battles over trade policy and
governmental spending, the Boer War was seen by some as driving Britain into dire fiscal straits.
Yearly budgets were showing massive deficits instead of the usual surpluses. A feeling of fiscal
constraint was particularly pressing for the Conservative Unionist government that held power
from 1900 to 1905. The specter of excessive governmental spending loomed over decisions
about alliances and the organization and deployment of the army and the navy.28
Tax rates were raised between 1899 and 1902 in response to emergency spending. There
were also warnings by Michael Hicks Beach and others that the finances of Britain were in crisis.
They argued that the nation‘s financial difficulties predated the beginning of the Boer War and
would persist even once hostilities were concluded. In their view, the existing tax system could
not fund steadily expanding peacetime expenditures. Joseph Chamberlain and a few others who
continued to defend further increases in spending were now decisively outnumbered. A new
consensus emerged in the wake of the war that Britain had reached the limits of its financial
resources.29
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Eventually, key British political leaders like Arthur James Balfour and Joseph
Chamberlain‘s son Austen, who became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1903, came to believe
that larger budgets, accompanied by higher taxes, would inevitably harm the economy. A
weakened economy would ultimately reduce Britain‘s ability to raise large sums of money in an
emergency. Political opposition from either the rich or the poor and perhaps from both was also
seen as a possibility. Despite this logic, taxes were increased but still failed to match
expenditures. Increased defense spending and expanding social spending were simply too much
for a balanced budget. 30
By the turn of the century, the debate had moved on to tariff reform. From 1860 to 1932,
American tariffs were at extremely high levels. Thanks to Britain‘s willingness to allow
American goods reasonably free access to its market without reciprocity, the United States
enjoyed a free ride in terms of international trade. This finally ended when Britain responded to
the American Smoot-Hawley Tariff by raising reciprocal tariffs against American goods.31
From 1903 to 1905, the Conservative party and the country as a whole became embroiled
in an increasingly bitter debate over tariff reform. In July 1903, the economist Percy Ashley
wrote that Britain‘s exports were ―almost stationary.‖ He claimed that the commerce of Britain
had suffered because of foreign tariffs and the industrial development of other countries. Still,
Ashley concluded, ―Taking such indices as we have, the capital of the country is not declining.‖
He believed that the nation was growing more dependent on banking than on manufacturing, but
―if scientific and industrial ability remains [in] the country, new industries will develop.‖32
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In August 1903, Prime Minister Balfour declared that foreign protectionism was to blame
for the declining British economy. He argued that the nation‘s economy might be holding steady
at present, but he suggested that there was little reason to think that it would continue to do so.
He proposed imposing retaliatory tariffs with the hope of gaining concessions from offending
trading partners.33
Alfred Marshall, one of Balfour‘s consultants, agreed with Balfour‘s conclusions that
tariffs by foreign nations were hurting Britain‘s trade. He also suggested that the expansion of
exports had slowed in recent years. He argued that in the future, Britain could not be ―the leader
but she may be a leader.‖ Marshall viewed as inevitable the loss of some of Britain‘s earlier
advantage. He believed that the best way to keep Britain in the top tier of nations was to promote
free trade with Germany and the U.S.34
Joseph Chamberlain‘s son, Austen, took over the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer
in 1903. In Chamberlain‘s view, the financial resources of the United Kingdom were inadequate
to provide for imperial defense. Civil spending would need to be frozen and defense budgets
would need to be cut. He insisted that both the army and the navy share in the cuts that were now
seen as unavoidable. ―It is with great reluctance,‖ he wrote, ―that I suggest any curtailment of
expenditure on the navy; but it would seem clear that we cannot obtain from the army alone all
the relief that we require.‖ By December 1903, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Selborne agreed
that naval spending would go up by only ₤2 million in 1904. However, this compromise was
abandoned by the end of the year when the Admiralty made a sudden request for two additional
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battleships. Nonetheless, by 1905 naval expenditures dropped from ₤41.0 million to ₤37.2
million.35
Balfour and his fellow Conservatives chose a time-honored method of dealing with
financial distress—spending cuts designed to bring budgets back into balance. Defense spending
was still seen as abnormally and unnecessarily high two and three years after the close of the
Boer War. Conservatives were also concerned about the new social and political forces that were
increasingly determining the shape of domestic politics. They preferred the danger of military
disaster overseas to certain electoral defeat at home.36
The drive for economy had a significant influence over the empire‘s defensive posture.
Between 1904 and 1906, the spending on the army was reduced from ₤31.6 million to ₤29.1
million. Chamberlain‘s luck with the army was somewhat better. As hostilities in South Africa
drew to a close, the budget for ground forces was reduced. In 1901-1902 total expenditure on the
army stood at ₤94.2 million. By the next year, the figure was ₤70.2 million. It fell to ₤39.6
million in 1903-1904. Chamberlain wanted even more cuts, perhaps to the pre-war level of
around ₤20 million.37
One of the problems that confronted both free traders and fair traders in determining
relative decline was that, as Friedberg argues, there was ―no reliable way of estimating growth
rates or comparing overall economic capabilities across national boundaries.‖ This made judging
relative decline difficult. Had decision makers been able to use an index that estimated spending
as a share of gross domestic product, such estimates would have indicated that while outlays had
increased dramatically, the economy of Britain had also grown substantially. By the turn of the
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century the burden of government spending had grown heavier, but the picture was not nearly as
bleak as absolute expenditure figures seemed to suggest. Armed with this type of information,
Giffen and Chamberlain might have been more successful in easing their contemporaries‘
anxieties. Without this type of index, it was probably inevitable that absolute spending figures
would dominate discussions of the nation‘s finances. As budgets grew, so too did fears of
impending fiscal catastrophe.38
Because of the optimistic reports and despite a growing feeling of unease about Britain‘s
relative economic decline, no responsible politician was willing to challenge openly the
country‘s faith in free trade. The Government‘s free traders in the cabinet and the various
bureaucracies looked for signs of hope or at least for evidence that what was happening was the
inevitable result of the operation of natural forces. Therefore, even though there was evidence
showing that Britain‘s opponents were growing faster than it was, Britain reacted in a
fragmented and only partially coordinated way. There was not enough evidence to convince the
vast majority of politicians to move away from the ideal of free trade, and no real change in
governmental policy was forthcoming.39
Since there was no decisive evidence of relative decline, neither side was able to win the
intellectual or policy debate regarding Britain‘s future. The participants of the debate were
largely able to revert to their preexisting beliefs about what was best for Britain and for
themselves, and to interpret what evidence there was through the prism of those beliefs. Since
the free traders had dominated the political landscape before the debate, an intellectual stalemate
amounted to a victory for the free traders. The status quo would continue.40
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Military Threats
Perhaps even more troubling than the long-term possibility of economic decline was the
threat of the loss in the short term of outright naval supremacy. In the mid-nineteenth century,
the Royal navy consisted of over 240 ships, crewed by more than 40,000 sailors. It was the
largest navy in the world by far. Niall Ferguson argues, ―At no other time in history has one
power so completely dominated the world‘s oceans, as Britain did in the mid-nineteenth
century.‖41
The doctrine of the navy held that its principal mission was control of the seas. In time of
war, this would require the prompt engagement and destruction of all enemy forces. As a
consequence of this doctrine, the key to naval success rested upon the concentration and rapid
mobility of British naval forces. Any unnecessary dispersion of the navy, such as to sooth
colonial anxieties during peacetime or to protect colonial shores in war could hamper the navy‘s
primary mission.42
At the end of the nineteenth century, maintaining parity with the French and Russian
navies was becoming an increasingly costly undertaking. The emergence of a strong German
fleet raised the possibility that the traditional two-power standard, in which Britain maintained
naval forces equal to its next two competitors, might not be enough to ensure British control of
European waters. Finally, the growing capabilities of the American and Japanese navies meant
that even a firm grip on European waters was no longer a guarantee of worldwide command of
the seas. As a result, some of Britain‘s outlying interests and possessions could not be considered
as secure as they once had been.43
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A member of the British parliament suggested at the time of the First Hague Conference
in May 1899, ―The United States, Great Britain and possibly Japan should make their combined
naval power so absolutely supreme that they could order the other naval Powers to sell out their
ships. Should they refuse, their vessels would be captured on leaving port. That would settle the
peace of the world.‖ At the same time, at least one British service journal also advocated the idea
of a preventive war to check naval competition. Within British naval circles, there was a fair
amount of unguarded talk about preventive war. Alfred Vagts quotes one member as telling the
German naval attaché that at present Germany possessed only a few ships, which the British
Navy could easily dispose of, ―but in a few years you might be strong and we would lose too
many of our ships….‖44 Britain would eventually find itself faced with naval opposition both
from Europe and further abroad.

**Continental Powers**
In 1817, Foreign Minister Castlereagh articulated the policy that would govern British
Naval policy for the next nine decades. He suggested that Britain‘s goal should be ―to keep up a
navy equal to the navies of any two Powers that can be brought against us.‖ By the 1830s, there
were already concerns that France and Russia would sign a treaty and effectively combine their
two fleets in opposition to Britain. Worries about a possible Franco-Russian alliance became
more intense in the wake of the Crimean War. An Admiralty minute of early 1858 warned,
―When determining upon the number of ships which England should have, it should be borne in
mind that the navies of France and Russia may very probably be combined against her.‖ To
make matters worse, by the end of the 1870s, the French began a shipbuilding program that
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equaled Britain‘s in cost. Italy, Germany, and Russia also all increased their naval expenditures
at about the same time.45
The two expanding empires of Russia and Britain met in the nineteenth century in Central
Asia. Beginning in 1879, when the British, for the second time, attempted to invade and control
Afghanistan, Britain and Russia conducted the world‘s first cold war along the North-West
Frontier. This continued until 1919.46 Despite these increased tensions, both powers came to fear
Germany more than they feared each other. As a result, they signed the Triple Entente, an
essentially defensive treaty, with France in 1907.47
France, Russia, and Germany were seen as probable challengers to British naval
supremacy throughout the 1880s. The fear was that France and Germany would sign a treaty and
effectively fuse their fleets in opposition to Britain. By 1884, France had nearly as many ships as
Britain. If Britain were to face a combined Franco-German fleet, the Royal Navy would face a
superior force of battleships and an almost equal number of cruisers. In 1887 and 1888, British
naval activity decreased while that of the nation‘s competitors continued unabated. To
complicate matters further, at the beginning of 1888 renewed rumors began to circulate that
France and Russia might enter a formal alliance with the goal of driving Britain out of the
Mediterranean.48
In the spring of 1889, the first lord of the Admiralty, George Hamilton, restated the twopower standard. In a flashback to the ideas of 1817, he recommended to Parliament a five-year
program of construction to build ten battleships, forty-two cruisers, and eighteen torpedo boats.
The total price tag was ₤23 million. Hamilton concluded, ―Our establishment should be on such
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a scale that it should be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries.‖ In particular,
Hamilton was referring to ―the newest type and most approved design‖ of battleships.49
Though it never stated so publicly, from the beginning the Admiralty had its eye on a
possible Franco-Russian alliance. Fortunately for Britain, geography prevented the French and
Russian fleets from combining with ease. The hopes of the British navy were pinned on a
strategy of destroying its opponents as they moved out of ports on the Baltic and Atlantic coasts
and attempted to come together at sea. Furthermore, as long as a Franco-Russian alliance was the
worst thing Britain had to fear, it was reasonable to expect that it could maintain control of the
waters surrounding Europe. In essence, no hostile forces would be able to fight Britain on the
high seas and would not be able to attack its colonies.50
Another threat to Britain would come if more than two European powers combined
against Britain. There was a fear that a larger ―Continental Coalition‖ possibly including
Germany, could form. These fears were further heightened by the ―Kruger telegram‖ incident in
which the Kaiser publicly attempted to mobilize European opposition to British policy in South
Africa while threatening privately that England would face a ―Continental League‖ if it did not
sign a treaty with Germany. At the turn of the century, Germany did in fact emerge as Britain‘s
single most dangerous naval threat.51
Beginning in the mid 1880s, Britain became more concerned about the Franco-Russian
threat and had to work harder just to keep up. There was a fear that Britain could be eclipsed by
the combined naval forces of France and Russia. The British were also concerned that the French
and Russians would interfere in British naval operations in the Mediterranean. In the late 1880s
49
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and early 1890s, there were signs that both the Russians and French were increasing the size and
improving the quality of their fleets. In August 1891, France and Russia entered into a formal
entente. Though this stopped short of outright military alliance, it was still disconcerting to
British naval observers. Then, in October 1893, Franco-Russian solidarity peaked when a
Russian squadron arrived at the French port of Toulon.52
In December 1893 the Conservative opposition in Parliament, including Joseph
Chamberlain, accused the Government of doing nothing about an increasingly unfavorable naval
balance in vital strategic areas. Chamberlain, arguing that the two-power standard might be
antiquated suggested, ―It may be that a better formula would be…that for any three battleships
built by any naval combination against this country we should build five, and that for every
cruiser built by the same combination we should build two.‖53
The Liberal leadership, however, stuck to the two-power standard. At the time of the
Toulon visit, naval intelligence warned that if there were no change in the pace of naval building,
Britain would lose its two-battleship advantage over France and Russia within two years and
would instead stand at a three-ship disadvantage. By 1896-1897, the disadvantage could grow to
as wide as eight capital ships. In early 1896, Salisbury‘s advisers warned him of increasing
Russian naval activity in the Pacific.54
In the face of these concerns, First Lord of the Admiralty Spencer proposed a substantial
increase in planned construction. Prime Minister William Gladstone resisted this plan, but after
the Prime Minister‘s hasty and forced retirement, a smaller version of Spencer‘s plan was
adopted. This new building program ultimately included nine new first-class battleships. This
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building spurt ensured that Britain would maintain a slight numerical edge over the combined
forces of France and Russia.55
Other decision makers saw trouble elsewhere. Sir Charles Dilke, a navalist in Parliament,
cautioned that existing plans did not adequately address the new threat posed by a rising
Germany. He argued that the Government had two options: it could either enter into an alliance
with some other state (a measure that he opposed), or it could follow ―the only true policy of this
country…keeping up such a fleet as would make us safe against any probable combination.‖
Over the next two years, Dilke continued to criticize the government‘s building plans. He argued
that a three-power coalition was always possible. He also warned that there was growing
evidence that increasingly effective French and Russian mobilization procedures were increasing
the danger of surprise attack.56
Other British policy makers did not agree with Dilke‘s assessment. First Lord Goschen
criticized Dilke‘s position on the grounds that it was a proposal that suggested Britain ―must
have a Navy as large as all the navies of the world combined.‖ Goschen dismissed this idea as
―preposterous.‖ He answered Dilke‘s warnings by arguing that the nature of a coalition with its
ships of varying design and capabilities could never defeat the navy of a single nation, even if the
opposing fleets were equal in size. Any advantage gained by superiority in numbers would be
nullified by the problems of coordination. Arthur Balfour also dismissed Dilke‘s scenario as ―the
extreme case‖ and argued that while the combined French-Russian fleet looked formidable on
paper, most of their battleships were not capable of operating very far from their homeports. He
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informed the House that by 1898, Britain would enjoy a five-ship advantage in first-class craft
over Russia and France.57
In May 1898, figures published in Parliament showed that Britain had fifty-two
battleships, France had twenty-seven, and Russia had twelve. The Franco-Russian alliance also
had eighteen battleships under construction. Britain only had twelve battleships under
construction. This meant that the gap between the two sides would decrease from thirteen to
seven. Germany clearly held the balance with seventeen battleships built and five in the process
of being built. At the time of the release of these figures, however, no one seemed to pay much
attention.58
During the summer of 1898, it was announced that the Russians were building six
additional capital ships. In response, four battleships and four cruisers were added to the Royal
Navy‘s construction schedule. At the end of 1898, a report from the Director of Naval
Intelligence forecast that within six years Britain would have fifty-seven battleships, compared
with twenty-five for Russia and thirty-four for France.59
The Fashoda crisis, in which Britain successfully faced down France, boosted confidence
in the fleet and highlighted the continued importance of sea superiority. Some optimists believed
that Britain‘s rivals would back away from their plans against the country now that it had shown
that it was still superior at sea. Other observers saw only a narrow margin between the nation and
potentially unfriendly states, an increasingly costly effort to preserve that advantage, and the
possibility that German collaboration would upset the delicate balance.60
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The Boer War only aggravated these fears. During the first months of the war in South
Africa, there were persistent reports that the Russians were attempting to draw France and
Germany into an alliance against Great Britain. There was also concern that France would take
advantage of the relative weakness of the Channel fleet which was supporting operations in
South Africa to carry off a surprise invasion of the home islands.61 Furthermore, from the British
point of view, thanks to the naval law of 1898 and Admiral Tirpitz‘s plan to build a German
North Sea battle fleet, the German navy was fast becoming the Royal Navy‘s most dangerous
rival. 62
The concern about Britain‘s ability to maintain its naval supremacy during this time
seems to have penetrated to the highest levels of government. Goschen, in 1900, stated, ―This
great development of naval power which is being made, not only in France, Russia and Germany
but also in the United States and Japan. In all directions we see this great increase of naval
construction.‖63
Lord Selborne assumed control of the Admiralty toward the end of 1900. First Sea Lord
Walter Kerr advised Selborne on 22 October 1900 that estimates showing Britain with a slight
lead over its two closest competitors was flawed. These estimates included some vessels armed
with obsolete muzzle loading guns. The French were already modernizing their navy with
superior breechloaders. Kerr concluded that by 1905 France and Russia would have fifty-seven
battleships opposed to fifty-six for Great Britain. Even this estimate included some newer
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muzzleloaders in the British front line. Selborne therefore recommended a minimal building
program of six additional battleships (the two-power standard plus two additional ships), to be
completed by the end of 1905.64
Sir Reginald Custance, the director of Naval Intelligence, worried that even this might
not be enough. He calculated that by 1907 Germany would have the same number of battleships
as Russia. To make matters worse, the German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea
rather than divided between the Black Sea and the Pacific. Custance deduced that ―if we are
involved in difficulties with any other Nation, and Germany adopts a menacing attitude, it will
be necessary to maintain a force in the North Sea sufficient to mask the German fleet. As the
German Navy will be at that date a much greater danger to this country than the Fleet of Russia it
is thought that in future all our calculations should refer to France and Germany rather than to
France and Russia.‖65
Selborne was also concerned about the potential strength and importance of the German
navy. He was becoming increasingly aware of an intensified German political hostility toward
Britain. By the end of 1902, Selborne was becoming quite anxious about the German threat. He
wanted an additional six battleships over and above simple parity with France and Russia.
Selborne was convinced that ―the great new German navy [was] being carefully built up from the
point of view of a war with‖ Great Britain.66
By 1905, the German navy had come to be perceived as a potent and threatening
challenger for control of the waters around Europe. The only real alternative to the redistribution
of naval forces was therefore an even greater expansion in the Royal Navy‘s overall size. More
battleships and cruisers could conceivably have permitted a buildup close to home while
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allowing a larger continued presence in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. However, this was
dismissed as economically infeasible. Since prevailing financial assumptions were so strong, the
possibility of trying to maintain regional as well as European supremacy was never seriously
entertained.67
In the wake of the divisive Boer War, the Liberals‘ enjoyed an electoral victory in
January 1906 with one of the biggest election landslides in British history. As they took power,
however, the security threat of Germany was looming. In 1907 the Foreign Office official Eyre
Crowe, drafted a ‗Memorandum on the present state of British relations with France and
Germany‘. Its bleak message was that Germany‘s desire to play ―on the world‘s stage a much
larger and more dominant part than she finds allotted to herself under the present distribution of
material power‖ might lead it ―to diminish the power of any rivals, to enhance her own [power]
by extending her dominion, to hinder the co-operation of other states, and ultimately to break up
and supplant the British Empire.‖68
During this period of intense naval competition, preventive action was also proposed in
addition to or in substitution of a British naval buildup. Whether the threats to British naval
supremacy were real or merely perceived, the fear that it caused led to the restatement and
advocacy of the idea of preventive action by British Navy and Army officers. For example, the
British military attaché in Berlin in the 1890s, James Grierson, was convinced that ―we must go
for the Germans, and right soon, or they will go for us later. A pretext for war would not be
difficult to find, and I don‘t believe that even Russia would stand by them.‖ 69 In 1895, R.P.
Hobson recommended that the British take preventive action against the French to avert the loss
of naval supremacy.
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At the time, such proposals found only a small amount of approval in British admiralty
circles. Nonetheless, some naval writers adopted the idea and suggested that if ―European
Powers do not stop the building of warships, an ultimatum should be sent to them by some
modern Pitt, and, if not attended to, British fleets should be sent to destroy them in foreign ports
and dock yards….‖70
First Sea Lord Fisher was also an advocate of preventive war against Germany. For
example, he contemplated destroying the German fleet inside the Kiel harbor during the first
Moroccan crisis. The ministers of Parliament, both Conservatives and Liberals, allowed Fisher,
who was widely respected for his reorganization of the navy, to openly promote his preventive
war ideas. The Germans concluded that Fisher meant what he said and that his Government did
not disavow him, in spite of some British assurances that ―nobody listens to the wild talk of
Fisher.‖ 71
Fisher was not alone among British defense officials in his concepts of preventive war.
His and King Edward‘s close friend, Lord Esher of the Committee of Imperial Defence, also
supported preventive war. In November 1908, Esher told the French that in case of a Continental
war, the British Government ―would be led, by the force of things, to intervene.... Germany will
be our competitor and rival and, sooner or later, the opposition of our interests will lead us into
conflict. Much better that it should come about today while we remain faithful to our policy [of
the entente with France] rather than postpone the day it is falling due and thus alienate France
and possibly prepare for ourselves terrible reprisals. This would as well be for our fleet an
exceptional occasion to annihilate the German fleet before it can become a real menace to us.‖ 72
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German concerns were heightened in May 1905 when a British admiral was quoted as
saying that much as he regarded an Anglo-German war a great calamity, he ―would sooner see
such a war break out tomorrow than see it (if it really must come) postponed for a series of years
when Germany will be stronger by sea and it may be possible for her to obtain an advantage over
us.‖ The ongoing Anglo-German naval competition, increasingly burdensome and hence
irritating, produced on the British side both proposals for a halt in the race and proposals for
preventive action against Germany before it was too late. 73
Despite these proclamations by some government and military officials, even with
considerable backing from the press, there was no broad popular sentiment for preventive war
against Germany in 1914 or before.74 Government approval for such preventive action was never
obtained. There were threats on the far horizon that also required attention.
The Admiralty was also concerned with the possibility of another threat emerging in the
form of non-European countries developing significant naval capabilities. It was feared that the
development of this latter threat would spread thin the British fleet and would likely require a
substantial enlargement of the fleet. Combining this threat with countering a Franco-Russian
(and possibly German) alliance would be extremely difficult. At the end of the 19th century and
beginning of the 20th century, this nightmare scenario came to pass.75

**United States**
For Great Britain, a rising United States represented a new front on which Britain would
have to fight even before the close of the eighteenth century. As the wars of 1779-1783 and
1812-1814 showed, this could be a problematic distraction if British forces were engaged in a
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full-scale European conflict.76 This would be a theme that would play out over the next century
and a half.77 Robert Kagan argues, ―Except for the need to protect Canada, an increasingly
difficult assignment, British policy aimed at appeasing the United States, not challenging it.‖78
The United States had allowed its fleet to decay after the Civil War; and as late as the mid
1880s the American fleet was still an insignificant entity, smaller even than the Swedish fleet.
However, beginning in the late 1880s, it began the slow process of rebuilding by embarking on a
navy-building program more ambitious than even Germany‘s. The achievement was incredible,
and by 1907 the American fleet was second only to the Royal Navy. By the early 1900s Great
Britain recognized the United States as a rival empire serious enough to be worthy of
appeasement.79
As late as 1889, War Office and Admiralty officials concluded that existing garrisons in
North America provided sufficient protection to Britain‘s imperial possessions in the Western
Hemisphere as long as the United States did not increase the size of its navy. The army‘s
planners concluded that no immediate reinforcements were needed at places like Bermuda and
Halifax as long as the U.S. navy remained weak. However, the report from the joint conference
noted, ―The present naval policy of the United States tends in the direction of a considerable
increase of strength.‖80
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By 1890, the United States had three battleships capable of conducting operations along
its coasts, and in 1892 a fourth battleship was added to the fleet. The British navy, with its
overwhelming naval power, had nothing directly to fear from these developments. The real
problem for the British was that there was now the possibility of yet another hostile collaborator
against British imperial interests.81
In late 1895 and early 1896, Britain and the United States were involved in a dispute over
the determination of boundaries in Venezuela. Partly because this crisis coincided with the
Kruger telegram incident, the cabinet decided to give way before American pressure, and in so
doing, they ceded dominance of the hemisphere to the United States. 82 Arthur Balfour, the Tory
leader in the Commons, declared in January 1896 that Britain had no ―forward policy‖ in
South America and that it had ―never desired‖ and did not ―now desire, either to interfere in
the domestic concerns of any South American State or to acquire for ourselves any territory that
belongs to them.‖ He also pleaded for permanent Anglo-Saxon friendship and unity. Fears of
Germany and Russia and to perceived vulnerabilities across the expanse of the British Empire
helped pave the way from British acquiescence in the Western Hemisphere. 83
On the first day of 1896, after the worst had passed, Lord Dufferin, former governor of
Canada, wrote to Queen Victoria: ―Even if peace is assured for the present, America is sure now
to set about strengthening her navy; and, when she has a powerful fleet she will be tempted to
use it. Consequently…England ought to make herself strong enough to confront not two navies,
but three.‖84
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Calls for a three-power standard did not, as has been noted, make much headway,
whether the presumed third party was Germany or the United States. Nevertheless, in the wake
of the Venezuelan scare there was a renewed interest in the defense of the North American
portions of the empire. In April the Joint Naval Military Committee agreed that ―in the case of
war with the United States the safety of Canada could be best ensured…by landing a British
force on American territory and making a vigorous offensive movement.‖85
Increasingly, however, an invasion of the United States was seen as less and less
desirable. There were already high-ranking officials in London who doubted both the wisdom
and the feasibility of entering into an open and explicit naval competition with the United States.
By the end of 1896, some navy officers were warning that they had already lost superiority on
the western half of the American continent. On 8 January 1897, Lord Lansdowne, secretary of
state for war and future head of the Foreign Office, argued that if Britain tried to keep pace with
the United States in the Western Hemisphere, financial ruin would inevitably result.86
At the end of 1897, the first sea lord warned that the American government was making
―a supreme effort‖ to strengthen its coastal defenses ―as well as to increase the Navy.‖ The
Admiralty was rapidly losing whatever stomach it might once have had for a wartime effort to
land forces along America‘s eastern seaboard. The Admiralty for its part was becoming less and
less willing to contemplate the possibility of a naval clash with the United States.87
The British view of the American navy came into focus in the last couple of years of the
19th century and the first couple of years of the 20th century. During the Spanish-American War,
the United States demonstrated the fighting power of its new navy and acquired bases from
Spain in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In addition, three more battleships were added to the six
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in service in 1898, another three came online during the next year, and an additional two were
ordered in 1900.88
Great Britain now faced a serious dilemma. If it were to remain superior off the Atlantic
coast of North America, it would need either to redistribute some of its forces in European and
Asian waters or undertake an even larger buildup of its own. In February 1899, L.A. Beaumont,
the outgoing Director of Naval Intelligence, warned, ―the United States mean to be the strongest
Naval power [along their eastern coast] and it will be difficult to prevent it.‖ As Custance,
Beaumont‘s successor as Director of Naval Intelligence, would shortly point out, ―with Cuba,
Puerto Rico and St. Thomas in the hands of the Americans our position in Jamaica and the
Caribbean Sea will be precarious, and will be the cause of much anxiety in the event of war with
the United States.‖89
To make matters even worse for the British, the United States was also pressing for a
canal across Central America that would link the eastern and western portions of its fleet and its
new ―empire.‖ For almost two years, the U.S. and Britain had been involved in sporadic efforts
to renegotiate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. This treaty did not allow either country to
build and exert exclusive control over a Central American sea canal. 90 The treaty reflected the
disparity of power between the British Empire and the United States in 1950, but by the end of
the nineteenth century, the U.S. government felt it was in a much stronger position. 91 The United
States government wanted the ability to quickly move its growing navy, in order to protect its
new possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The British, on the other hand, were dragging
their feet in the negotiations precisely to prevent this enhanced American flexibility. The British
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were happy with the status quo. However, with the outbreak of the Boer War and their troubles
in Europe and the Far East, Lord Landsdowne, the new head of the Foreign Office was much
more willing to reach some sort of agreement with the U.S., even if it meant giving in to a
number of American demands.92
On 5 January 1900, the Admiralty produced a report that suggested that the United States
would soon have ―a fleet sufficiently powerful to insure to her command of the Caribbean Sea
and of American waters on the Pacific Coast. It is difficult to see how Great Britain can prevent
this if the latent resources of the U.S. are considered.‖ The report noted that under existing
conditions Britain could still deploy sufficient forces to gain local superiority. Doing so,
however, would seriously weaken its position in other areas. The situation was likely to worsen
as the United States further utilized its latent power. It was therefore extremely unlikely that the
Royal Navy could safely match the Americans on either side of the proposed isthmian canal. The
development of a canal would make the task of overwhelming the U.S. fleet even more difficult.
A canal would virtually ensure American supremacy off U.S. coasts in wartime. Given the
relatively small British deployments there, this condition already prevailed during peacetime.
Lord Landsdowne argued that with or without the canal, the American navy would become
dominant in the Western Hemisphere. There was little complaint from the admiralty, which had
already come to the same conclusion.93
The army, on the other hand, since there was no formal treaty with the U.S., continued to
hold itself ultimately responsible for the defense of Canada and the manning of the various
imperial outposts scattered off the U.S. coast. Canada, with its extended land border, was of
special concern to the army. The British army had hoped to deal with the danger of an American
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invasion by planning an amphibious counterattack against the eastern seaboard of the United
States. This plan was clearly no longer viable after 1901. As the Admiralty reduced the circle
within which most of its forces would operate, it inevitably left the army dangerously exposed in
North America. As recognition of the new situation began to dawn, an interagency tussle of
major proportions erupted.94
On 24 February 1903, the Admiralty spelled out some of the conclusions to which it had
come two years before. It predicted that by the end of 1905 the U.S. fleet would consist of
twenty battleships and eight armored cruisers. Only a small number would be deployed in the
Pacific. This fact, along with the increasing strength of the European Continental Powers, did not
bode well for the probability that Britain would be able to blockade the Atlantic portion of the
United States‘ fleet in its own ports. Admiral ―Jackie‖ Fisher went so far as to suggest that the
defense of western Canada was ―absolutely hopeless [and] that it would be equally hopeless
elsewhere….‖ Fisher‘s conclusion was that given the weakness of its position, the policy of the
British government ought to be to ―use all possible means to avoid‖ a war with the U.S. In any
case, ―it seems an utter waste of time to prepare for it.‖ In his view, there was little Britain could
do to defend Canada if the U.S. was determined to invade.95
The decision to acquiesce to an American-built-and-controlled canal committed Great
Britain to naval inferiority in American waters and therefore to friendship with the United States.
On 6 January 1905, the Admiralty made a formal statement: ―The view of the Admiralty is that
Canada must primarily rely upon her own resources for defence against invasion by the United
States.‖ The Admiralty also warned the Canadian government that it should do nothing by way
of preparation that might antagonize the Americans. Appeasement was to be pursued by both
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Ottawa and London. For all practical purposes, the British presence in the Western Hemisphere
had come to an end.96

**Japan**
British acquiescence to the United States opened the door to similar actions regarding
Japan. A rising Japan was signaled when that island nation defeated China in the spring of 1895,
but Japan had been on the move well before then. During the late 1880s, the Japanese began
taking the first steps toward acquiring a modern navy.97 While the emergence of the United
States as a naval power seemed an obvious threat to British interests, the materialization of a
strong Japan was a more ambiguous occurrence.
After the defeat of the Chinese, the European powers coerced Japan into surrendering
much of what it had gained through combat. In the wake of this humiliation, the Tokyo
government vowed to never again be at the mercy of the Europeans and began a substantial naval
buildup with plans to construct six battleships and six modern cruisers. In 1896, Brassey‘s
authoritative Naval Annual pointed out that ―the Japanese are already building two powerful
battleships in England and have drawn up an extensive programme of shipbuilding, which
includes four battleships of 15,000 tons. It is clear that with this new competitor in the field, we
cannot hope to hold much longer the prominent position we have hitherto done in the waters of
Eastern Asia.‖98
In the closing quarter of the nineteenth century, the European powers were competing for
influence in the Far East. By 1898, Japan was at least theoretically capable of tipping the naval
balance in a war between the European powers. Britain therefore had good strategic reasons to
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seek amiable diplomatic relations with Japan and perhaps to encourage the growth of the
Japanese armed forces. If Britain regarded Japan as a potential enemy, it would need to either
accommodate one or more of the other powers in the region, or increase its forces there
unilaterally. If, however, Japan became an ally, the combined fleets of the two ―island empires‖
might be able to take on those of even the largest Continental coalition. Beginning in the early
1870s, English officers acted as instructors to their Japanese counterparts. Furthermore, most of
the major ships in Japan‘s navy were actually built in England until 1900.99
At the end of the summer of 1901, the Government was preparing to enter into serious
treaty talks with Japan. Britain was concerned with defending its interests in the Far East while at
the same time more than matching its likely opponents in European waters. Of primary concern
was the fact that Russia‘s naval strength in Asia had been steadily increasing.100
Selborne argued that if Britain entered into a naval alliance with Japan, the combined
battleship strength of the two nations in Asian waters would be eleven, two ahead of France and
Russia. They would also be assured of a ―preponderance of cruisers.‖ Selborne‘s arguments
played an important part in the cabinet‘s decision to negotiate an agreement with Japan. If
Britain wished to remain superior in the Pacific to France and Russia, or even Japan, let alone a
coalition of all three, it would need to either weaken itself dangerously in European waters or
make substantial increases in overall fleet size.101
The Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed on 29 January 1902. It was published several
weeks later and committed each country to come to the assistance of the other if it was attacked
by two or more hostile powers. A secret clause also called for substantial naval cooperation in
times of peace. Britain was thus forced in the opening years of the twentieth century to abandon
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its traditional diplomatic policy of ―splendid isolation.‖ This was a direct result of the
deterioration in its relative naval power.102
In February 1904, Japan and Russia came to blows. Britain and France had no desire to
be sucked into the war by their respective allies. In an effort to avoid such a scenario, Britain and
France came to an agreement regarding spheres of influence in North Africa. The agreement
ushered in a major improvement in relations between the two old rivals and would eventually
lead to a virtual diplomatic and military alliance.103
The opening battles of the Russo-Japanese War proved the Japanese to be more than a
match for their Russian opponent. Initial naval engagements off Port Arthur left the Russian
Pacific fleet badly damaged. By the end of the war, Russia was reduced to the rank of a minor
naval power and forced to sue for peace. With the demise of the Russian fleet and more cordial
relations with France, Germany was increasingly seen as the principal threat to Britain‘s control
of European waters. For this reason, the concentration of British forces would have to continue.
The new organization was made easier by the weakening of Russia‘s presence in the Far East
and by the virtual disappearance of the czar‘s fleet.104
Russia‘s defeat was a boon for Britain. Before the Japanese victory, England would have
been no match numerically for a coalition of France, Russia, and Germany. In the aftermath of
the Russo-Japanese War, the Royal Navy could deploy, in the words of Fisher, ―a force of
battleships considerably superior to the combined battleship strength of those three Powers.
Remember, it is the battleship that determines victory.‖105
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By the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Britain had an alliance with Japan and more
cordial relations with France. Russia was no longer a naval threat. Britain had also resolved the
puzzle of what to do in the Western Hemisphere by conceding the region to the United States.
Germany was still a serious concern, but many Britons were secure in the fact that at least Britain
would not be facing a coalition of powerful states should conflict come.

Analysis
In this section, I assess the performance of my Domestic Politics Model of Prevention in
predicting the outcome of British policy during the periods under consideration. Following the
method of structured, focused comparison, each of the eleven questions posed in chapter three
are answered, and then an overview of the model‘s performance is outlined for each question.
The typology for this model appears in table 4.1 while the flowcharts for the individual cases
appear in Appendix A.
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Table 4.1: A Typology of Preventive Action

Causal Mechanisms

Containment

Outcomes

Systemic
Structure/
Polarity

Internal
Power
Constraints/
Offense vs.
Defense
Severe/
Defensive
Strategy

Domestic
Political
Constraints/
Pressures

Ruler Belief
Systems/
Perception of
Threats

Severe Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Moderate Acquiescent/
Low – NonMilitarized
Moderate Pragmatic/
Moderate –
NonMilitarized

Acquiescence/
Do Nothing

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Accommodation/
Mix of Strategies/
Carrot and Stick

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
DefensiveOffensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Initiate Sustained
Coercive/
Confrontational
Diplomacy
Initiate
Militarized
Preventive Action

Bipolar/
Unbalanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
OffensiveDefensive
Strategy
Minimal/
Offensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure
Minimal Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Unbalanced
Multipolar

Pragmatic Militant/
Moderate Militarized
Militant Radical/
High Militarized

1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained?
The internal power of Britain was highly constrained between 1900 and 1905 in
the wake of the Boer War. Free trade policies also had an impact on government
revenue since an absence of tariffs meant no income from imports. Furthermore,
deficits during this period limited decision makers‘ options regarding preventive
action toward challengers. This is brought into stark contrast with Hicks Beach‘s
recommendations to cut defense spending. His view that Britain was reaching the
limits of its financial resources is important in understanding the ability of the country
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to continue its military buildup. The expenses of the Boer War put further pressure on
the finances of the empire. These financial constraints eventually resulted in military
constraints.
Using the typology of preventive action, I have developed (see figure 4.1) the
UK‘s internal power constraints and military posture during this period can be
classified either as a ―Severe/Defensive Strategy‖ or ―Moderate/Defensive-Offensive
Strategy‖. This would suggest that the UK would acquiesce to or accommodate rising
powers. This is what we have seen during this period. Particularly when it came to
European powers, Britain was much more inclined to a containment policy. In regards
to the U.S. and Japan, acquiescence and accommodation were the order of the day.

2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained?
As we have seen, though there was talk of possible preventive war against
Germany, France, and Russia (particularly in terms of naval matters), this ―loose talk‖
was never transformed into governmental policy. In fact, these discussions were never
given serious consideration by most decision makers. Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that pro-preventive action elements were fairly constrained.

3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system?
The leadership of Britain during this time can only be labeled as moderate or
pragmatic. The latter label seems the most appropriate. This is particularly true when
looking at British policymakers decisions regarding naval forces. In this case, British
political leaders recognized that British naval power was not sufficient to maintain
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preponderance around the globe; and so they ceded some of that responsibility to the
Americans and the Japanese. Since European waters were the priority for British
policymakers, this was a very pragmatic decision.
Looking again at the typology in figure 4.1, ―Moderate-Acquiescent‖ and
―Moderate-Pragmatic‖ best describe the ruler belief systems during this period. This
would suggest outcomes that square very well with reality. Acquiescence and
accommodation are predicted by the DPMP, and that is what in fact occurred.

4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)?
As early as the 1840s, Prussia was seen as an economic threat. In the 1870s and
1880s, the United States and Germany were both seen as economic threats. There was,
as has been noted above, a contentious debate about fair versus free trade. There was
also talk about retaliatory tariffs (a form of preventive action), but no real action was
taken during the period under investigation.
Furthermore, Russia, Germany, and France were all seen as naval competitors.
The primary British response to this was a continued naval buildup in an attempt to
maintain a favorable balance of power. Over time, however, fleet consolidation in
European waters became necessary.
The U.S also posed a threat to the supremacy of the Royal Navy in the Western
Hemisphere, but not to the British naval supremacy in the waters surrounding Europe.
It became increasingly clear that if Britain maintained parity in the Western
Hemisphere it would risk losing supremacy in Continental waters. It was also evident
that Canada and other British positions in the Western Hemisphere were becoming
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indefensible. As a result, the British decided to pull back from the region and not
attempt to forestall the rise of American regional power. British appeasement of
American power, therefore, opened the door to further American expansion.
Japan, like the United States, posed a naval threat on the periphery. Japan could
clearly tilt the balance of power in the Far East. It was therefore in Britain‘s interest to
make sure that Japan was on its side in any conflict. War with Japan would have meant
sending some of the Royal Navy to the Far East, weakening the British position in
some other part of the world. It seemed more expedient to make sure that such a
conflict be avoided, and so Britain entered into an alliance with Japan.
On this dimension, the DPMP performs less well. Though the British were not
extremely concerned about the threat of Japan and the U.S. to the home islands, their
navies still represented a militarized threat in their respective regions. In these two
cases, the classification of the situation as ―Moderate-Militarized‖ would probably be
most appropriate: suggesting ―coercive/confrontational diplomacy.‖ This, of course,
did not happen. Britain instead acquiesced to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere and
allied itself with Japan in the Far East. Regarding Continental powers, at least at some
points during the period under study, there was a ―high-militarized‖ perception of
threat. The typology suggests that under this condition, Britain should have initiated
some kind of militarized preventive action. Instead, Britain moved more to contain the
Continental powers—alliance with Japan, concentration of naval forces in European
waters—than to actively counter their rise with military force or economic embargoes.
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5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable?
Oddly enough, the belief in the inevitability of economic conflict does not seem to
have played a major role in the decision making process during this time. The
possibility of conflict was often framed in economic and trade terms, and even then it
was treated as largely theoretical in nature. Even in terms of tariffs, there was no
consensus to use retaliatory tariffs against other states. Prime Minister Balfour,
however, did recommend the implementation of retaliatory tariffs. Asquith‘s statement
about the benign nature of Britain exemplifies the belief or hope that conflict was
unnecessary.
In examining the naval relations between Russia, France, Germany, and Britain, it
is difficult to determine the perception of the likelihood of conflict. However, it is
reasonable to assume that conflict was seen as at least somewhat likely since there
were crises such as Fashoda and the Crimean War. Unfortunately, the murkiness of
this issue causes problems for my model.
Conflict with the U.S. seems to have been thought possible, but less urgent than
that of Continental powers. Probably the main reason for this fact is that the U.S. was
not a threat to the British home islands themselves. Furthermore, control of the
Continental waters was seen as the highest priority, and the U.S. was not perceived to
threaten British supremacy there. Similarly, conflict with Japan was not seen as
inevitable by British policy makers. It did not even seem likely. Therefore, the
decision to enter into an alliance was a fairly easy one for the British. Additionally, the
British-Japanese alliance can be seen as a form of preventive action against the
Continental powers and perhaps even the United States. By ensuring a strong Japan,
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the British reduced the probability that another power would be able to move into the
Far East.
In looking at the typology in figure 4.1, it seems that here again the DPMP falls
short of accurately predicting British behavior. For the U.S. and Japan, there was a
―moderate‖ threat of conflict and since this threat had a militarized component, Britain
should have, according to the typology, initiated sustained coercive diplomacy with
these two powers. On the other hand, regarding the Continental powers, there was a
higher threat of conflict that should have at least resulted in confrontational diplomacy
and perhaps militarized preventive action. Some of the former did occur, but the latter
did not. Therefore, my model does not perform extremely well on this dimension.

6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly?
Clearly, conflict between Britain, Russia, Germany, and France would be costly.
Furthermore, British decision makers had to contend with the real possibility that any
war with any one of these powers would result in a war with all three. Its two-power
standard would in no way guarantee victory against these three powers. Therefore,
militarized action would have been seen as very costly and possibly catastrophic.
Conflict with the U.S. would have also been expensive. It was widely believed
that the United States would be able to invade Canada and take that country regardless
of what the British navy and army did. As the 19th century came to a close and the 20th
century dawned, it became increasingly clear that American power in the Western
Hemisphere was outstripping that of Britain in the region. Conflict, therefore, would
be prohibitively expensive.
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Similarly, a war with Japan would have been costly because it would have created
vulnerabilities in other parts of the empire. This cost would have increased if Japan
joined a coalition of European powers—particularly France, Russia, or Germany—or
any combination of the three. Alliance and accommodation seemed a much wiser
course of action to many British decision makers.
The DPMP (see flowcharts in Appendix A) predicts this dimension fairly well. In
those instances when militarized preventive action is seen as costly it should be less
likely. This was certainly the case with Britain. Even in those instances where it would
have been less costly to initiate militarized preventive action sooner rather than later,
there was still a great amount of apprehension. This occurred as predicted by my
model.

7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war
later?
There was clearly the belief by some decision makers, including Lord Esher, that
if war were inevitable, it would be better to have it in the short term before Germany
fully developed its naval potential. However, as has been noted, British policymakers
were extremely cautious. It was clear that any conflict, especially militarized conflict,
would present a heavy burden.
Conflict on the periphery was also seen as problematic. War with the U.S. was
already seen as prohibitively expensive. Canada would certainly be lost, as would
other British positions. By the beginning of the 20th century, war was seen in most
corners of British policy making as simply too expensive to contemplate. Similarly, a
war with Japan that could possibly involve Continental powers was seen as
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exceedingly costly and dangerous. Acquiescence was a more logical choice from the
standpoint of British decision makers. This would also have the added benefit of
perhaps freezing other powers out of the Far East.
This again is addressed by the flowcharts in Appendix A. The real problem here is
that by the time British political leaders started to contemplate preventive action, the
costs were already seen as too high. This was especially true when considering
militarized preventive action. As a result, containment and other forms of nonmilitarized preventive action were preferred. This is as expected by the DPMP.

8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would be
greater than the chances of winning a later war?
There was the belief that there was a better chance of a favorable outcome in the
short term should there be conflict, than there would be further in the future. Time did
not seem to be on Britain‘s side. However, this was tempered by the belief that Britain
could maintain its position, especially economically, if Britons simply worked harder
and returned to more traditional values.
By the close of the 18th century, war with the U.S. was seen as extremely
dangerous because should such an event occur, British deployment of naval forces
from Continental waters to the Western Hemisphere would leave the British home
islands extremely vulnerable to invasion by Continental forces. In essence, then, war
with the U.S. was simply too risky to contemplate, and a war could not be ―won‖
either at that time or later.
As Japan rose, the danger of a Japanese-European coalition was the real danger.
Once Britain had ensured that that was not going to happen, the real danger subsided.
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For British policymakers an alliance with Japan was much less risky than a war with
Japan that might eventually involve other European powers.
This question is similar to the previous question. Again, the real problem is that
even if a war was winnable, it was still seen as a Pyrrhic victory, especially in the
wake of the Boer War. As a result, as predicted by the DPMP, non-militarized
preventive action, if any action was to be taken at all, was preferred over militarized
preventive action.

9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their
state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy?
The August 1896 Board of Trade report suggested that Britain was likely to
continue experiencing relative decline in the areas of manufacture and export vis-à-vis
the United States and Germany. The report suggested that the only way this trend
could be reversed was if a war would break out that would disrupt one or both of the
competitors. Despite this gloomy outlook, there was no call for preventive action.
Regarding the free trade versus fair trade debate, there was no consensus that the
status quo would continue to get worse for Britain. There was also the belief that even
if Britain continued to decline relatively, it was experiencing absolute improvement.
Nonetheless, prominent political leaders such as Balfour were concerned about the
future relative decline of Britain. Other public officials such as Marshall, however,
believed that free trade with the U.S. and Germany would stave off future relative
decline for Britain.
In terms of military challenges, Germany was seen as the primary threat in terms
of naval power. It was feared that the longer German naval power went unchecked, the
117

worse the future would be for Britain. As has been shown, British naval planners also
feared a Russian-French-German alliance. These possibilities by themselves suggested
a worsening status quo.
Elsewhere in the world, it was clear that American naval power would continue to
grow. The status quo for Britain in the Western Hemisphere would continue to worsen
regardless of what Britain did. Any war with the U.S., the conventional wisdom ran,
would only hasten the decline of British power in this part of the world. In essence,
then, the rise of American naval power was seen as inevitable by most British
policymakers.
British policymakers were also cognizant that Japan‘s naval strength was
growing. After Japan defeated the Chinese and then the Russians, it was clear that the
status quo in the Far East was shifting. British political leaders seemed to be aware
that British power in the region was in decline relative to that of Japan, but the BritishJapanese alliance seemed to assuage the larger fears of these policymakers.
British policymakers and public officials almost universally came to see the status
quo as worsening for the British people. However, many believed that with hard work
and a return to traditional British values, the decline could be halted and even
reversed. Then there were those who saw relative decline as inevitable as other
countries grew and industrialized. British decision makers were also constrained in
what they could do about the situation, even if they did acknowledge a worsening
status quo. Therefore, while the answer to the question is ―Yes, most British
policymaker believed the status quo was worsening,‖ there was relatively little

118

preventive action taken to stop it. This represents a failure of the DPMP, which
predicts that under such conditions, some sort of preventive action becomes likely.

10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system?
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by
balanced multipolarity, while the period 1903-1918 was characterized by unbalanced
multipolarity. According to his theory of offensive realism, war was therefore
somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and most likely during the period 1903-1918. 106
One question this theory does not answer is this: Why did war occur in 1914 and not,
in say 1910 when the structure was the same? Mearsheimer‘s model comes up short in
answering this puzzle.
The typology of preventive action developed in this study also incorporates
Mearsheimer‘s concepts of polarity. Within the typology, a ―Balanced multipolar‖
system suggests that Britain should have acquiesced, which is largely correct.
However, in the later ―unbalanced multipolar‖ system, the typology predicts that
Britain should have used coercive/confrontational diplomacy. On this point, the
typology does not do a good job of accurately predicting the outcome.

11) What type of government exists in each state, i.e., are either or both
democracies?107
Between 1816 and 1879, the United Kingdom was an anocracy. During this
period, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies and Japan as an
106
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anocracy. The United States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore,
according to Schweller‘s model, the United Kingdom should have either formed a
defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia,
and the U.S.108 Of course, what we have seen is that Britain was moving toward a
defensive alliance with Japan and acquiesced to American demands in the Western
Hemisphere. Schweller‘s model does not provide an adequate explanation for this.
From 1880 to 1896, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia were
autocracies, Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the U.S. was a full democracy.
Therefore, the UK should have formed a defensive alliance against Germany, Russia,
and Japan and should have accommodated the rise of the United States. While the UK
did accommodate the rise of the U.S., it did not form a defensive alliance against
Japan, but instead moved still closer to accommodation with Japan.
From 1897 to 1902, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia, on the
other hand, were autocracies during this period and Japan is classified as an
anocracy.109 Therefore, the UK should have formed a defensive alliance against
Germany, Russia, and Japan. In 1902, Britain and Japan formally signed a defensive
alliance. This is not explained by Schweller‘s model.
During 1903 and 1904, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Germany and
Japan were anocracies and Russia was an autocracy during this period. Schweller‘s
model predicts that the United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance
against Germany, Russia, and Japan during this period. Instead, Britain and Japan
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were allied. Germany and Russia, however, were still seen as adversaries by British
political leaders.
Between 1905 and 1913, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Japan, on the
other hand, was an anocracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller, the
United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Japan during this
period. Finally, from 1914 to 1918, the United Kingdom was a full democracy while
Russia and Japan were anocracies. Therefore, according to Schweller, the United
Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Russia and Japan during this
period. Of course, as has been seen above, this did not occur. Nonetheless, Schweller‘s
model does work well for all of these periods if we consider the fact that Japan was an
anocracy during all of these periods and not an outright autocracy. It does not,
however, explain why Britain was willing to enter into a defensive alliance with Japan
but not with the anocratic Germany (after 1903). Still, it is impossible to discount his
model completely. All of these periods and predictions are summarized in table 4.2.
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Table 4.2 Mearsheimer‘s and Schweller‘s Predicted Outcomes

Time Period
1816-1879

1880-1896
1897-1902
1903-1904
1905-1913
1914-1918

Power Distribution
Predicted Outcome
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely*
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Unbalanced Multipolar
War most likely
Unbalanced Multipolar
War most likely
Unbalanced Multipolar
War most likely

UK
Anocracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy

Regime Type
Predicted UK Action

Prussia/Germany

Russia

Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance

Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance

Democracy
Democracy

Anocracy
Defensive Alliance

Japan
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance or
Preventive War
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance

US
Democracy
Defensive Alliance or
Preventive War
Democracy
Accommodation

Blank boxes indicate that the United Kingdom was no longer in relative decline vis-à-vis the other power or the other power had
surpassed the UK. Either condition is outside the scope of this research.
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Conclusion
The most striking aspect of British foreign policy vis-à-vis rising states from 1816 to the
second decade of the twentieth century is its acquiescence and accommodation. In essence, it
allowed the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia to rise relative to it, and in some cases to
surpass it, with little or no effort to check their ascendance. The periphery was increasingly left
to powerful, but for the moment at least, friendly nations. Whether the threat was economic or
financial, as in the case of the United States and Germany, or primarily military—as in the case
of Russia, Japan, and Germany—the United Kingdom did little to stop the rise of the threatening
power. British public officials thus came to accept a geographically constrained form of naval
superiority in which England could maintain its two-power standard only in European waters.
This strategy implied coming to some accommodation with the peripheral powers and perhaps,
as the European states increased their naval strength, with one or more of them as well.
The typology and models developed for this research project perform about as well as
Mearsheimer‘s polarity model and Schweller‘s democracy model. Despite the preventive action
typology‘s failures, it still has some value in trying to predict, with more precision, the actions of
Britain during this time. On some dimensions such as internal power constraints and ruler belief
systems, the DPMP performed very well in this case study. On other dimensions such as system
polarity and perceived likelihood of conflict, the model failed to predict accurately British
behavior. This suggests that while the DPMP is far from perfect, with some modifications it may
become a valuable tool in predicting the likelihood of different forms of preventive action.
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Chapter Five
The Decline of Russia and the Soviet Union

A Brief History to 1816
This chapter examines the decline of Russia and the Soviet Union vis-à-vis several rising
powers from 1816 to the mid 1940s. It is helpful, however, to outline a brief history of the
emergence and rise to power of this pivotal nation. This section is meant to serve only as a very
brief overview of the rise of Russia and the Soviet Union. In this project, of course, we are much
more interested in its decline, the rise of challengers, and its reaction to those events.
The rise of Russia really begins with Peter the Great‘s conquests of the early eighteenth
century.1 Russia emerged on the international scene with its growth of military power and its
defeat of the Swedes at Poltava in July 1709. Aided by numerous foreign advisers and willing to
borrow widely from the military expertise of the West, Peter the Great built up a massive army
and navy to protect his new possessions on the Baltic. Later in the eighteenth century, Russia‘s
army was often larger than that of France. Russia‘s manufacturing base was also gaining strength
and the country itself was difficult if not impossible to conquer, as Napoleon (and later Hitler)
was to discover. Though it was still a backward country in many ways, it showed signs of
modernizing on several fronts. By borrowing from other countries and thanks to its vast
resources, it was able to catch up and then surpass other states.2
By the time of the Seven Years‘ War (1756-1763), Russia could be considered a great
power. The country‘s armies fought courageously and occupied Berlin in 1760.3 Russia retired

1
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2
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(New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 107.
3
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into profitable neutrality before the war ended, and at the end of the conflict, Russia emerged
secure and dominant in the east and north.4
By the end of the eighteenth century, Russia was among the most powerful nations in the
world. By 1792, for example, Russia had made great advances at Turkey‘s expense. It had
annexed the Crimea and it had secured the northern coast of the Black Sea. Furthermore, by 1796
Catherine the Great had added 200,000 square miles to the already huge Russian Empire.
Russia‘s raw numbers in terms of population also allowed it to occasionally field an effective
offensive military force.5 With the Russian defeat of Napoleonic France, Alexander was ready to
lead Russia into the top tier of European powers.6

Power Relations7
Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States
For most of the years between 1816 and 1860, Russia was dominant but in relative
decline vis-à-vis the United States. In 1861, the United States‘ CINC score surpassed that of
Russia and the U.S. maintained its dominance with only short periodic breaks until the early
1970s when Russia once again dominated the U.S. This condition lasted until just before the end
of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See figure 5.1 below.
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Figure 5.1

Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis Prussia/Germany
Closer to the Fatherland, Prussia/Germany posed a more immediate threat than the
United States for much of this period. Between 1816 and 1878, Russia dominated
Prussia/Germany, but Russia was in relative decline nearly the whole time. Germany dominated
the bilateral relationship between 1879 and the end of the First World War. The 1920s once
again brought Russia into the dominant position, but the first half of that decade presented a
slowly declining Russia, and in 1923, 1924, and 1927 Russia declined more conspicuously
relative to Germany. By the 1930s, Russia was in steady relative decline and was overtaken by
Germany starting in 1939 and lasting until the end of the Second World War. Germany, of
course, was divided after the end of World War II, and did not emerge again as a united political
entity until 1990, at which time Russia dominated the newly united country. However,
throughout the 1990s Russia was in relative decline vis-à-vis Germany. See figure 5.2 below.
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Figure 5.2
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Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis Japan
Russia‘s power relationship with Japan has been complex. Russia dominated Japan from
1860 (the first year of data available for Japan) until 200 when Japan reached parity with Russia.
Most of the fluctuations in relative power during the entire period 1860-1995 have more to do
with the ups-and-downs of Russian/Soviet power than they do with an increase or decrease in
Japanese power. However, the two periods, 1894-1945 and 1952-1973 were generally positive
times for Japan in terms of power. See figure 5.3 below.
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Figure 5.3

Russia/Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United Kingdom
Britain lost its consistently dominant status vis-à-vis Russia shortly after the turn of the
twentieth century. After 1905, Russia and then the Soviet Union was more often than not in a
dominant position over Britain. By the 1920s, the Soviet Union was clearly dominant over the
United Kingdom, and it never relinquished that dominance. Russia has maintained its dominance
over Britain in the post Cold War period. Though the Soviet Union was dominant in the period
1936-1946, it was in relative decline vis-à-vis the U.K. during most of that time. The period
1972-1979 was another period of relative decline for the Soviet Union. 1984 to 1998 is the final
period covered in this study in which the Soviet Union/Russia was dominant but in relative
decline vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. See Figure 5.4 below.
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Figure 5.4

This chapter examines the following instances in which Russia/the Soviet Union was in a
dominant but relatively declining position in relation to the challenger8:
Russia/United States: 1816-18609
Russia/Germany: 1816-1878, 1932-1938, 1990-199810
Russia/Japan: 1860-1873, 1878-1888, 1892-1906, 1913-1918, 1936-1944, 1951-1967, 19771979, 1986-199311
Russia/United Kingdom: 1936-1946, 1972-1979, 1984-199812
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To simplify matters somewhat, the following time periods encapsulate the above scheme: 18161888, 1892-1906, 1913-1918, 1932-1946

Nature of the Threat
Economic Challenges
Russia‘s finances suffered heavily from the series of wars that occurred during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The government printed paper money at a fantastic
rate, increasing the number of rubles in circulation from 200,000,000 in 1801 to nearly
826,000,000 in 1816. As the number of rubles in circulation increased, their value decreased to
the point that by 1816, the value of the paper ruble was only a quarter of a silver ruble (25 silver
kopeks).13 Despite attempts by Finance Ministers Count D. A. Guryev and Egor Kankrin, who
had succeeded in bringing inflation under control and had laid a solid foundation for economic
growth, the expensive and ultimately futile war in the Crimea had wreaked havoc on state
finances.14
The area of trade relations presented further challenges for the Russian state. Russia, like
the rest of Europe, gravitated from free trade to protectionism in the second half of the 19th
century. Tariffs rose from their lows of the late 1850s and early 1860s—first to a 10 percent
tariff in 1881, then 20 percent in 1885, and finally to a prohibitive tariff of 33 percent in 1891.15
Ministers of Finance Ivan Vyshnegradskii (1887-92) and Sergei Witte (1892-1903) imposed high
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protective tariffs that were designed to improve Russia‘s balance of trade and promote domestic
industries.
Witte‘s domestic program was cautious and conservative. It postponed immediate
gratification and saw economic development as the key to future increases of power. Witte‘s
initial successes in the 1890s led to a rate of industrial growth for Russia never to recur until the
1930s.16 Industrial production increased at an average of 8 percent per year, higher even than that
of the United States. As Reginald Zelnik notes, ―Russia‘s presumptive but precarious position as
a ‗great power‘ provided an underlying motivation for the pursuit of economic development,
industrial strength, and financial independence.‖17 Unfortunately, Witte‘s policies became
increasingly difficult to maintain as Russia became ensnared in Asian affairs. Tariffs
implemented during this time were not designed to stunt the growth of potential challengers, at
least not overtly, but they were created to help Russia maintain its great power status. Prestige
was continuing to be an important factor for the Russians.
By the early 1920s, years of warfare had once again ruined the national economy. In
1921, for example, the country was facing total economic collapse. In that year, gross industrial
output fell to less than one-fifth of the level before World War I, and production in the textiles
industry was a mere one-tenth. Similarly, agricultural production was severely reduced during
this period. Famine and epidemics claiming millions of lives ensued when the 1921 harvest
produced significantly less than half the pre-war average. By 1922, hyperinflation was once
again rampant and had driven prices for agricultural products to astronomical heights. The Soviet
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government responded with a tight-money policy that caused difficulties in wage payments at
many factories thereby triggering strikes and disorders.18
Economics, not ideology, drove the Soviets to engage in economic agreements with the
West in the aftermath of World War I. For example, the Russians signed a trade agreement with
the British in March 1921. Germany and the Soviet Union also signed the German-Russian
Agreement of 19 April 1922. One of the goals of the Treaty of Rapallo was to form closer
economic ties between Germany and Russia. 19 Clearly, economic necessity trumped ideological
orthodoxy during this period.
Vladimir Lenin, recognizing the weakness of the Soviet economy, argued that military
conflict between the capitalist and socialist camps was not necessarily inevitable. He suggested
that they could both compete and cooperate with each other. According to his line of logic,
socialist states could interact, especially economically, with the capitalist world because in any
long-term competition socialism would ultimately prevail. This was a very pragmatic ideological
shift given that the international proletarian revolution that was supposed to have occurred did
not emerge, and therefore the Western assistance that was to have flowed to the new Soviet state
did not materialize. Lenin and other Soviet leaders recognized that it was vital that the USSR end
its diplomatic isolation and attract financial aid. This proved to be quite difficult, and as the
decade opened not a single major industrial nation had yet given the revolutionaries diplomatic
recognition. Nor were there any signs of significant foreign investment in the new state.20
Despite these setbacks, by 1924 the national economy began to recover. Restarting
factories closed during the civil war caused a sharp rise in manufacturing output. As a result, the
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output of large-scale industry reached nearly half its pre-war scale in 1924 and 75 per cent a year
later. Industrial exports rose to nine times what they had been at the beginning of the decade,
even if still only a third of pre-war figures. By 1924, the cultivation of arable land approached
1913 levels, and marketable output in agriculture increased 64 percent between 1922 and 1925.21
This, of course, was only a recovery of the pre-war base, not an expansion. Industry soon
reached a point of diminishing returns. There had been virtually no investment in industrial
capacity since before the First World War. What the Russian civil war had not destroyed was, by
the mid-1920s, badly worn or outmoded. Restarts of old factories could increase output, but
without significant new investment, these factories could never reach the pre-war standard.
Meanwhile, trade and foreign investment, which increased significantly after 1921, still fell far
short of financing a renewed industrial base.22
The Communists‘ answer to these shortcomings was the announcement of the ‗Five-Year
Plan for Industrialization and Socialist Construction‘. Henceforth, the state would not only
intervene in economic relations but would actually serve as the chief, even sole, manager of the
economy. This ambitious plan aimed to dramatically increase investment, industrial production,
electrical generation, and the size of the industrial labor force. Even with these grand goals,
Stalin was unsatisfied and by the end of 1929 ‗Five in Four‘—that is, the fulfillment of the Plan
in four years—became official policy. The result of the increased expectations was a constant
state of emergency, ubiquitous shortage, and near total chaos of the Soviet economy that
sometimes spilled over into the larger Soviet society itself.23
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The Five Year Plan‘s record was mixed, but by 1932 Stalin could claim some real
achievements. Gross industrial production and producers‘ goods surpassed the ambitious goals
laid out in the Five Year Plan. During this period, the value of machinery more than quadrupled.
Total employment in construction, transportation, and industry also exceeded the benchmarks set
by the Plan. On the other hand, the production of consumer goods was less impressive, and there
were significant shortfalls in the output of coal, electricity, and steel.24
Stalin recognized the shortcomings in the Soviet economy and remarked to a conference
of economic officials during the First Five-Year Plan, ―Do you want our socialist fatherland to be
beaten and to lose its independence?‖ He further stated, ―We are fifty or a hundred years behind
the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we
shall go under.‖ The Soviet government thus set out to quickly industrialize the country. It was
largely because of this forced-pace industrialization that the Soviets were victorious in the Great
Patriotic War of 1941-1945. However, because of increased military expenditure, investment in
the collective and state farm system remained woefully inadequate. Agriculture still lagged and a
major crop failure in 1936 strained the state‘s reserves and distribution network.25
After the Second World War, the Fourth Five-Year Plan, which was adopted in March
1946, set the target of exceeding pre-war levels of production by the end of 1950. In fact, the
Soviet Union fulfilled this plan in most significant sectors. By 1950, for example, gross
industrial output exceeded that of 1940 by 40 percent.26
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Military Threats
The years from 1815 to 1914 marked a time of relative peace in Europe. During this
period, there were no general wars between the great powers. The five Great Powers that had
organized the Congress of Vienna continued to dominate Europe. The wars that did break out
were short and limited in scope.27 For the forty years after Russia defeated Napoleon, Europeans
regarded Russia as the most formidable power on the continent. However, Russia failed to
progress at the same rate as competing nations in the areas of weapons development, logistical
support, education, and industry. Russia, for example, was very late in developing a railroad
system. This ultimately hindered its ability to supply troops in the Crimea. The sorry state of
their military can be seen in the defeats they suffered at the hands of the Japanese (1904-1905),
the Germans (1914-1918), and the Poles (1920).28
Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century was a complex picture that promised
further Russian advances. By 1814, Russia was the greatest continental power and took an
interest in all European problems. Alexander I, who reigned as emperor from 1801 to 1825,
expected that Russia would play a leading part in all Continental affairs. He was in favor of
establishing a new system of international order and peaceful cooperation with the other
Continental powers. As a consequence of this newfound activism, Russia was involved in the
settlement at the Congress of Vienna.29
Alexander I also worked outside the bounds of the Congress of Vienna to enhance
Russia‘s involvement with the rest of the Continent. In September 1815, he drafted the Holy
Alliance in which he, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia were ‗to take for their sole
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guide the precepts of the Christian religion‘. The alliance became a symbol of the association of
the three eastern monarchies.30
Similarly, the Quadruple Alliance of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain, which had
come into effect in 1814, opened the door for periodic meetings between the rulers of the four
powers and their foreign ministers.31 The first of these meetings was held at Aachen from
September to November 1818. Its main business was to arrange for the evacuation from France
of the allied armies of occupation.32
By the time of the outbreak of war over the Crimea, Nicholas‘ army looked strong on
paper but it was no match for the allies. Russia‘s army was widely disbursed to protect against
possible border attacks. The lack of industrialization and the lack of railroads proved to be a
serious detriment to the forces sent to the Crimea. These forces actually had to be supplied by ox
cart. Russian weapons, which had not been upgraded since earlier wars, had far shorter effective
range than the enemy‘s weapons. To make matters worse, sanitary conditions for Russian troops
were appalling, and disease claimed far more men than did battle. Not surprisingly, the troops
were demoralized and ultimately defeated. At the same time, Nicholas became ill and died of
pneumonia in early February 1855.33
By 1856, in the wake of the war in the Crimea, Russia underwent numerous internal
reforms including the gradual elimination of serfdom, education reform, judicial reform, and
finally reform of the military. The Russian military adopted Western models and improved
military technology, reorganized military administration, and improved the professionalism of
military schools. The Universal Military Training Act of 1874 established universal conscription
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regardless of class standing, a significant change over the old system in which the nobility was
exempt from military service. Under the 1874 Act, terms of service were determined by level of
education, not by social origin or rank.34
Forces drawing the Western Powers to Russia were also in play in the later 19th century.
When, in 1875, Bismarck threatened France with preventive war if it attempted to rearm, Russia
and England saw this as overtly threatening and believed that the Germans were trying to start a
war. In St. Petersburg and London, France found far more sympathy than Bismarck had
expected. He had tried to turn European powers against France by presenting her as a state bent
on domination through rearmament, but instead found that he was himself viewed as the rogue.
This view was led by England and Russia, the two countries who were supposedly Germany‘s
closest friends. Instead of criticizing France‘s rearmament or joining Germany‘s preventive war
to stop the rearmament, Russia and England endorsed France‘s ―very natural‖ rearmament
program while denying the legitimacy of preventive war.35
Threats by Germany were not the only incentives driving the West into closer relations
with Russia. In a poor state like Russia, which taxed its poorest citizens harshly, social and
political revolution was seen as a real possibility. In reaction to this, and in the face of a rising
Germany, the Western Powers worked to enhance their political ties with Russia. From 1890 to
the outbreak of the First World War, France, Britain, and Belgium invested heavily in the giant
to the east. Because of these investments, Russia‘s railways, industry, and foreign trade all
increased dramatically.36
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Russia‘s power was also enhanced by an increasing population that nearly doubled
between 1863 and 1913. However, the country was economically backward when compared with
its European counterparts. For example, the only rail line in Russia in 1855 ran between Moscow
and St. Petersburg. As a result, it was difficult to move key resources around the country and key
markets remained isolated. Russia still imported 70 percent of all machinery and did not have upto-date technology. All of this began to change in the final years of the 1870s, and by the mid
1880s railway lines had increased from 1484 miles in 1861 to 18,720 miles in 1887. At the same
time, the industrial base grew substantially and industrial production roughly doubled during the
period 1861-1886.37
Between the 1830s and the 1870s, Russia consolidated its power in the territories that
bordered it. Poland was systematically dismantled as an independent state with the abolition of
the Polish governmental councils in 1867, the reorganization of the area into ten Russian
administrative provinces in 1868, the conversion of Warsaw University into a Russian institution
in 1869, and the introduction of the Russian judicial system in 1876. Russia also used force in
the Caucuses to put down a resistance movement there. The military campaign of 1857-62
achieved a semblance of control, but Russian power remained tentative and vulnerable. The
1860s and 1870s also marked the expansion of Russian rule into Central Asia. The motives for
such a move came from two sources: an interest in its capacity for cotton production, and a
desire to establish a firm and reliable border in the area. As a result, between 1864 and 1873
Russia gradually reduced Central Asia to a protectorate status with unmistakable Russian
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predominance.38 In the years just before 1914, the Russian Empire was advancing rapidly
towards modernity.39
Late Imperial Russia seemed to contain within its borders inexhaustible stores of power
and energy. It was the largest consolidated state in the world, it had the largest population in
Europe, and it had the world‘s largest army. It produced more agricultural products than any
other state in Europe and was the chief recipient of external investment thanks to its massive
mineral resources. 40
The leaders of Russia during this time wanted to prolong the European peace to provide
continued stability in which Russia could continue its development. Russia was a leading
proponent of peace conferences in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Peace conferences at The
Hague in 1899 and 1907 were largely held at the Tsar‘s urging. Disarmament, the arbitration of
international disputes, and the rules of land warfare were the topics of discussion at these
conferences. Out of these meetings emerged the International Court of Justice in 1900 and the
Hague Convention in 1907.41 Alas, peace was not meant to last indefinitely. The outbreak of the
First World War and then internal revolution would immerse Russia into turbulence for years.
As the world slipped toward the First World War, alliances began to play a key role in
European politics. The agreements between Russia and France obliged them to assist each other
if attacked, but the third member of the Triple Entente, Great Britain, was not formally
committed to come to their defense. In addition, there was no treaty in force between Russia and
Serbia. Even the treaty of 1839, which committed Britain to uphold Belgian independence,
predated the Triple Entente. Despite appearances, then, these countries were not locked into
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automatic responses to aggression. They actually had quite a bit of room to maneuver. The fact is
that in 1914, they all chose war.
In St. Petersburg, Tsar Nicholas II had ordered full mobilization on 30 July. It seems that
he did not consult the Minister of War before making his decision. News of Germany‘s
declaration of war, which had occurred on 1 August, quickly reached St. Petersburg and on 2
August, Russia declared war on Germany. The Russians hoped that they would be able to
mobilize fully their army in eighteen days and that they would ‗be in Berlin before the Germans
were in Paris.‘42
February 1917 ushered in a revolution in which the tsar agreed to abdicate his throne.
Amidst the crisis of war and social upheaval, the provisional government tried to rule and
reform. Poland, which was under the occupation of the Central Powers, was granted virtual
independence by the provisional government. Autonomy was also granted to Finland. In the
wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Allies tried to intervene in the emerging Soviet Union, but
their intervention had little military effect.43
The new Soviet state tried to further its rise to power through the New Economic Policy
(NEP) of the 1920s. It was hoped that NEP would ignite revolution in Europe thus creating
Soviet friendly governments and improving the standing of the Soviet Union in Europe. None of
this came to pass. While Lenin had pursued ‗peaceful coexistence‘ with the capitalist world,
Stalin emphasized what he saw as the link between foreign threats and the internal mobilization
of the Soviet populace and resources. For Stalin, it looked as if the capitalist powers wished to
encircle the Soviet state. Soviet behavior, based on this belief of encirclement by hostile powers
bent on the destruction of the USSR, only served further to estrange the USSR from the rest of
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the international system. As a result of this behavior, the Soviet Union was widely distrusted by
the end of the 1920s, and it did not have any reliable allies. The situation for the Soviet Union at
the end of the decade was little better than it had been at the beginning of the decade.44
Despite its militaristic overtones, the Soviet government realized during the period of the
New Economic Policy (NEP) that the country needed time to heal its wounds and strengthen
itself militarily. Daniel Orlovsky suggests, ―The army not only represented a military force but
also provided the formative experience for the first generation of Bolsheviks.‖ It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union developed as a military-administrative state. Military
ideology and military thinking permeated government, economy, and society.45
During this period, the immediate focus of Soviet foreign policy was survival and state
interest.46 In pursuit of this goal, commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) called for total
disarmament. This call, not surprisingly, evoked nothing but skepticism in European capitals.
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union did succeed in normalizing relations with neighboring countries
and establishing full diplomatic relations with the United States in 1933.47
By the late 1930s, the Soviet Union had largely accomplished its goal of recovering from
the trauma of its birth and was a thoroughly militarized state. Soviet defense outlays in 1941
amounted to over 43 percent of the country‘s GNP. This massive amount of defense spending,
however, could not compensate for the loss of experienced military leaders purged by Stalin
during the 1930s.48 Because of this perception of weakness and vulnerability at the highest levels
of Soviet leadership and despite an ideological view that included the inevitability of war
between the capitalist world and the communist world, the government remained on the
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defensive, and continued to postpone the actual outbreak of the coming conflict until the Soviet
Union was in a more advantageous position.49
With the triumph of the Nazis in Germany and the consolidation of a Japanese puppet
state on the Soviet Union‘s eastern borders, the Communist International (Comintern) developed
and implemented a strategy of Popular Fronts and an intensification of Soviet efforts to achieve
collective security with the European democracies. These policies bore fruit in the form of
mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and the election of a Popular
Front government in France in 1936. 50
There was a limit, however, to the extent to which the European democracies were
willing to cooperate with the Soviets. This limit was reached during the Spanish Civil War.
Despite Soviet assistance to republican forces in Spain—or perhaps because the European
democracies feared a communist Spain more than one ruled by Franco, the European
democracies failed to prevent fascists from coming to power in Spain. The betrayal of
Czechoslovakia at Munich in September 1938 confirmed Soviet suspicions that neither Britain
nor France would come to the aid of the Soviet Union should Nazi Germany decide to expand
eastward.51

**Germany (1816-1938)**
Between 1881 and 1887, Russia joined Germany and Austria in the Dreikaiserbund, and
between 1887 and 1890, it signed two ‗reinsurance‘ treaties with Russia. After Bismarck‘s

49

Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 265.
Siegelbaum, "Building Stalinism 1929-1941," 316.
51
Ibid.
50

142

dismissal, however, relations cooled between Russia and Germany. The Tsar then turned to
France and Britain for diplomatic partners.52
By the time Vyshnegradskii left office and Witte took over, the Russian military—despite
the misgivings of political conservatives and enemies of republicanism—had begun to see
France as the most reliable ally for Russia and the best chance to balance against the rising
power of Germany. By 1892, even a cautious Foreign Ministry, which was loathe to raise the ire
of Germany, concluded its first, quite limited entente with Paris. By the end of the 1890s, both
Russian economic and foreign policy were more oriented towards France than ever. This meant
more potential conflict with Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and ultimately with
Germany itself.53
In 1908, Vienna, at Russia‘s expense, unilaterally annexed the disputed Balkan provinces
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and then reneged on a promised quid pro quo. This was embarrassing
to Russia to say the least. Infighting between the army and the navy was depleting the budget and
demoralizing the military. Plans for Russian domination of Mongolia and Manchuria no longer
seemed plausible and were scaled back. There was also disagreement between key Russian
decision makers regarding the issue of where to draw the line in terms of defending Russia
against Germany and Austria. How far west should the line be drawn?54
Russian military planners, watching the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, committed to a
―Western‖-oriented strategy and planned for full rather than partial mobilization in the event of a
major international crisis.55 As war became more likely in 1914, the Russians wanted to avoid
another humiliation in the Balkans. They also seemed to be losing their long quest to control the
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Ottoman Empire and the Black Sea. Russia, as always, was also concerned with maintaining its
great power status and did not want to be left behind. It also feared Germany‘s growing military
and economic power. Its strategic and diplomatic ties to Britain and France further complicated
matters and pulled Russia further into European politics and struggles. As Daniel Orlovsky puts
it, ―Like the other powers, Russia was unduly deferential towards strategic planning and the
general staffs, the ideology of the offensive, and the illusion that war could be localized and won
quickly.‖56
In the wake of the First World War, the Treaty of Rapallo opened the way for secret
German-Soviet military co-operation. Germany would be able to conduct training and weapons
testing (forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles) on Soviet soil. In return, the Russians would be
able to increase its military prowess by learning from German military expertise.57
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the increasing likelihood of war in
Europe prompted a radical shift in foreign policy away from seeking collective security with the
Western democracies and towards an accommodation with Hitler. As mentioned earlier, after
examining the democracies actions in Spain, the Soviets concluded that the West could not be
relied upon to come to their assistance in the case of a Nazi attack. Therefore, Stalin signed the
Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. Acting on a secret provision of that Pact,
Soviet armed forces occupied eastern Poland, the three Baltic republics, and the Romanian
province of Bessarabia. The Soviets also invaded Finland and eventually the Soviet army was
victorious in the ‗Winter War‘ of 1939-40. In the wake of these military adventures, the Soviet
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government fed its citizens a steady diet of Soviet patriotism accompanied by a massive build-up
of the armed forces and defense industries.58
Unfortunately, the Soviet leadership failed to understand the nature of Nazi war doctrine.
For example, the Soviet leadership believed that a war with Germany would most likely start
after an extended period of crisis, which would give the Soviet army time to mobilize.59 This
failure to grasp the concept of blitzkrieg, and the aggressive nature of Hitler and Nazism,
doomed the Soviet Union to a disastrous beginning once hostilities actually broke out.

**United Kingdom (1936-1946)**
The Soviet Union‘s relationship with the United Kingdom during the 1930s was largely
one of non-interaction. Though its industrial output had soared and probably overtaken that of
Britain, the Soviet Union had turned inward and was trying to build ―socialism in one country.‖
The trend in the Soviet Union, as with many other countries at the time, was toward autarky. The
Soviet Union was in diplomatic isolation and deeply suspicious of the western democracies.
Furthermore, because of military weakness and the purges of the 1930s, Stalin felt that his
country was passing through a ―danger zone‖ and therefore diplomacy designed to give the
Soviet Union time to heal was the order of the day. The Soviet Union had joined the League of
Nations in 1934 in hopes of getting some collective security benefits.60
From the British side, the psychological scarring that occurred after the First World War
created a sense of isolation and a desire to stay out of Continental affairs. On the other hand, as
suggested in the previous chapter, Russia was seen as a threat to India. During the 1930s, the
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British were becoming conscious that their defensive resources were stretched very thinly, and
that only through diplomacy could they hope to keep their empire intact and free from military
attack. However, British policymakers could not get past their dislike of communism. They,
therefore, could not see the Soviet Union as a potential ally against the fascist threat.61

**United States (1816-1860)**
Alexander I wanted to eliminate tensions between Russia and the United States. To this
end, a treaty was signed between the two countries in 1824 that reduced Russia‘s claims to
Alaska to the area north of 54º 40‘ latitude. Freedom of navigation in the Pacific for both nations
was also recognized.62
By 1857, Alaska was seen as more of a liability than an asset, and the Russians were
willing to sell it to the United States. Its sale was put on hold during the American Civil War, in
which the Russian government was ―markedly friendly‖ to the North.63 Russia decided to
withdraw from North America and sold Alaska to the US in 1867.64*

**Japan (1860-1944)**
Japan, which was totally closed to the outside world until 1855, quickly learned European
ways and established an empire of its own, first in Korea and then in China.65 When the Japanese
emerged on the world stage, they felt no inhibitions with regard to aggressive war. On the eve of
the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894, the Japanese shocked Secretary of State Gresham by telling
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him, ―our situation at home is critical and war with China would improve it by arousing the
patriotic sentiment of our people and more strongly attach them to the Government.‖ However,
it did not surprise the German ambassador in London when his Japanese colleague Baron
Hayashi informed him that there was a predominant view in Tokyo that war with Russia was
inevitable. Hayashi added that many influential politicians were advocating preventive war
against Russia and that a strike should come sooner rather than later. Japanese generals were
confident that their armies could not be defeated during the next two years, and the admirals
were certain that the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet.66
Russia‘s Asian policy had become increasingly expansionist and aggressive since before
the turn of the century. Russia, overall, was in a dominant position over the Japanese, but the
Russians were unprepared when the island nation struck in February 1904. The Japanese felt
compelled to action by the daily strengthening of Russia‘s military position in the Far East.67 The
1904-1905 war resulted in national humiliation for Russia.68 However, even in the wake of this
disastrous conflict, in which Japan gained southern Manchuria and Korea (which it fully annexed
in 1910) Russia continued to strive for great power status. However, its military position was
weaker than ever and the growth of an ever more troublesome deficit made the costs of
rearmament difficult to overcome.69
During their war for the control of China in the early and mid 1930s, the Japanese could
never quite agree on who their next or ultimate enemy would be. For the army, Russia was
originally the chosen enemy. The army plan was to fight the Soviets, when the timing was right,
and with little or no assistance from the navy. If the Japanese military clique ―foresee an eventual
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clash as inevitable,‖ Joseph Grew, American ambassador to Japan, reported in July 1933, ―it is
quite possible that they may intend to strike before Soviet Russia gets stronger—and the time
element is all in favor of the latter.‖ However, for reasons that are more imperialistic than
strategic, Japanese aggression eventually settled on the United States.70 In the end, the Soviet
Union concluded a neutrality pact with Japan in April 1941, and was not inclined to join the war
against them until after the war against Germany had been concluded.71

Analysis
In this section, I assess the performance of my Domestic Politics Model of Prevention in
predicting the outcome of Russian/Soviet policy during the periods under consideration.
Following the method of structured, focused comparison, each of the eleven questions posed in
chapter three are answered, and then an overview of the model‘s performance is outlined for
each question. The typology for this model appears in table 5.1 while the flowcharts for the
individual cases appear in Appendix A.
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Table 5.1: A Typology of Preventive Action

Causal Mechanisms

Containment

Outcomes

Systemic
Structure/
Polarity

Internal
Power
Constraints/
Offense vs.
Defense
Severe/
Defensive
Strategy

Domestic
Political
Constraints/
Pressures

Ruler Belief
Systems/
Perception of
Threats

Severe Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Moderate Acquiescent/
Low – NonMilitarized
Moderate Pragmatic/
Moderate –
NonMilitarized

Acquiescence/
Do Nothing

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Accommodation/
Mix of Strategies/
Carrot and Stick

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
DefensiveOffensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Initiate Sustained
Coercive/
Confrontational
Diplomacy
Initiate
Militarized
Preventive Action

Bipolar/
Unbalanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
OffensiveDefensive
Strategy
Minimal/
Offensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure
Minimal Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Unbalanced
Multipolar

Pragmatic Militant/
Moderate Militarized
Militant Radical/
High Militarized

1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained?
For much of Russia‘s history, it has taken an isolationist viewpoint. From the time
of Alexander III, who abandoned direct intervention in Europe, to the leaders of the
Soviet Union who wanted to wait until the time was right, Russia and then the Soviet
Union was much less aggressive in foreign affairs than is often portrayed.72 For the
first seventy years, the United States (1816-1860), Prussia/Germany (1816-1878), and
Japan (1860-1873, 1878-1888) were the primary challengers to Russia. Though
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Russia was seen by other European powers as the most formidable power on the
continent after the Napoleonic Wars, Russia seems to have always suffered from an
inferiority complex. What we find throughout this period is a Russia that does not
back down from an attack, but also does not go out of its way to get into trouble,
particularly with the other great powers. Nonetheless, when Russia occupied
territories of the Ottoman Empire in 1853, prompting Turkey to declare war on
Russia, and then eventually forcing Britain and France to declare war on Russia,
Russia fought for several years and then sought peace in 1856. This war showed some
serious weaknesses of the Russian military.73 In the wake of the Crimean War, Russia
underwent military and social reforms that prevented it from adopting an overtly
offensive military doctrine.
From the 1890s, Russian leadership was bent on modernization. Heavy
investment from the West helped increase industrialization dramatically. However,
right up until the outbreak of the First World War, compared to other European
powers, Russia continued to be economically backward. Russia‘s population also
doubled between 1863 and 1913, but the economic backwardness of the country
prevented many of these people from reaching their potential. The leadership in
Russia, particularly after the Crimean War, seemed to be holding their breath hoping
that the peace in Europe would last long enough for Russia to catch up with the other
European powers. The war with Japan in 1904-1905, and Russia‘s humiliating defeat,
did not help matters. Through all of this, then, we can conclude that the internal
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constraints on preventive action were quite strong up until the outbreak of the First
World War.74
In terms of the above typology, I would argue that Russian and then Soviet
leadership was severely to moderately limited in terms of internal power constraints
and had a defensive or defensive-offensive strategy for most of this period. The
typology, therefore predicts that Russia/Soviet Union would follow a policy of
acquiescence or accommodation during these periods. In this category, the typology
does a good job predicting actual Russian/Soviet behavior.

2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained?
Since the overwhelming outlook of Russia‘s leaders from 1816 up until the
outbreak of the First World War was to maintain the peace between the major
powers, pro-preventive action advocates were largely silent. Even those who were
advocating an offensive military ideology were much more focused on preemption
instead of prevention.
A similar mindset can be seen among the Soviet leadership after the First World
War. Lenin and Stalin argued that what the Soviet Union needed was time to develop
74
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its own resources and realize the potential of the vast country. Additionally, by
putting off conflict with Western democracies, it would give the capitalist countries a
chance to fight among themselves, thereby weakening themselves while the Soviet
Union would be getting stronger. This would suggest that pro-prevention advocates
would be largely silenced. This orientation toward avoiding conflict with the West
should result in Russian and Soviet leadership that should be acquiescent and
accommodating. Overall, again, the typology in figure 5.1 does a good job predicting
Russian/Soviet behavior.

3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system?
From the time of Alexander I, Russian and then Soviet leaders tended to be
pragmatists. Alexander helped create the European peace of 1816-1914, and his
successors tended to follow suit. In the two major clashes Russia had with foreign
powers between 1816 and 1913, Russia did not initiate military action. It did,
however, take actions that prompted first Turkey and then Japan to declare war. Even
these two moves: seizing the territory of a faltering Ottoman Empire in 1853 and
reneging on its promise to withdraw troops from Manchuria in 1904—however can
be seen as pragmatic moves given Russia‘s dominant power position. Of course, as
we know, both moves ultimately turned out to be less than wise on the part of the
Russian leadership.
William Husband notes:
In its foreign policy, a pragmatic internal logic governed Soviet behavior.
Revolutionary Russia faced a hostile international community in 1921: the
overthrow of tsarism by a mass movement had alarmed the ruling elites in the
West, giving rise to the Red Scare. The Bolshevik state compounded such fears
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when it nationalized industry, including foreign-owned enterprises, and
repudiated the pre-1917 national debt (much of which was held by foreign
creditors).75
The period 1932-1946 seems quite similar to the previous periods, and for similar
reasons. Communist ideology suggested that war amongst the capitalist countries was
inevitable, and that if the Soviet Union just waited and built ―socialism in one
country,‖ it would be the beneficiary of those wars. Lenin and Stalin both suggested
that war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries was not inevitable, or
at a minimum, should be put off as long as possible in order to build up the might of
the Soviet state.
Similarly, Stalin from 1932 up until the Second World War took a pragmatic view
of the international environment. He first attempted to achieve collective security by
reaching out to France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and then when the European
democracies failed them in Spain, the Soviets turned to accommodation with Hitler.
Stalin‘s primary goal was to give the Soviet Union time to build up its defenses.
Whether relying on European democracies or by accommodating Hitler, his goal was
to buy time.
Jack Snyder notes that the Soviets practiced what he calls ―moderate
expansionism‖ that reflected a dichotomy in Soviet strategic thought. Stalin, and
other Soviet leaders, believed that the security of the Soviet Union required expansion
and that real security for the country would only come when socialism replaced
capitalism in the more advanced countries. Therefore, Soviet policy should promote
the spread of socialism. However, the Soviet Union‘s early leaders also believed that
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if they exercised restraint in foreign policy, the capitalist countries would be more
likely to focus their aggression on each other and leave the Soviet Union alone.76
Snyder notes further that while Stalin may have had a hostile image of the
capitalist nations; Stalin was a pragmatist who saw few opportunities to strike first.
Stalin, therefore, tried to avoid provoking the capitalist countries or getting involved
in their squabbles. Instead, he attempted to build a military deterrent. Stalin himself,
in 1925, stated that if war comes ―we shall have to take action, but we shall be the last
to do so in order to throw the decisive weight into the scales.‖77 Furthermore, Snyder
argues, ―Stalin bent over backward to avoid provoking the Japanese and the Nazis.‖78
For both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, then, the leadership was moderatepragmatic. This would suggest an accommodation strategy. If the conclusions reached
here are accurate, the typology in figure 5.1 accurately predicts Russian/Soviet
behavior.

4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)?
Since both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union were economically backwards
and not reliant on global trade or distant colonies, most threats from other powers
were seen as largely military in nature. Unlike Great Britain who had a widely spread
empire and trading interests, Russia had relatively few economic ties to be threatened.
For example, when Bismarck threatened France in 1875, Russia saw this as an
attempt by Germany to start a war. Russia joined France and Britain in opposing the
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German maneuver. This move by Russia, Britain, and France can be seen as a
preventive action against Germany‘s attempts to start a preventive war. This is an
interesting case of prevention to stymie prevention. Even the Russo-German tariff
wars of the 1880s cannot really be classified as preventive in nature. They were more
protective than preventive.
In this case, then, military threats were the primary concern of Russian and Soviet
leadership. Still, even with these perceived military threats, primarily from
Prussia/Germany, they were seen as secondary threats since Germany was likely to
attack towards the west before turning east. Russian military planners therefore faced
what can be classified as a moderate-militarized threat. This would suggest that they
would engage in sustained coercive or confrontational diplomacy. On this level, it
seems that the typology in figure 5.1 does not do a particularly good job of predicting
Russian/Soviet behavior. On the whole, between 1816 and the outbreak of World War
II, accommodation seemed to be more the order of the times from the Russians.

5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable?
We have seen that Alexander I was very involved in preserving peace in Europe
and helped to establish the Concert of Europe. It does not appear that Russian leaders
between 1816 and the outbreak of the First World War viewed conflict with any
particular power as inevitable. On the contrary, Russian leadership wanted to avoid
military conflict with the major powers whenever possible in order to allow Russia to
develop its massive potential.
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The same can be said of the Soviet era up until the outbreak of World War II.
Communist ideology dictated that eventually conflict would occur between the
capitalist countries and the socialist countries, but Lenin thought that at least in the
near future the two sides would be able to cohabitate. Stalin thought that by lying
low, the Soviet Union might be able to sit out conflicts that were likely to occur
among capitalist countries and that by doing so, the USSR would be in a powerful
position should the day of reckoning come between the socialist and capitalist worlds.
So, even in those quarters where conflict was seen as ultimately inevitable, it was
thought to be advantageous to put it off as long as possible. The DPMP, therefore,
would predict that preventive action would be unlikely and that if it did occur it
would be non-militarized in nature.79 Under these conditions, our model predicts
Russian/Soviet behavior fairly accurately.

6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly?
The view that time was on their side prompted Russian military leaders to view
war as more costly in the short term than it would be in the longer term when Russia
would be in a stronger position. Russians in the imperial age and Soviets later
respected Prussian/German military prowess and they went out of their way to avoid
conflict with that nation. The same can be said of the Soviet Union‘s relations with
Japan prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. It seems clear that these
periods, Russian/Soviet leadership believed that general conflict was not worth the
price. For these cases, the DPMP accurately predicts Russian/Soviet behavior.
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Russia was less cautious towards Japan in 1904. It did not withdraw from
Manchuria as it had previously agreed, and does not seem to have been overly
concerned about war with Japan. It seems that conflict with Japan was seen as likely,
but the Russian leadership felt they would be able to defeat the island nation at
relatively little cost. Of course, we now know that Russia would pay a heavy price for
its bungling. For this case, the DPMP predicts that Russia would have engaged in
militarized preventive action. This did not occur since Japan attacked Russia. Our
model fails in this case.

7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war
later?
As already mentioned, quite the opposite is true. The Russian/Soviet leadership
felt that the future was brighter for their country than the present and that a war now
would be more costly than a war later. In the view of the leadership, Russia/the Soviet
Union had immense resources; it just needed time in which it could develop those
resources into military and economic power. On this level, the DPMP somewhat
predicts Russian/Soviet behavior.
The DPMP predicts that the dominant power is likely to take non-militarized
preventive action under these conditions. In some cases Russia/the Soviet Union
engaged in this type of behavior, but more often than not it simply acquiesced or
accommodated the challenger.80 For example, in regards to Germany during the
1932-1938 period, the Soviets first tried to align themselves with the West against
Germany, but failing that, they signed non-aggression pacts with both Germany and
80
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Japan. Therefore, we must conclude that the DPMP does not accurately predict
Russian/Soviet behavior under these conditions.

8) To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would
be greater than the chances of winning a later war?
Again, the leadership of Russia/the Soviet Union was confident that over time,
their power would grow, and therefore the longer they could put off a war, the better
their chances would be to win the conflict. Similar to the last condition, our Domestic
Politics Model of Prevention again predicts that Russia/the Soviet Union was likely to
engage in non-militarized preventive action. This once again holds true in some
instances, but not in others. See Appendix A: Russia/Soviet Union-Prussia/Germany
Threat.

9) To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their
state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy?
In all of the cases with the exception of the United States, Russian leadership felt
that in the end, Russia would emerge as more powerful than its challengers. They
were hopeful that the future belonged to them. When it came to the U.S., however,
they almost seemed resigned to a power sharing agreement. The Russian withdrawal
from North America and consolidation of power in Asia and Europe suggests that
from an early date, Russian leadership was seeing the world in terms of a Russian
sphere of influence and an American sphere of influence.
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I would argue, however, that though Russian leadership in the 1850s and 1860s
did not see the future as particularly bright vis-à-vis the United States, this was of
little concern to them. Their focus was on Asia and Europe, not on North America. In
Appendix A: Russia-US Threat, therefore, I have answered ―no‖ to the question ―Will
status quo continue to worsen if no action is taken?‖ From my research, there was not
an overwhelming concern about the rise of the United States on the part of the
Russian leadership.
As long as the Russian/Soviet leadership did not feel that the status quo was
getting worse (or in the case of the US—they did not care if it would get worse), the
DPMP predicts that preventive action was unlikely or that should there by preventive
action it was likely to be non-militarized in nature. My model seems to do a good job
of predicting Russian/Soviet behavior under these conditions.

10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system?
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by
balanced multipolarity (war somewhat likely), while the period 1903-1918 was
characterized by unbalanced multipolarity (war most likely). 1919 to 1938 constituted
a balanced multipolar system (war somewhat likely) while 1939 to 1945 was an
unbalanced multipolar system (war most likely). According to his theory of offensive
realism, war was therefore somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and again from 1919
to 1938. War was most likely during the periods 1903-1918 and 1939 to 1945. 81 One
question this theory does not answer is this: Why did war occur in 1914 and not, in
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say 1910 when the structure was the same? Mearsheimer‘s model comes up short in
answering this puzzle.
The typology of preventive action developed in this study also incorporates
Mearsheimer‘s concepts of polarity (see table 5.1 above). Within the typology, a
―Balanced multipolar‖ system suggests that Russia should have acquiesced or have
used a mixed strategy, which is at least partially correct. However, in the later
―unbalanced multipolar‖ system, the typology predicts that Russia should have used
coercive/confrontational diplomacy. On this point, the typology does not do a good
job of accurately predicting the behavior of Russia/the Soviet Union.

11) What type of government exists in each state, i.e., are either or both
democracies? 82
Between 1816 and 1879, Russia is classified as an autocracy as is
Prussia/Germany. During this period, Japan is classified as an anocracy. The United
States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller‘s
model, Russia should have either formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive
war against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.83
Russia was a key player in the Concert of Europe and was active in European
affairs, particularly under the rule of Alexander I and Nicholas. Many of the
agreements reached during this period could be viewed as defensive alliances, so
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Schweller‘s model seems to hold up during this time. However, Russia did not
engage in preventive war, or preventive action of any kind during this entire period.
From 1880 to 1896, Russia and Germany were classified as autocracies. The UK
is classified as a full democracy and Japan is classified as an anocracy. Therefore,
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against
Germany, Japan, the UK and the United States. Russia continued to be involved in
European affairs, but not in an overly aggressive way. Defensive agreements were
made, but no real preventive action was taken.
From 1897 to 1902, Russia and Germany were still autocracies. Japan was still
classified as an anocracy while the United States and the United Kingdom are
classified as full democracies.84 Therefore, Russia should have formed a defensive
alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany, Japan, the UK and the United
States. Again, Schweller‘s model somewhat predicts what Russia did during this time.
Russia did not engage in preventive war, but its agreements at the Hague and
elsewhere could be seen as entering into defensive alliances with other powers.
During 1903 and 1904, Russia is classified as an autocracy while Japan is
classified as an anocracy. Therefore, Russia should have formed a defensive alliance
or initiated preventive war against Japan. In reality, Russia did neither. It attempted to
continue its expansion in Asia, but Russia was humiliated when Japan launched a war
against it in an attempt to put a halt to its expansionist dreams in Asia.
Until 1906, Russia was still an autocracy and Russia‘s rulers refused to recognize
any law that could not be subordinated to or reversed by the autocrat.85 In 1906, the
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government of Russia underwent a significant change. On 23 April 1906, Russia
formerly acquired a constitution, though it was flawed in several ways. Despite its
shortcomings, it did have at least the potential to put some restrictions on the tsar‘s
ability to increase military budgets. This now had to be approved by the Duma.86
Between 1906 and 1918, Russia and Japan are classified as anocracies. Therefore,
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against
Japan. What we really see, though, is a turning inward and westward by Russia
during this time. With the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea, there was less incentive
for Russia to continue attempted expansion in Asia. In any case, the events in Europe
began to demand more attention than events in Asia.
Between 1932 and 1946, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. Germany
is classified as an anocracy in 1932, but then is classified as an autocracy between
1933 and 1944. Japan is classified as an anocracy between 1932 and 1944. The
United Kingdom is classified as a democracy between 1932 and 1946. Therefore,
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against all
of these powers. Of course, this did not happen. The Soviet Union did not engage in
preventive action during this period, and several of the agreements that it entered into
were not defensive against these powers. The Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact of
August 1939 was not a defensive alliance against Germany, as would be predicted by
the Schweller model. Schweller‘s model seems to fail spectacularly in predicting
Russian Soviet behavior. All of these periods and predictions are summarized in table
5.2.

86

Ibid., 221.

162

Regime Type
Predicted Russian/Soviet Action

Table 5.2 Mearsheimer‘s and Schweller‘s Predicted Outcomes

Time Period

Power Distribution
Russia/Soviet Union

UK

Prussia/Germany

Japan

US

Predicted Outcome
1816-1879

Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely

Autocracy

Autocracy
Defensive Alliance or
Preventive War

Anocracy
Democracy
Defensive Alliance
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
or Preventive War
1880-1896
Balanced Multipolar
Autocracy
Anocracy
War Somewhat Likely
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
1897-1902
Balanced Multipolar
Autocracy
Anocracy
War Somewhat Likely
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
1903-1904
Unbalanced Multipolar
Autocracy
Anocracy
War most likely
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
1905-1913
Unbalanced Multipolar
Anocracy*
Anocracy
War most likely
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
1914-1918
Unbalanced Multipolar
Anocracy
Anocracy
War most likely
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
1932-1938
Balanced Multipolar
Autocracy
Democracy
Autocracy**
Anocracy
War Somewhat Likely
Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance or
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
Preventive War
or Preventive War
1939-1945
Unbalanced Multipolar
Autocracy
Democracy
Autocracy
Anocracy
War most likely
Defensive Alliance Defensive Alliance or
Defensive Alliance
or Preventive War
Preventive War
or Preventive War
* Russia was in turmoil in 1905 and therefore there is no Polity IV data for that year for Russia. Russia is classified as an anocracy starting in 1906.
**For 1932, Germany is actually classified as an anocracy, but then in 1933 its classification reverts to autocracy.
Blank boxes indicate that Russia/the Soviet Union was no longer in relative decline vis-à-vis the other power or the other power had surpassed Russia/the Soviet
Union. Either condition is outside the scope of this research.
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Conclusion
Russian and Soviet leadership had a largely optimistic view of the future for their state.
Despite chronic economic and military weakness, both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union saw
themselves as great powers at least equivalent to the most powerful states in Europe, Asia, and
North America. Moreover, their belief that time was on their side and that they would only
continue to get stronger led to a belief that conflict with other great powers should be avoided
whenever possible. This was taken to an extreme in communist ideology, which suggested that
the capitalist nations would fight amongst themselves, and a neutral Soviet Union would be the
true beneficiary of such a conflict.
This optimism about the future precluded a strong preventive school of thought from
taking root in either Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. Russia and the Soviet Union both
largely accommodated rising powers, in much the same way that Britain had done, though for
very different reasons. British leadership was largely resigned to a fate of declining power, while
Russian and Soviet leadership were optimistic about their power potential.
In the case of Russia and the Soviet Union, the typology and model developed for this
research project perform about as well as Mearsheimer‘s polarity model and better than
Schweller‘s democracy model. Where the DPMP does fail (nature of threat, expected cost of
war, perceived chances of winning a war), it does not fail completely. Unfortunately, because it
is correct some of the time while missing the mark at other times, we must conclude that on these
dimensions, it performs poorly as a predictor of Russian/Soviet behavior.
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Chapter Six
The Decline of the United States
This chapter examines the decline of the United States vis-à-vis several rising powers
from the middle of the nineteenth century to the close of the twentieth century. The first section
of this chapter is meant to serve as a very brief overview of America‘s rise to power and its
foreign policy. The rest of the chapter will delve into particular aspects of America‘s relative
decline, the specific threats to its dominance of the Western Hemisphere and the international
system, and its reaction to those challenges.

A Brief Overview of American Power and Foreign Policy
The story of the United States‘ rise to prominence begins in 1783, but even as early as
1776; the rebellious colonies were showing signs of their future greatness. In that year, by some
accounts, the Americans were producing more pig iron and bar iron than Great Britain.1 By the
1770s, New Englanders may have been the wealthiest people in the world with per capita
incomes that were at least equal to that in Great Britain. New Englanders also had bigger farms,
bigger families, and better educations than their counterparts living in the old country did.2
Furthermore, victory against Great Britain in the Revolutionary War (1775-83) ensured
independence for the American colonists and began the long process of the breakup of the
British Empire.3
The march forward for the new nation would not be without its challenges and pitfalls,
however. After the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, Britain and the major powers in Europe reacted
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negatively to liberal revolutionary movements. In Europe, there was a movement back toward
monarchism. The ―Holy Alliance‖—made up of Russia, Austria, and Prussia—vowed to deal
with countries whose governments had been changed by revolution. Americans were obviously
concerned about this wave of anti-liberalism, but they were also absorbed in their own domestic
affairs and a looming civil war.4
In the wake of its civil war, the United States emerged more powerful and influential than
ever. By the end of the 1870s, the U.S. ranked among the richest countries in the world.5 The
historian John Lewis Gaddis notes that by the 1860s, it was already becoming clear to the rest of
the world that the United States‘ industrial strength and military might was becoming
formidable. He argues, however, that Americans were never very comfortable with the power
they accumulated and they were not always confident of their ability to wield power wisely. The
foreign policy of the U.S. was, he asserts, ―curiously unassertive.‖6
By the mid-1890s, despite greatly increased power, the U.S. continued to show
apprehension in wielding its new power. For example, even though it created a colony in the
Philippines, the U.S. government almost immediately saw this as a mistake and began to prepare
the Filipino people for independence. Furthermore, the U.S. refused to turn Cuba into a colonial
possession. Even after the First World War, the United States dismantled its military and then
rejected Woodrow Wilson‘s primary vehicle, the League of Nations, for exercising American
power.7 It would take another global conflagration to convince Americans that their leadership in
world matters could be beneficial.
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After the Second World War, the United States chose to be much more engaged in global
affairs. In July 1944, at the Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) Conference, the United States took
the lead in formulating a postwar monetary and economic system.8 It also oversaw the creation
of the United Nations and other international mechanisms designed to prevent another global
conflict. With the onset of the global struggle with the Soviet Union in the wake of the Second
World War, American involvement on the world stage was entrenched. With the fall of the
Soviet Union and the apparent triumph of democracy, the United States became the sole
superpower and the undisputed leader of the international system.
Despite its dramatic rise to power, the United States did not go unchallenged. The Soviet
Union confronted the United States at various times during the twentieth century. Prussia and
then Germany posed concerns for the United States from the late 1840s through the end of the
1930s. Japan challenged the United States for supremacy in Asia and elsewhere periodically
from the mid-1860s up through the early 1980s. The United Kingdom, though an ally of the
United States, also grew in power relative to the U.S. at various times between 1930 and 1996.
The rest of the chapter will examine these challenges to American dominance and how the U.S.
responded to these challenges.

Power Relations9
United States vis-à-vis Russia/Soviet Union
Between 1816 and 1860, Russia was in a dominant position over the United States. In
1861, the United States surpassed Russia and maintained that dominance, with only short breaks
8
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until the early 1970s. However, between 1863 and 1970, there were three periods in which the
United States, while still dominant, was in relative decline to either Russia or the Soviet Union.
These will be explored in detail in this chapter. See figure 6.1 below.

Figure 6.1

United States vis-à-vis the United Kingdom
In 1892, the United States reached parity with the United Kingdom. However, it was not
until 1897 that the U.S. successfully took the lead for good. Still, as was the case with Russia, the
U.S. was in relative decline vis-à-vis the UK at various times during the twentieth century. We
will examine these periods of relative decline in this chapter. See Figure 6.2 below.
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Figure 6.2

United States vis-à-vis Prussia/Germany
In the year 1844, the United States matched the power of Prussia for the first time. For
most of the next century and a half, the United States would maintain a dominant position over
the Prussian and then the German state. There were three periods during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, however, in which the U.S. did decline relative to Prussia and Russia. We
will study these periods in this chapter. See Figure 6.3 below.
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Figure 6.3

United States vis-à-vis Japan
The United States has dominated the relationship with Japan since the island nation
joined the modern international system in the 1860s. Like the other relationships outlined above,
however, there were periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which the U.S. declined
relative to Japan. These periods will be examined in this chapter. See Figure 6.4 below.
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Figure 6.4

In summary, this chapter examines the following instances in which the United States
was in a dominant but relatively declining position in relation to the challenger:
United States – Russia/Soviet Union: 1863 – 1875, 1925 – 1938, 1946 – 1970
United States – Prussia/Germany: 1849 – 1858, 1873 – 1888, 1920 – 1939
United States – Japan: 1865 – 1876, 1930 – 1939, 1952 – 1982
United States – United Kingdom: 1930 – 1939, 1946 – 1996

Nature of the Threat
Robert Kagan argues that Americans in the nineteenth century did not view the world
through the lens of power but instead ―evaluated other nations and their relationship to the
United States according to where they stood on the continuum of progress.‖ Some nations were
advancing on this continuum at a rapid pace, some were moving ahead more slowly, and others
were not moving at all or perhaps even sliding backward. In the contemporary American view,
the global achievement of Western liberal civilization was the ultimate goal, since Americans
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equated progress and civilization with peace and their own national security. They believed
that the more advanced, liberal, and commercial a people were, the more attuned they would
be to modern concepts of justice and morality and the less inclined to war and aggression.10
This view of the world as a continuum of progress and civilization helped Americans
organize their international affairs. It created a moral compass by which countries could be
judged ―bad,‖ ―good,‖ ―improving,‖ etc. The more backward and despotic a nation, the more
dangerous it was considered. Russia was usually viewed in this light . Germany too was
seen as backward and repressive as the expectation of budding liberalism faded. These
countries were considered dangerous both because their concepts of justice and morality were
less developed than liberal democracies, and because they retained the warlike spirit
characteristic of societies in the ―barbaric‖ stage.
Kagan notes that these moral judgments often blurred into strategic judgments.
Since Russia was ―bad,‖ it needed to be constantly scrutinized and beaten back when
necessary. Some Americans were also concerned that advanced liberal societies like the United States
were in danger of losing the martial spirit necessary to defend themselves, and therefore civilizing the
world‘s barbaric peoples was all the more urgent. The world had to be made safe for civilized
peoples before they lost the will or the capacity to destroy the barbarians.
On a more positive side, many Americans saw ―opening‖ other nations to commerce in
the American interest not only because of the possibility of making money, but also because of
a belief that over time commercial interaction would lead to the progress of backward
peoples toward civilization. They would become more liberal, more commercial, and therefore
less threatening to the United States and to the civilized world in general. The spread of
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civilization would bring order worldwide through the spread of morality and the
reinforcement of virtue. For example, Japan was often viewed as a good candidate for progress
and on the path toward western style liberalism. It, therefore, could be allowed to expand at
Russia‘s expense without causing much concern. 11

Economic Challenges
In the late nineteenth century, the United States emerged as an economic powerhouse.
Europeans warned of an ―American invasion‖ of U.S.-made goods and U.S. based multinational
corporations long before they worried about U.S. military, political, or cultural power. One
example of this was that by 1914, Russia‘s largest integrated commercial enterprises were two
American based multinational corporations: Singer Sewing Machine and International
Harvester.12 During the twentieth century, this economic prowess would only grow, but there
were challenges to this dominance.

**Russia/Soviet Union**
Russia and then the Soviet Union never presented much of an economic threat to the
United States, with the exception of the mid 1880s, when Russia represented an economic
challenge for the United States primarily in terms of oil. 13
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**Prussia/Germany**
The primary period of German economic challenge to the United States (at least for the
purposes of this study) was during the 1870s and1880s. During this period, German commercial
interests were growing in Latin America. By the 1880s, Germany was second only to the British
in Costa Rica‘s coffee export industry. The Germans were also becoming a dominant force in
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. German commercial interests in the area also
manifested other, perhaps more threatening, undertones. In the 1870s, Berlin sent a six-ship war
fleet to Nicaragua to protect German investors and collect an indemnity. In the early 1880s, the
German minister to the region accused the United States of harboring imperial designs on the
region. At the same time, Germany attempted to establish naval bases and colonies in the region.
Secretary of State James G. Blaine responded to these challenges to U.S. leadership in Latin
America by pushing for a Pan-American movement. The united response of the various
American nations was so negative that German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had to make a
tactical retreat.14

**Japan**
Early conflicts between the United States and Japan, though occurring during a period of
relative American decline, are not at all clearly of a preventive nature. For example, Japan, still
trying to close itself off from the West in 1864, apparently burned the U.S. legation. It then
closed the Strait of Shimoneseki to all foreign shipping. Secretary of State William H. Seward
reacted viscerally to any nation that tried to shut itself off from trade. He saw such moves as
unnatural and immoral. Seward especially grew angry because the Japanese opposed the
promotion and practicing of Christianity. Because of these indignities, the U.S.S. Wyoming
14
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joined British, French, and Dutch ships that blasted their way into the Strait of Shimoneseki and
then, in 1866, dictated trade treaties.15 It is difficult to characterize these actions as preventive.
On the contrary, they seem to be actions designed to open Japan to the West and thus, at least in
accordance with the thinking of the time, advance its development.
Beginning in 1868, Japan transformed its government and committed to modernize the
country along Western industrial lines. The U.S. minister to Japan in the mid-1870s, Judge John
A. Bingham, rewarded the Japanese by showing sympathy to Japanese demands for tariff
autonomy. He also understood that U.S.-Japan cooperation could undercut the powerful British
position in the Japanese market.16
Japan again challenged American economic dominance in the decades following the
Second World War. In the early 1960s, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato decided that Japan would
adopt a policy of ―low posture‖ on defense and would avoid international quarrels, concentrating
instead on economic development. This was the beginning of the Ikeda ―income-doubling‖
program that led ultimately to the Japanese ―economic miracle.‖ Still, it was not until the 1970s
that Japanese automobiles, TV sets, and other electronic products began to make serious inroads
into the American market. Once this did occur, however, it created problems for American
companies. This in turn aroused strong congressional sentiment and heralded the era of ―Japanbashing‖ in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This challenge had created economic, political, and
philosophical conditions that were taxing the viability and strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
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Competition between the two nations was turning adversarial, so that rivalry rather than
accommodation set the tone.17
Although the 1960s started out inauspiciously, the decade saw the beginning of the
remarkable economic growth that was to bring Japan in a few years to the position of third
greatest economic power in the world. The Korean War (1950-1953) provided a sharp spurt to
Japan‘s economy, as American procurement for the war could be most economically
accomplished in Japan. The period thereafter, especially the 1960s, became Japan‘s takeoff for
economic growth, averaging in excess of 10 percent per year throughout the decade. In 1962, the
Gross National Product (GNP) was already three times that of the prewar period 1934-1936.18
Until 1965, the United States exported more goods to Japan than it imported; but in that
year, the balance turned the other way. By 1972, two-way trade amounted to $14 billion, with a
surplus for Japan of $4.9 billion. By 1981, there was a trade deficit, on the American side of the
ledger of $16 billion. By 1982, total trade had climbed to $60 billion, and the American deficit
had amounted to $17 billion.19
The relationship between the United States and Japan in the post World War II era,
however, is a complex one. While many Americans railed against Japanese imports, the United
States provided 80 percent of Japan‘s grain imports and 95 percent of its requirements for
soybeans. Japan, in fact, was the leading customer for American farmers. Annually, American
farmers supplied over $7 billion worth of agricultural products to Japan.20
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This complicated relationship extended to Japanese investments in the U.S. where
Japanese investment had generally been welcomed. However, starting in the late 1970s and early
1980s, there were the beginning signs of what some Japanese called ―investment frictions.‖ Even
the appearance that Japan was freely buying up American properties with profits from an unfair
trade system—whether true or not—could create an explosive political situation. However, even
under these circumstances, Japanese investors could count on significant political allies in the
United States. Besides businesses, their American partners included local populations and
mayors, governors and members of Congress who saw jobs being created and economic activity
being stimulated in their districts. State governments, in fact, competed with each other for
Japanese investments.21

**United Kingdom**
The United Kingdom never presented an economic threat to the United States (during the
periods under consideration in this chapter). Therefore, we will now turn to various military
threats to American supremacy.

Military Threats
**Russia/Soviet Union**
Despite the fact that Russia was rising relative to the United States during the American
Civil War, most Union supporters viewed Russia favorably. They mistakenly believed that the
tsar had intervened on the Union‘s side when the Russian fleet had entered New York harbor.22
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Furthermore, Alexander II had endeared himself to Northern antislavery leaders when he freed
the serfs in 1861.23
This atmosphere of goodwill helped pave the way to the purchase of Alaska in 1867. A
deal to buy Alaska from Russia had been in the works for decades since the Russians had long
understood, at least since the 1830s, that they had lost control of Alaska‘s trade and even its food
supply to New England traders who had been exploiting the region for decades. Nor, the
Russians reasoned, could the territory be defended against a British attack from neighboring
Canada, or against the Americans should they choose to settle in the territory. In the face of this
no-win-situation, officials around Tsar Nicholas I wanted to divest Russia of Alaska. By the mid1850s, the tsar was ready to sell, but the American Civil War precluded any transaction. The
afterglow of Russia‘s perceived support during the Civil War helped warm the political
atmosphere. This, in turn, allowed Secretary of State William H. Seward to sign the treaty to
purchase the territory.24 The sale of Alaska was significant because, by selling the territory to the
U.S., Russia essentially abandoned the Western Hemisphere. By doing so, and for the next three
decades, Russia posed little danger to perceived American interests.25
The goodwill between the two countries began to evaporate, however, even before the
ink was dry on the Alaska purchase treaty. Starting in the 1860s, Alexander II began enforcing
old anti-Semitic regulations. Tsarist authorities often did not bother to distinguish between
Russian Jews and American Jews, abusing and sometimes arresting American Jews. In the late
1860s, and for the next three decades, this issue (and other human rights issues) came to
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dominate Russian-American relations as many Americans came to despise the Russian
government.26

Before the Cold War27
During the 1920s and up until 1933, the official policy of the United States government
regarding the Soviet Union was ―nonrecognition.‖ This policy allowed the United States to make
clear its dislike for what was happening in the Soviet Union without actually doing anything
about it. While American officials would welcome the overthrow of Bolshevism, the American
government was not prepared to take active measures—beyond denying normal diplomatic
relations—to bring that event about. Instead the government would rely upon the effects of
isolation and the passage of time to produce the desired results.28
This policy ultimately backfired during the 1920s. By the mid 1920s, most of the world‘s
nations had established diplomatic ties with Moscow. The Republican administrations of the
1920s also inadvertently helped to stabilize the Soviet regime through the Republican
commitment to the ideals of limited government and free enterprise. According to these
principles, the government had no authority to force private American individuals and
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corporations into compliance with official policy. Therefore, American trade, investment, and
famine relief, played a major role in stabilizing the new Soviet government.29
American diplomatic recognition for the Soviet regime finally came in 1933.30 Goodwill
from the recognition, however, had largely dissipated by 1939. The Nazi-Soviet pact and the
invasion of Finland caused whatever amity was left to disappear altogether. Still, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt took the consistent position that Germany posed a greater threat to world
order than did the Soviet Union. He resisted pressures to break diplomatic relations with
Moscow following the pact with Germany and the attack on Finland. He shared intelligence with
Stalin pointing to the likelihood of a German attack; and when that attack finally came, in June
1941, he immediately embraced the Russians as allies and within months made them eligible for
Lend Lease. As Gaddis points out, ―These were not the actions of a nation determined to exploit
the vulnerabilities of another.‖31
Gaddis also suggests, ―There is simply no evidence that the Roosevelt administration at
any point contemplated taking advantage of what in retrospect was the most obvious opportunity
since 1917 to eliminate the Soviet regime: alignment, whether openly or surreptitiously, with the
geopolitical objectives of Adolf Hitler.‖ While it is true that the United States was content to
allow the Red Army to bear the main burden of ground fighting in Europe, it is not clear at all
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that the United States and Great Britain could have created a successful second front much
earlier than they did.32

The Cold War
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was a crippled giant. It was in no
condition to engage in any kind of protracted economic or military competition with its
American rival. The United States, on the other hand, was at the height of its strength. It had
suffered relatively few casualties and little civilian dislocation. Its industrial capacity was
actually twice what it had been before the war. Perhaps most importantly, it possessed a
monopoly over atomic weapons and the means to deliver them.33
While the United States government at no point committed itself to overthrowing the
Soviet regime, after 1945 it did take the lead in containing the expansion of Moscow‘s influence
in the postwar world.34 After the death of President Roosevelt, President Harry S Truman tilted
to the side of the hard-liners in his government almost immediately after assuming the
presidency. Many of the hard-liners stayed on as the new president‘s chief policy advisers, while
former FDR intimates began to leave. The hardliners offered clear-cut advice that was consistent
with the new president‘s general outlook.35 The new president had a dislike for communism and
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was more critical of the Soviet Union than Roosevelt had been.36 Truman also hoped to
demonstrate his toughness and decisiveness as a policymaker.
However, Truman also understood the importance of the wartime alliance.37 As a result,
his get-tough attitude did not immediately translate into a clear shift in policy.38 Instead, there
was a gradual change in tone toward the Soviets. This was, in part, due to a changing view about
the role the U.S. should play in Korea after the war.39 Despite these new concerns about the
Soviet Union, there was never any real attempt to engage them through militarized preventive
action.
Not everyone in the Truman administration agreed that the United States should be taking
a harder line with the Soviets. Henry Wallace, Truman‘s Secretary of Commerce, delivered a
speech in September 1946 in which he argued that containment was not the appropriate approach
to take regarding the Soviet Union. The president soon fired him.40
By 1946 and especially in 1947, the ascendant attitude in Washington found expression
in a general policy of containment. The new policy was announced by Truman in March 1947
along with a request to Congress for support for embattled Greece and Turkey. The president
took the occasion to articulate the fundamental principle behind the containment policy: the
United States would support any free people threatened by communist aggression or subversion.
In June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a program of economic aid to ensure
stability in the vital western European sector of the containment line. The next month, in a
widely read essay, Director of the State Department‘s policy-planning staff, George F. Kennan
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(disguised as ―X‖), published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he laid out the strategic and
moral implications of the Truman administration‘s new course.41
Kennan argued that the task of American diplomacy should be to ensure that Moscow‘s
attempts to widen its influence were unsuccessful, and to persuade Soviet leaders to moderate
their hostility toward the outside world. In an attempt to accomplish these goals, Kennan wanted
to build countervailing centers of power along the periphery of the Soviet Union, through
mechanisms like the Marshall Plan. He also hoped that these countervailing centers of power
would erode Moscow‘s control over its own satellites. He believed that given such a situation,
Soviet leaders would be forced to moderate their suspicion of the outside world.42
Despite the increasingly belligerent tone coming from Washington, Stalin continued to
remain hopeful through the first half of 1947 that the Soviet Union and the United States would
be able to remain friendly in the post war environment. When Truman stated his doctrine,
drawing an ideological line across the world, Stalin responded with a cool reaffirmation of the
possibilities of cooperation. Nor did Stalin approve of the leftist resistance in Greece. In fact, as
Hunt notes, he called on Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria to terminate their support of the
movement. Moreover, Stalin did not immediately reject the Marshall Plan. Instead, he sent a
delegation led by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Paris to explore the intentions behind
the plan.43
When Molotov reported to Moscow, however, Stalin had to conclude finally that the
United States was trying to use its economic power to tighten its grip on Western Europe and to
dislodge the Soviet Union from its advanced position in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Soviet
intelligence in London had sent word of Anglo-American consultations over how best to direct
41
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the Marshall Plan against Soviet interests. At the same time, Molotov reported from his
preliminary soundings in Paris that Britain and France were ―now in dire straits,‖ so that only
submission to U.S. interference would enable them ―to overcome their economic difficulties.‖
Stalin decided to withdraw his delegation from the Paris meetings and forbade participation in
the Marshall Plan by the eastern Europeans.44
As relations between the two countries began to cool, there was talk about initiating a
preventive war against the Soviet Union, though few people took it seriously.45 However, there
was a real question regarding how much military strength would be necessary to discourage a
Soviet attack against the West. The United States wanted to have enough military power to deter
the Soviet Union, but not so much that the Soviet Union was provoked. Kennan was convinced
that the Russians had nothing to gain by starting a war. The Truman administration in 1947 and
1948, accepting this assessment and accepting the calculated risk that the Russians would not
attack, concentrated on economic rather than military instruments of containment. However,
provocations in Europe such as the coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin set off
calls from Europeans themselves for American military guarantees. The Truman administration
would ultimately respond by creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).46
The year1948 proved to be a watershed year in American-Soviet relations. In June,
Stalin—in an attempt to disrupt the Anglo-American-French effort to unite their zones of
occupation in Germany—placed a blockade on Berlin. Once it was clear that the blockade had
failed, Stalin abandoned crude pressure and turned to diplomacy to achieve his foreign policy
goals. As the United States moved toward the creation of NATO and toward West German
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membership in that military alliance, the Soviet leader proposed a united but demilitarized
Germany. Washington was no longer interested in Soviet plans regarding Germany.47
The lines of the Cold War solidified when the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapon in
1949. It was also in 1949 that Communist forces achieved victory in China over U.S.-backed
Nationalist forces. Despite this seemingly good fortune for the communist bloc, Stalin‘s worst
fears were realized with the Creation of NATO in 1949, and the integration of West Germany
into that military alliance. From the Soviet perspective, they now faced a capitalist line of
encirclement stretching from Turkey to Norway. It was becoming increasingly clear that Western
Europe was lost. In order to counter the new American policy of containment, Stalin began to
look elsewhere for revolutionary allies, especially among national-liberation movements. Then,
in 1950, American policymakers were shaken by the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet alliance.48
Policymakers had also been dazed by the development of the Soviet atomic bomb. This
event opened the possibility of nuclear retaliation against the United States or its allies. It also set
off a debate about whether the United States should respond by building a ―super‖ or hydrogen
bomb. Opponents of the H-bomb questioned whether the new weapon would add any measure of
security not already provided by atomic bombs. They also wondered whether it would
irreparably damage prospects for the eventual control of atomic weapons and whether it would
provoke the Russians into developing H-bombs of their own. Furthermore, they questioned the
wisdom of nuclear weapons as the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression in the first place.
Proponents of the H-bomb argued that whatever the military value of the new weapon, it was
necessary to build it because the Russians surely would.49
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A related issue to the ongoing discussion about the H-bomb was the development of a
new national security strategy in 1950. In response to these and other developments, the National
Security Council put forward a fresh appraisal of the global situation. This report, NSC-68,
offered a stark, even cataclysmic picture of ideological struggle between the American-led West
and the Soviet-dominated East. NSC-68 concluded with proposals for a major increase in the
defense budget. Truman immediately approved the general outlines of NSC-68 but asked for
more information on the costs of the programs recommended in its conclusion. With the
outbreak of war in Korea, however, Truman fully embraced NSC-68 and authorized a tripling of
defense spending.50
Like Kennan, the authors of NSC-68 foresaw the possibility of exploiting potential cracks
and weaknesses within the international Communist movement. The assumptions and goals of
containment suggested that though the Soviet Union held an expansionist ideology, it was up to
the United States to maintain the balance of power. Furthermore, containment of the Soviet
Union could be accomplished without war between the two powers, but if war should occur
between the U.S. and a Soviet proxy, the war could be kept carefully limited. The policy of
containment also suggested that while internal change within the Soviet Union itself was not a
prerequisite for the success of containment, the success of containment might bring about
internal change. Finally, if containment was successful in bringing about internal changes to the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union might then be assimilated into the established international order.
Containment promised no immediate results and no one could predict how long it might take. It
depended upon the ability of Soviet leaders to free themselves from their own self-generated
illusions.51

50
51

Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 126.
Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations, 28-30.

186

Korea as an Early Theater
Containment started to manifest itself even before the end of the Second World War.
General Marshall and his colleagues in the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the U.S. should occupy
at least part of Korea in order to increase American power in the postwar balance between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Far East. Still, it was only after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki
on 9 August 1945 that the U.S. planning for the occupation of Korea began in earnest. While the
U.S. did not want to see the Soviet Union take control of the entire peninsula, there was a lack of
commitment from Washington to support a government in the south. In essence, Korea was not
important enough to warrant a deep commitment, but was too important to allow it to fall to the
communists. Because of this American desire to reduce its presence in Korea, and still minimize
the risk of the entire peninsula becoming communist in the short term, the UN became heavily
involved in Korean affairs. The priority for the United States was clearly the occupation of Japan,
and preventing the Soviets from having any role in its occupation. The Soviets ultimately agreed
to the 38th parallel as the demarcation line in Korea.52
Despite the fact that the U.S. government at first did not see Korea as the cornerstone of
the policy of containment, Korea was important to Truman for two main reasons. First, he did
not want to open himself up to accusations of ―losing‖ another country to communism. Second,
he viewed a communist Korean peninsula as a threat to Japan, which was seen as a key element
of American strategy in the Far East.53
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Post Korea Cold War
Despite the increasing competition between the East and West in the aftermath of the
Korean War, by the mid-1950s President Dwight D. Eisenhower acknowledged that nuclear war
with the Soviet Union was unwinnable by either side. About that same time, Moscow was also
ready to concede that there could be no winner in a nuclear war with the West.54 Instead of an
actual war with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and his advisers foresaw a long-term competitive
relationship with the Soviet Union. This conclusion was based on two developments that
manifested themselves in the late 1940s and early 1950s. First, Moscow‘s progress in developing
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them meant that war could destroy the United States
itself. Because of this fact, Eisenhower quietly ruled out direct military confrontation between
the two superpowers. Second, Eisenhower believed that the strategy of building centers of
resistance to the Russians in all parts of the world threatened by Soviet expansion ran the risk of
bankrupting the United States and ultimately undermining its way of life. The president thus
neither expected nor sought a quick end to Soviet-American competition. Instead, he
concentrated on finding ways to allow the U.S. to sustain that rivalry over an extended period,
and to do so while reducing the chances of war between the superpowers.55
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not see the SinoSoviet bloc as a unified monolith. Dulles, in fact, sought to implement strategies for driving a
wedge between the Soviet Union and China. The public, however, knew nothing of this. Official
rhetoric continued, well into the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to portray a monolithic
communist threat to the ―free world.‖ Gaddis suggests that this was done ―for fear that the
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domestic consensus in support of containment might crumble if the threat came to seem less
awesome than in fact it appeared to be.‖56
Eisenhower‘s preferred strategy was the so-called ―New Look.‖ This approach relied
heavily upon the prospect of nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet expansionism while at the same
time conserving limited American resources. Official strategists came to emphasize deterrence
through the accumulation of overwhelming and instantly deliverable force. The strategy,
however, did not depend wholly upon the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower also
endorsed negotiations as a way of reducing the danger of war while lowering the costs of
confrontation. Gaddis argues, ―Since surrender was unthinkable, military victory impossible, and
the cost of long-term containment unacceptable,‖ it seemed reasonable to find ways in which the
Soviet-American rivalry—which was seen as inevitable—could be carried on within a mutually
acceptable framework. Through such a framework, the two sides would be able to coexist
indefinitely. This policy of competitive coexistence was continued by the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations.57
John F. Kennedy had made much of the issue of a ―missile gap‖ between the Soviet
Union and the United States during the 1960 campaign. Even after he learned what Eisenhower
had known all along—that the Soviet threat had been grossly overrated—Kennedy continued to
carry out a massive missile-building program. This buildup probably set off the actual Soviet
building program that would bring the Russians to the point of parity with the United States in
missile launchers by the end of the decade.58
By the time President Lyndon Johnson left office, the conditions of competition had
dramatically changed, and not to the advantage of the United States. The U.S.‘s military exploits
56

Ibid., 55-56.
Ibid., 32-57.
58
Ibid., 56.
57

189

in Southeast Asia had severely weakened its standing, both at home and in the world at large. In
the meantime, the Soviet Union had used the opportunity to strengthen its own military position,
and with somewhat less success, to widen its influence in the rest of the world. Still, no one in
Washington had explicitly repudiated the goal of competitive coexistence first articulated by
President Eisenhower.59
The incoming Nixon administration, however, saw the Kennedy-Johnson strategy as a
failure that had allowed the Soviet Union to approach military parity with the United States. The
new administration was determined to reverse this trend. However, Nixon‘s critics argued that
the new administration was simply accommodating itself to the unfavorable reality. Nixon‘s
strategy, ―cooperative coexistence‖ added yet another chapter to the strategy of containment. 60

**Prussia/Germany**
Americans—at least Northerners, Republicans, and the U.S. government they
controlled—supported Bismarck‘s Germany for a brief time during and just after the FrancoPrussian War of 1870-71. Prussia‘s pro-Union leanings during the American Civil War and
German immigrants—an ethnic population that outnumbered French immigrants fifteen to one—
had contributed to the northern cause and was also a crucial Republican voting bloc in several
states.61 It also helped that Germany‘s opponent was France, a country that many northerners
despised because of France‘s pro-southern sympathies during the U.S. Civil War and its imperial
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pretensions manifested in its attempt to implant a European monarch in Mexico.62 Furthermore,
many Americans also convinced themselves that Bismarck‘s newly unified Germany would be a
beacon of liberalism in Europe, while Napoleon III‘s France was seen as the exemplar of
imperial despotism.63
Unfortunately for German-American relations, the high expectations many Americans
held for a liberal Germany were severely disappointed over the coming decades. The reality of
conservative rule under Bismarck and the Kaiser gradually dismantled the mistaken image of a
liberal constitutional government in Germany. Trade battles between the two countries in the
1880s did not help matters, and by the 1890s many Americans hated and feared Germany as
much as they hated and feared Russia. Americans tended to view both of these nations as
somehow backward, hostile to progress, despotic, and therefore aggressive. 64

The Crisis over Samoa
American perceptions of Germany as a backward, hostile, and aggressive power shaped
American strategic judgment and provided an ideological backdrop for the confrontation
between the United States and Germany over the tiny islands of Samoa in the 1880s. Given this
ideological environment, it should not be surprising that Americans would react strongly to
Germany‘s attempts to gain a foothold in the South Pacific.65
The Samoan islands stood across the path of transpacific travel and through much of the
nineteenth century had been a port of call for American whalers. The tribes and foreign
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settlers who lived there had often engaged in internecine struggles. The various factions
often looked to outside powers for help and offered their harbors as inducements.66 The
Samoans, fearing British and German attention, were attempting to pit foreigner against
foreigner.
Land speculators and American firms, arrived first to Samoa hoping the islands would
serve as a strategic base that would help open trade to Asia and relieve the growing glut of
U.S. goods. However, it was the 1872 treaty, signed by Navy Commander Richard W. Meade
without advance authorization from the U.S. government, that for the first time truly involved
the United States government in Samoan affairs. Mead was primarily interested in the fine,
protected harbor of Pago Pago, for which he received a lease in return for a protectorate. The
Senate accepted the harbor but rejected the responsibility of a protectorate. In a modified
pact, the U.S. promised that it would mediate in any conflict between Samoa and foreign
powers in exchange for rights to a naval station at Pago Pago. This proved more acceptable to
the Senate. Later, the Samoans made similar agreements with both Germany and Great Britain.
Though the Samoans attempted to play the foreigners off each other, in reality the U.S.,
British, and German consuls worked out a tripartite agreement for joint protection of the
islands. The Americans were also encouraged by the appointment of the pro-American King
Malietoa Laupepain. The tripartite arrangement existed for the next eight years, although not
without growing conflict between U.S. and German claims. 67
By the mid-1880s, German commercial interests were expanding in the South Pacific.
As this expansion occurred, Germany began to demand greater control over the Samoan islands.
In 1885, Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard warned Berlin that he would ―not allow any
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one power to have a commercial preference.‖ Powerful German business interests also began
to support a rebel group who, if successful, vowed to overthrow King Malietoa Laupepain and
install a more German-friendly king.68
Bismarck tried to reassure the Americans that German moves were not hostile to
American interests. He announced, ―We have no interest whatsoever in gaining a foothold
anywhere in the Americas, and we acknowledge unequivocally that, with regard to the entire
continent, the predominant influence of the United States is founded in the nature of things and
corresponds most closely with our own interests.‖ Such pronouncements from the Chancellor did
little to ease American concerns. Neither President Grover Cleveland nor Secretary of State
Bayard was prepared to back down in the face of what they regarded as German bullying. They
wanted to uphold the independence and autonomy of the Samoan people free from ―foreign
interference.‖ In so doing, they hoped to prevent Germany from dominating Samoa.69
By 1887, the Germans, having grown impatient with the standoff with the United States
over Samoa, dispatched four warships to the islands. The Germans demanded indemnities
and apologies from King Malietoa for various alleged offenses. The Germans landed seven
hundred marines, ravaged several villages, seized Malietoa, and recognized another chieftain
as king. American officials were outraged by the German actions. The Samoan government
appealed to the United States government for help. 70
The three powers met at Washington in 1887 to sort out the imperial claims.
Bayard beat down German plans for de facto control with the argument that in U.S.
eyes, Samoan ports were a vital link in the system that connected the U.S. railroad
network to Asia. Nothing came out of the conference, and in 1888 Germany moved more
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directly to seize power. American opinion flared, led by business groups such as the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce, which ominously warned that if Samoa fell to the
Germans, Hawaii would be next. As Washington prepared to respond, the Iron Chancellor
wondered aloud why Americans were so concerned about these ―remote, inconsiderable
islands.‖ In a note to Bayard, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee outlined
the geopolitics of a rising Pacific empire:
They may be remote and inconsiderable for Germany, but to us they are proximate and
considerable, for in the hands of a naval Power they threaten our Pacific flank, and indeed
they threaten all the Pacific Coast of South America too, and Hawaii besides. Samoa offsets
Pearl Harbor, and Bismarck so intends it.
President Grover Cleveland adopted Adee‘s ideas and sent a ringing message to Congress
upholding U.S. rights. Congress began to consider military appropriations.
While the press of both the Republican and Democratic parties condemned Germany‘s
mistreatment of the islanders, Bayard was determined to avoid war with Germany. He
assured the Samoans and the American people that he would do what he could ―to secure a
measure of justice and fair treatment to these innocent and unhappy islanders,‖ but there was
little he could do ―without placing in useless jeopardy the vaster interests of our own
countrymen.‖ He warned that war with Germany would be a terrible thing. His concerns were
confirmed by a senior naval officer who reported, ―If we go to war with Germany there is an
extreme probability that the German fleet may threaten to shell New York.... We have
practically nothing with which to drive the enemy away, and it would take a long time to
build anything suitable for that purpose.‖ Bayard also declared that the United States had ―no
policy of annexation or protectorate whatsoever in Samoa or anywhere else.‖ However, he and
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other Americans saw Germany as a bully and felt both sympathy and responsibility for the
Samoans.71
The year 1888 was also an election year, and the president was feeling political pressure
to do something about the Germans. Most Americans did not have strong opinions about Samoa,
but when the Kaiser raised a challenge, many Americans wanted their government to respond
vigorously and curb German adventurism in the South Pacific. President Cleveland, under
pressure at home and angry at German behavior, dispatched three warships to Samoa to ―protect
American interests‖ in the ongoing fighting. By early 1889, the port of Apia was crowded with
foreign warships: three American, three German, and one British. It was not difficult to
imagine conflict erupting through miscalculation or misunderstanding. Bismarck called for a
conference in Berlin, but before it could convene, the three nations‘ warships were struck
by a mighty typhoon. Only the British vessel escaped to open water and survived. Fifty
American and ninety German sailors were lost. The sheer magnitude of the tragedy
temporarily overshadowed the international confrontation. Thanks to the diplomatic breathing
room created by the typhoon, a settlement was reached later that year temporarily restoring
tripartite cooperation in Samoa. The United States received its main demand, its own
protectorate over Pago Pago harbor. 72

The Run-up to the Second World War
The American reaction to German provocation in the early and mid-1930s was
understated, to say the least. In 1933, Adolph Hitler denounced the Geneva disarmament
conference and withdrew Germany from the League of Nations. Two years later Britain entered
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into a naval agreement with Germany that allowed the German navy to grow to 35 percent of
Britain‘s naval strength. This was a significant increase for Germany over the levels established
at the end of the First World War. Then in 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland and
reoccupied an area that had been termed a demilitarized zone at the end of World War I. The
powers, including the United States, did largely nothing.73
In November 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt took a minor step to prevent German
influence from expanding into the Americas. In that month, Roosevelt travelled to Buenos Aires,
Argentina where he headed a conference designed to create an atmosphere of cooperation
between the American nations and prevent outside interference. Curbing German influence in the
Western Hemisphere was clearly the aim. At this and subsequent meetings, the American nations
agreed to consult with each other regarding threats to the hemisphere. Also because of this
conference, cultural exchanges flourished between the American nations.74
Akira Iriye suggests that the United States gradually took steps, starting with the Buenos
Aires conference, to begin reengaging in foreign affairs. Some of these attempts were abortive,
such as Roosevelt‘s attempt to reach across the Atlantic to British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain. Roosevelt had hoped to meet with Chamberlain to discuss cooperation in
international affairs between the two nations, but nothing came of the invitation. In October
1937, Roosevelt made a speech in Chicago where he called for international cooperation to
isolate or ―quarantine‖ aggressive states. While not much attention was paid to the speech at the
time, in retrospect it shows that Roosevelt‘s thinking regarding the actions of Japan and
Germany had begun to change. Immediately after the speech, Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles proposed a world conference to clarify fundamental principles of international relations.
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Nothing came of this proposal, but both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull supported
the League of Nations when it called for a conference to discuss the Sino-Japanese War. The
conference was boycotted by Japan and Germany, and not much, other than a condemnation of
Japanese actions, came of the conference. Still, it is another example that the U.S. was beginning
to take a more active role on the international stage.75
In March 1938, Germany annexed Austria—in what it called the Anschluss—and
began preparing ―Mitteleuropa‖ for German hegemony. The United States responded to the
Anschluss by announcing that it would step up its rearmament program. This rearmament
would go beyond the ―treaty limits‖ imposed by earlier naval disarmament agreements that
had been nullified since 1936. 76
Between 26 September and 28 September 1938, Roosevelt sent an appeal to all parties
involved to resolve the Sudetenland crisis—the German invasion of Czechoslovakia—
peacefully. When the Munich conference seemed to settle this dispute, Roosevelt expressed his
approval. U.S. involvement on the international stage was again seen in November 1938, in the
wake of Kristallnacht (the night of broken glass) in which Jewish businesses and synagogues
were destroyed, and Jews killed or jailed by the Nazis. President Roosevelt was outraged and
withdrew Hugh Wilson, chargé d‘affaires in Berlin. William Dodd, the U.S. ambassador to
Germany, had already resigned in late 1937 in disgust at Nazi race policies. Hitler responded by
withdrawing the German ambassador from Washington. Both posts would remain empty for the
remainder of the prewar period.77
After September 1938, there were increasing calls for some kind of action against Hitler‘s
Germany. His aggression in September 1938 was so obvious and so revolting that Senator
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George Norris of Nebraska, a veteran isolationist and the only surviving member of Congress
who had voted against America‘s entry into the First World War, publicly stated that, faced by
such a situation, he would be among those who ―would consider a preventive war against the
Fascist nations.‖78
Other measures were considered at the conference of American states held in December
1938. In Lima, Peru, the American nations issued a resolution decrying Nazi race doctrines.
Closer consultative ties were also adopted. At about the same time, Roosevelt decided to start
selling military aircraft to Britain and France for a possible war against Germany.79
At the beginning of 1939, at the behest of President Roosevelt, the United States
embarked on a rearmament campaign unparalleled in American history during peacetime. Fifteen
percent of government outlays were going to be for defense. For fiscal year 1940, this would
amount to $1.3 billion out of a total $9 billion budget. Total defense spending was actually even
more than this since Congress granted the president additional appropriations for defense.80
Further steps were being taken that would involve the United States much more in global
affairs, even at the risk of becoming involved in the emerging conflict in Europe. In November
1939, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Congress revised the neutrality laws to allow
belligerents to purchase American arms on a cash-and-carry basis.81 This policy was clearly
aimed at helping supply the British with war materials since the British controlled the seas.
Even before the United States entered World War II, members of the American General
Staff proposed that the U.S. should ―take immediate steps to acquire British and French
possessions in the Atlantic,‖ so as to deny the Germans their use. Plans for American measures
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―"to protect such [possessions] from falling into the hands of Germany by surrender or cession‖
were worked out promptly. Concerns about German moves in South America prompted plans for
the United States ―to anticipate action by the preventive occupation of airfields and ports‖ in the
region.82
Vagts argues that the intent of the ―policy of the Roosevelt Administration in the prePearl Harbor period...was clearly preventive.‖ In fact, he suggests that the U.S. entered both
world wars in an attempt to prevent a German victory in Europe. It was imperative, however,
that the U.S. government avoid all appearance of having preventive war intentions, since the
long democratic tradition against the waging of preventive war obviously persisted. The
Roosevelt administration‘s preventive intention was first concretely expressed, Vagts continues,
by aiding the peoples who were resisting Hitler, so that they would not be ―knocked out of the
war one by one before our turn came and that we would [not] ultimately be left to face the
onslaught alone.‖ Modern conditions of warfare, Roosevelt warned, would not permit the United
States to wait until it was physically attacked.83

**Japan**
When Japan began its steady rise in the 1860s, there was a consensus in the United States
that Japan was a progressive force in Asia. It was seen as making a determined effort to copy
Western ways and institutions and Americans admired the Japanese peoples‘ eagerness to adopt
new ideas. In short, Americans believed that Japan was becoming more like America. At the
same time, Americans also recognized that as a rising power destined to be a force in East
Asia—where the United States also hoped someday to be an important player—Japanese and
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American interests were likely to clash. Nonetheless, Americans rooted for Japan in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95 because Japan was viewed as strong and progressive and China was
seen as backward and pitiful. When Japan attacked and sank the Russian fleet at Port Arthur ten
years later, Americans applauded again.84

The Run-up to the Second World War
In January 1930, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan held a naval disarmament
conference in London where the three countries agreed to limitations on naval armaments. This
would be the last agreement between the three countries for years. Even though the Japanese
delegation to London accepted the limitations on Japanese naval armaments, Japanese naval
leaders were not happy and argued that the civilian leadership had sold out to the British and
Americans. This criticism of the civilian leadership helped weaken the Japanese government and
made it vulnerable for a military takeover.85 Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was assassinated
shortly after accepting these naval limitations.86
The power of the military was enhanced when, in September 1931, the Japanese army
stationed in Manchuria began a campaign against the Chinese that resulted in a nearly complete
Japanese victory. The United States and other powers worked through the League of Nations to
bring about a diplomatic resolution to the crisis, but this never really had any effect on the
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actions in Manchuria, and Japan ultimately withdrew from the League of Nations.87 Henry L.
Stimson, Herbert Hoover‘s secretary of state, argued that the United States had an obligation to
uphold basic standards of decency and international law and should rally the support of the
international community against the Japanese aggression. President Hoover, however, did not
want to risk war and felt that his focus should be on the moribund American economy.88
As the Great Depression deepened during the 1930s, American foreign policy faltered.
Americans were increasingly preoccupied by what was going on within their own country and
wanted to focus on repairing the ills of the economy at home. They were less interested in what
was happening abroad. Despite the U.S.‘s new tendency to pay less attention to foreign affairs,
Americans were not happy with the announcement in 1934 by the Japanese Foreign Ministry that
the Japanese government would not look favorably on countries who chose to deal directly with
China without consulting Japan first. In response to these Japanese moves, Roosevelt chose not
to recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo, which the Japanese had set up in Manchuria. The
Roosevelt administration would not reward Japanese aggression, but neither would it take any
significant action to roll the Japanese back.89
This sense of the U.S. abandoning its leadership position in the world was exemplified by
the Neutrality Act of 1935 in which the U.S. Government outlawed the sales of arms to
belligerents in a war. This went against the traditional American ideals of neutrality in which a
neutral country could sell arms to all belligerents. Americans, by 1935, wanted to focus on
developing the domestic economy, and they did not want to get involved in foreign conflicts. 90
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When the London naval armament agreements expired in 1936, there was no new
agreement reached between Japan, the U.S., and Great Britain. Japan began to build a powerful
navy to first catch up to and then surpass the United States in the Pacific. Also of significance in
1936, Japan, Germany, and Italy signed the anti-Comintern pact in which each country secretly
agreed to come to the aid of the others should any one of them become involved in a war with
the Soviet Union.91
Another step towards global conflict came in the form of renewed fighting between
China and Japan, which broke out in July 1937. Also, at the end of 1937, the Panay incident—in
which Japanese military aircraft sank an American gunboat on the Yangtze—proved to be
another step toward renewed American internationalism. The gunboat had been evacuating
American personnel from Japanese occupied Nanking when it was attacked. The Japanese
offered an immediate apology and paid an indemnity, but Roosevelt was clearly alarmed by the
action. He sent Captain Royal Ingersoll—chief of the U.S. Navy‘s intelligence division—to
London to open secret talks with his British counterpart about possible joint action against Japan
should such provocation continue. These were the first of what would be ongoing talks regarding
bilateral military cooperation between the two nations.92
Despite the rising tensions with Japan, the United States continued to sell armaments to
the island nation. In 1938, American arms shipments to Japan amounted to $9.1 million.
Increasing public outcry over the Japanese aggression regarding China put mounting pressure on
the U.S. government to halt these sales. In July 1938, the State Department announced a moral

91
92

Ibid., 143-63.
Ibid., 149-63.

202

embargo of airplanes to Japan. This was not legally binding, but sent a message to Japan that
they might not be able to rely on American suppliers of armaments in their war against China.93
In November 1938, after conquering much of China but still not being able to defeat
completely the Chinese, the Japanese called for a ―new order‖ in Asia based on Asian ideals and
principles, not on Western concepts that had dominated the region for centuries. This clearly
presented a challenge to the Western nations, including the United States. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull immediately denounced the Japanese‘s ―new order,‖ arguing that Japan had no right
to create a new order unilaterally. He stated that the United States would oppose Japanese
unilateralism and would not recognize any modification in the regional status quo except through
consultation and cooperation.94 Because of this and other provocations, the U.S. began rebuilding
the U.S. Navy in both the Atlantic and Pacific.95
To drive the point home, in December 1938 the United States issued a loan of $25
million to the Chinese to use in any way they chose. In 1939, the United States withdrew from
the treaty of commerce it had with Japan, creating a situation where Japanese shippers,
merchants, and bankers were no longer protected by treaty rights, thus Japan was more at the
mercy of American goodwill.96 It was becoming clear to both the Chinese and the Japanese
where the U.S. stood in the Sino-Japanese War.97
By 1939, war had spread in China and anti-Japanese feeling was on the rise in the United
States. When the U.S. government announced it was going to terminate the commercial treaty
with Japan, the American public overwhelmingly approved. Joseph C. Grew, the American
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ambassador in Japan from 1932 to 1941, was home on leave when the announcement was made,
and he was astonished at the public support for a trade embargo. He warned the State
Department and the public that a policy of sanctions could lead to war.98

Post World War II
On 8 September 1951, the U.S. and Japan signed a peace treaty and endorsed a mutual
security treaty that would guarantee Japan‘s security and provide for the stationing of American
military forces in Japan. From this point onward, the United States assumed responsibility for the
security of Japan, especially from nuclear attack. The treaty created a security environment in
Japan of dependence on the United States.99 As the decades wore on, however, there would
become increasing tensions between the two nations.
By the 1960s, Japan began to enjoy remarkable economic growth that would bring,
within a few years, Japan to the position of third greatest economic power in the world. Prime
Minister Ikeda Hayato embarked on his policy of the ―low posture‖ (teishisei), meaning that
Japan would concentrate on its economic development and avoid international quarrels. By 1962,
the Gross National Product (GNP) was already three times that of the prewar period 19341936.100
The Japanese have used their constitution as a shield against remilitarization and as an
avenue for the ―low posture‖ of Japanese defense spending. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution
categorically states that the Japanese people ―forever renounce war as a sovereign right‖ as well
as the ―threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.‖ Japanese leaders have
interpreted this article to mean that Japan is prohibited from establishing military forces and from
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developing war potential. During the 1970s, they also instituted a policy of banning any sales of
weapons or defense technology to any nation without exception. Many Americans regarded the
Mutual Security Treaty and the long history of American-generated military aid and sales
programs as justification for a relaxation of the ban in the case of the United States. The issue in
Japan was contentious since there was a fear that any change in the interpretation of laws
regarding security matters could open Pandora‘s Box leading to the remilitarization of Japan.
Also of significance, by the early 1980s, the U.S. wanted Japan to build up its military, thus
relieving some of the burden from the United States. Ultimately, Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro yielded to American pressure—and his own concepts of a reasonable defense force for
Japan—and agreed to the sale of Japanese weapon technology to the United States in January
1983.101

**United Kingdom**
Great Britain and the United States often had strained relations during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, but by the twentieth century, most of the issues that divided the two
countries had been resolved. The status of Canada had been settled and British ambitions in Latin
America had been quelled.102 During the periods under investigation in this study, there was little
or no military animosity between the United States and Britain.
The one minor exception to this might be the Suez Crisis of 1956, in which Gamal Abdul
Nasser, the president of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal. For the British, the canal was a vital
link between Western Europe and Persian Gulf oil. After attempting negotiation at the behest of
the Americans, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, with cooperation from the French and the
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Israelis, embarked on military action to prevent Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower was surprised by the invasion and he was furious. He stated, ―How could
we possibly support Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world?‖103 The
United States went on to sponsor resolutions in the United Nations Security Council to end
British, French, and Israeli military action. The U.S. did this, in part, to prevent Soviet
intervention in the crisis. Under American pressure, the British, French, and Israelis withdrew
their forces from Egypt.104
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Analysis
In this section, I assess the performance of the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention in
predicting the outcome of American foreign policy during the periods under consideration.
Following the method of structured, focused comparison, each of the eleven questions posed in
the previous chapters are answered, and then an overview of the model‘s performance is outlined
for each question. The typology for this model appears in table 6.1 while the flowcharts for the
individual cases appear in Appendix A.

Table 6.1: A Typology of Preventive Action

Causal Mechanisms

Containment

Outcomes

Systemic
Structure/
Polarity

Internal
Power
Constraints/
Offense vs.
Defense
Severe/
Defensive
Strategy

Domestic
Political
Constraints/
Pressures

Ruler Belief
Systems/
Perception of
Threats

Severe Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Moderate Acquiescent/
Low – NonMilitarized
Moderate Pragmatic/
Moderate –
NonMilitarized

Acquiescence/
Do Nothing

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Accommodation/
Mix of Strategies/
Carrot and Stick

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
DefensiveOffensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Initiate Sustained
Coercive/
Confrontational
Diplomacy
Initiate
Militarized
Preventive Action

Bipolar/
Unbalanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
OffensiveDefensive
Strategy
Minimal/
Offensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure
Minimal Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Unbalanced
Multipolar
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Pragmatic Militant/
Moderate Militarized
Militant Radical/
High Militarized

1) To what extent is the internal power of the state constrained?
Prior to its civil war, the United States was very constrained in its foreign policy
relating to other major powers. It was extremely weak in terms of offensive military
power. After the Civil War, the United States emerged more powerful and influential
in world affairs, though still militarily weak vis-à-vis other major powers. Gaddis has
argued that Americans were not always confident in their ability to wield their power
wisely, and this military weakness might provide at least a part of the explanation for
that timidity. This lack of confidence seems to dominate American foreign policy—at
least in relation to other major powers—until the early to mid-1930s. It is really only
broken by American successes and ultimate victory during the Second World War.
After the war, it is clear that the United States took on a real leadership role on the
international scene. This leadership role and active foreign policy has continued to the
present day. Obviously, in the post World War II era, particularly with the
implementation of NSC-68 and other Cold War policy prescriptions, the internal
power of the United States has been much less constrained than it was during
previous periods. The United States has had considerable offensive military power,
especially in terms of nuclear weapons, during this latter period. However, the
strategy of the United States continued to be mostly defensive in the twentieth
century. This section analyzes American foreign policy vis-à-vis the other powers in
this study.
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Russia/Soviet Union
Russia really removed itself as a threat to the United States in the nineteenth
century with the sale of Alaska in 1867. There were, of course, other issues between
the two countries—including the mistreatment of American Jews in Russia—but
these issues never really translated into foreign policy. With the emergence of the
Soviet Union, there was an ideological and then a military challenge to the United
States. The U.S. reacted first with non-recognition and then eventually with
cooperation during the Second World War. After the war, of course, the U.S. and the
USSR slid into animosity towards each other.
After the war, there were minimal internal power constraints placed on the
American leadership, at least in terms of pure military capability. Demobilization
after the Second World War somewhat reduced American offensive potential,
however. More significantly, we see other kinds of restraints placed on the American
leadership. The policy of containment, by its very nature, tended to be a defensive
doctrine. While some leaders and commentators advocated rolling back communism,
the overall goal of containment came to be interpreted as holding the line until
communism was forced to change or collapse from within.
It is clear that this defensive strategy placed constraints on internal power. It is
difficult, however, to determine exactly where American internal power should be
placed on the above typology. It is conceivable that these constraints were moderate
since there was clearly capability, particularly in the early years of the Cold War, but
the policy of containment acted as a constraint on the exercise of that capability.
Given this, the typology would suggest a defensive-offensive or offensive-defensive
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strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during this period. The typology, then, seems to
do a good job of predicting actual American behavior in relation to the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, the United States used different strategies at different times to
include coercion and incentives as well as confrontational diplomacy.

Germany
Despite serious internal constraints on power, the United States was able to force
the tactical retreat of Bismarck from Latin America in the 1880s. Still, this was done
more through diplomacy and cooperation with the Latin American countries than
through threats or use of military force against Germany. In this case, Germany chose
to back down rather than face the U.S. and its Latin American associates.
Such was not the case in the Samoan crisis. Here, the U.S and Germany nearly
came to blows over the islands. There was, of course, a tripartite agreement between
Germany, Britain, and the United States, but this ultimately broke down. This was
followed by more negotiations, and then the deployment of warships by all three
nations to the islands. Had it not been for the intervention of nature in the form of a
typhoon that destroyed most of the warships harbored in Samoa, it is possible that
militarized conflict could have erupted. This did not occur, however, and the three
nations ultimately came to an agreement regarding the administration of the islands.
German-American relations were again strained with the increased militarization
of Germany in the 1930s and then the outbreak of war in Europe. To counter the
spread of German influence in Latin America, Franklin Roosevelt took a page out of
the history books and developed closer relations between the United States and its
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Latin American neighbors. Roosevelt also moved in the direction of ―quarantining‖
aggressive states.
With the Anschluss of 1938, the United States announced a rearmament program
clearly aimed at Germany. Despite this new more confrontational stance, the United
States did little during the Sudetenland crisis. After Kristallnacht, however, the U.S.
did signal its displeasure by withdrawing Hugh Wilson from Berlin. At the end of
1938, Roosevelt took the step of selling military aircraft to Britain and France for a
possible war against Germany. Finally, in early 1939, Roosevelt announced that the
U.S. would embark on a massive military buildup in anticipation of the coming
conflict. After the outbreak of war, the U.S. Congress revised the neutrality laws to
help supply war materials to the British.
In terms of the above typology, we can see that, up until the eve of the Second
World War, American leadership was severely constrained in terms of internal
power—largely because of a relatively weak military and a defensive strategy. The
typology suggests that in this case, the United States should have acted defensively
and acquiesced in the face of German aggression. While the U.S. did act defensively
for the most part, it did not acquiesce to German demands. It took action in Latin
America (twice) to prevent German interests from developing there. It also
confronted Bismarck‘s Germany with a show of military force in the Samoan islands.
The United States‘ record seems weaker in the run-up to the Second World War, but
even here it did not acquiesce in the face of German aggression, but instead took less
direct measures to check German power. Therefore, the typology—which predicts
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acquiescence—does not seem to perform well, at least on this variable, in the case of
Germany in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries.

Japan
American relations with Japan prior to the Second World War are complex. When
the U.S. ―opened‖ Japan in the mid 1860s, its military actions were not of a
preventive nature. On the contrary, the emergence of Japan on the international stage
and favorable tariff policies would ultimately help the Japanese increase their power.
At the same time, the majority of Americans saw the Japanese as becoming more
liberal and modern and therefore less threatening to the United States.
In 1930, the Japanese, Americans, and British agreed on limitations of naval
armaments. This was the last agreement between the three until after the end of the
Second World War. American reaction to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was
weak. Its attempt to stop Japan by working through the League of Nations was
ineffective, and the U.S. largely withdrew from the ongoing conflict in Asia with the
passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935. While the United States would not recognize
the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and it denounced Japan‘s attempts to
establish a ―new order‖ in Asia; the American leadership failed to take any real action
against Japan. It was only after the Panay incident in 1937 that Roosevelt began to
coordinate with the British with an eye to eventual confrontation with Japan. By
1938, the U.S. was engaged in rebuilding its navy. Still, the U.S. continued to sell
armaments to Japan through 1938. Finally, in 1939, the U.S. withdrew from its
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commerce treaty with Japan. Nonetheless, this was still a mild response to Japanese
aggression in China.
In terms of the above typology, I would argue that the United States leadership
was severely constrained in terms of internal power largely because of a relatively
weak military and a defensive strategy for the period up until the eve of the Second
World War. This defensive strategy did not lend itself to engaging in strong
diplomatic or military coercion of Japan. In this case, the typology accurately predicts
that the United States was likely to acquiesce or do nothing regarding Japan‘s
aggression against China.
American-Japanese relations in the post World War II era are also complex, but
the challenge from Japan—particularly in the 1970s and 1980s—was of an economic
nature, not a military one. The military alliance made any use of American military
power against Japan nearly impossible to fathom. Even economic coercion or
retaliation against Japan for perceived injustices was difficult to implement. While
―Japan-bashing‖ became a favorite activity for a brief time for some Americans, there
seems to have been no real discussion of ending the special relationship between the
two countries.
In this case, in contrast to minimal internal power constraints in terms of sheer
military power, there were significant internal constraints due to treaties and the
special relationship between the two countries. Aggressive action by the United States
against Japan in the post World War II era has been largely unthinkable. Japan has
been an important ally and trading partner. In this case, the measurement of
offensive/defensive military strategy does not seem to apply. In fact, the American
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desire in the early 1980s to see Japan rebuild its military really runs counter to my
preventive action theory. However, since Japan represented an economic challenge,
not a military one, this may not be as bad for preventive action theory as it appears on
first examination.

United Kingdom
Similar to the situation with Japan in the post World War II environment, war
between the United States and the United Kingdom during the entire twentieth
century was highly unlikely. After 1930, their relationship actually became friendlier
as Germany posed an increasing threat. After the war, Britain and the U.S. were
closer than ever and faced the Soviet Union together. With the possible exception of
the Suez Crisis, there has been little friction between the two nations. In the post Cold
War environment, Britain has remained one of the United States‘ closest allies. The
variable of internal power constraints does not seem applicable in this case.

2) To what extent are pro-preventive action elements constrained?
Russia/Soviet Union
One of the big questions this study should answer is the following: So why did the
United States not exploit the advantages it held in the years after the Second World
War to eliminate, or at least neutralize, its most likely competitor in the postwar
world? Prominent individuals—both within and outside the government—urged
preventive war against the Soviet Union before it had had time to recover its
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strength.105 According to the Socialist Norman Thomas, in 1944-45 Washington
already ―buzzed with gossip that war with Russia was a paramount subject of
discussion in the armed forces, with some officers, especially in the Navy, believing
that since war is so likely we had better have it soon while we, rather than the
Russians, are at the top of our strength.‖106
Some Americans, eyeing the American monopoly of the atomic bomb, and
frustrated over the spread of Moscow-centered communism, advocated using this
ultimate weapon for fighting a preventive war against Russia. Robert M. Hutchins,
Chancellor of the University of Chicago, told a Senate Committee, ―We ought to start
[a war] right now because we are in the best position to win it. The assumption that
there is going to be a war would lead to the conclusion that we had better start the war
this morning, because only this morning can we be sure of having supremacy in
atomic bombs.‖107
There were, of course, opponents to this way of thinking. Vagts notes that in
November 1945, ex-Ambassador to Moscow Joseph E. Davies denounced ―a few
militarists—not among the great war leaders—in this and other countries who
advocate war with Russia and now rather than later.‖ Davies called such talk
―insanity‖ and equated it to ―throwing dynamite around.‖108
Similarly, Henry Wallace, relegated to the position of secretary of commerce,
protested that ―a school of military thinking‖ was advocating ―a preventive war, an
attack on Russia now before Russia has atomic bombs.‖ To Wallace, such thoughts

105

Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations, 23.
Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 329.
107
Ibid., 330.
108
Ibid.
106

215

seemed ―not only immoral but stupid.‖ Unfortunately for Wallace, since he gave no
names of any advocates of preventive war, he made it easy for the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy to deny that there was any basis for his accusations.
They knew, they said, of no responsible Army or Navy officer ―who has ever
advocated or even suggested a policy or plan of attacking Russia. There is no such
military thinking in the War and Navy Departments.‖109
Wallace may have had in mind statements like those of General H. H. Arnold.
The general argued that there was only one defense against the atomic bomb, ―hit it
before it starts.... This country should capitalize on the atomic bomb, if necessary to
assure world peace.‖ Another officer of the Air Force, Lt. General Ira C. Eaker,
Deputy Commander of the Army Air Force, predicted, ―The next war would be a
short war of unparalleled destruction, that the first blows would be struck through the
air, and that to prevent destruction of this country in event of such an attack we must
strike the enemy first.‖ He went on to argue, ―If we are to prevent the launching of
atom bombs, guided missiles, or super-rockets against our industrial establishments,
we must have a force ready to destroy these weapons at their source before they are
launched.‖ Eaker concluded by stating, ―The only such weapon we have in the United
States today is our long-range bomber force.‖ Some of this, of course, could have
been hyperbole and posturing in an attempt to secure more Congressional funding for
the Air Force, but some strategists went even further. Colonel Louis E. Coira of the
Air Force Operations Division, emphasizing the need for secrecy and speed in the
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opening of a preventive nuclear war, concluded that the president ―must be prepared
to accept the responsibility for issuing the order [for a] preventive war.‖110
Military officers were not the only ones advocating preventive war against the
Soviet Union. The United States had suggested, in the Baruch Plan, that international
control of all atomic weapons programs be turned over to the United Nations. As a
science writer who had done much to popularize the atomic bomb, William L.
Laurence proposed that the United States initiate a new approach to the issue if the
Soviet Union would not agree to the Baruch Plan. He argued that any nation refusing
to renounce its sovereign right to manufacture nuclear bombs would be making itself
an aggressor nation subject to UN Charter sanctions. He advocated that in the
circumstances of such aggression, Congress should authorize the President ―to take
whatever action is necessary to meet the challenge of the aggressor.‖ The aggressor,
in his view, was to be prevented from continuing the production of nuclear weapons.
He argued that the Kremlin should be told, in effect, that the U.S. would be
compelled to ―destroy your atomic plants before they are ready to operate.... If that
means war, it will be a war you will force on us by your insistence on an atomic
armaments race which must inevitably lead to war anyway.... Under the
circumstances it would be to our advantage to have it while we are still the sole
possessors of the atomic bomb.‖111
Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, like Ambassador Davies and
Secretary Wallace, viewed preventive war with much skepticism. Stimson called
preventive war proposals ―worse than nonsense.‖ He argued that preventive war ideas
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result ―from a cynical incomprehension of what the people of the world will tolerate
from any nation.... We could not possibly take that opportunity without deserting our
inheritance. Americans as conquerors would be tragically miscast.‖ John Foster
Dulles seemed to agree with Stimson by suggesting that it was unthinkable that the
United States would start a preventive war. Perhaps alluding to the comments made
by members of the military, he argued, ―military factors were not to be ignored, but in
accordance with American tradition, let the military be an instrument of national
policy, and not in itself the maker of that policy.‖112
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, in private talks, and Secretary of the Navy
Francis P. Mathews, in a speech at the Boston Navy Yard, suggested that the United
States should be willing to pay ―even the price of instituting a war to compel
cooperation for peace.‖ This was generally understood as a proposal to launch a
preventive war against the Soviet Union. The State Department hastened to repudiate
the idea as not representing official American foreign policy.113
Some American military leaders, concerned with the direct competition between
the United States and the USSR in the production of atomic bombs, advocated the
preventive use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union before it had produced a
substantial number of bombs. Major General Orvil A. Anderson, commandant of the
Air War College, assuming that Russia would use its nuclear weapons when it had the
appropriate capability, expounded in classes and publicly on how a preventive war
through the use of strategic bombing could and should be carried out. Anderson was
taking the ―cold war‖ metaphor literally. In his view, he was not advocating
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preventive war since the United States and the Soviet Union were already at war, but
simply suggesting preventive moves within an already existing state of war. He thus
argued:
Since we‘re at war, damn it, I don‘t advocate preventive war, I advocate the
shedding of illusions. I advocate saying to Stalin: ‗Joe, you‘re not kidding
anybody. You are saying you‘re going to destroy us?‘ And if he says ‗yes‘—and
he has been saying ‗yes‘ all the time—we must conclude civilization demands
that we act. Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia‘s five A-bomb
nests in a week.
For these remarks, Anderson‘s superiors suspended him from his office and later
dispensed with his services altogether, explaining that the Air Force‘s primary
purpose was ―the prevention of war‖ and not the execution of a preventive war.114
With a show of righteousness, the Soviets protested that the warlike statements of
some Americans violated a UN General Assembly resolution against war propaganda.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinksy attacked the Western Powers as
―war-mongers‖ and preparers of a ―Pearl Harbor for the USSR.‖ He mentioned by
name a long list of enemies of the peace and of the Soviet Union, including Winston
Churchill, William Laurence and General George C. Kenney, former chief of the U.S.
Strategic Air Command.115
The authoritative military answer to preventive war proposals in the United States
was given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, whom
Vyshinksy had included in his list of warmongers. Bradley assured a congressional
committee in October 1949 that ―we are never going to start a war,‖ and that his and
his colleagues‘ strategy was therefore based on the assumption that the United States
would wait to be attacked. This was something that sober-minded military men had
114
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told the public before. But, he added, after allowing the enemy to strike first, ―we will
have to carry the war back to the enemy by all means at our disposal.‖ 116
As can be gleaned from some of the statements above, the Truman Administration
had to contend with an influential school of military members who were becoming
increasingly political. These politicized military leaders were less respectful of the
boundaries of the policymaking domain usually reserved for civilian control. These
men were ready to discard the American tradition against aggressive or preventive
war as outdated. President Truman answered these calls for preventive war by
reiterating the traditional American view that preventive wars were ―the weapons of
dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States, arming only for
defense against aggression.‖117 The Truman administration never seriously
considered taking advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities in so cold-blooded a way.
Gaddis argues that there were several reasons for this lack of preventive action on the
part of the U.S.:
First, however things may have appeared in retrospect, it was not all that clear at
the time that the United States enjoyed so decisive a military edge over the Soviet
Union. Second, moral considerations—and their very realistic political
implications—also discouraged any serious thought of initiating military action
against the Soviet Union. Third, there was the growing realization that the total
elimination of adversaries can cause more problems than it solves.118
There was also a sense that the Soviet government—unlike the adversaries of
World War II—was redeemable. Gaddis points out, ―It is significant that this
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viewpoint existed prior to the Soviet Union‘s acquisition of atomic weapons and of a
retaliatory capacity that could be used directly against the United States.‖119
Men who prided themselves for holding to the best traditions of democracy
echoed the conviction that no preventive war should be undertaken, even as part of
the so-called ―cold war.‖ A barrage of speakers, civilian and military, had to offset
statements by American politicos—both in and out of uniform—who favored
preventive war against the Soviet Union. General Omar Bradley assured the
American people and armed forces alike that ―we will not provoke a war against
anybody. And we will not wage a preventive war against an archenemy.‖ In May
1951, while testifying before Congress, Senator Harry P. Cain of Washington asked
General Bradley ―May I ask if you believe in a preventive war?‖ General Bradley
responded, ―I do not, because I do not believe that is a solution.‖120
Furthermore, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that proposals in favor of
a preventive war were ―self-defeating. It is only among those who have lost their
sense of proportion about the purpose for which we need to build our military
strength that talk of preventive war is possible. Only among those who have lost sight
of our goals can there be wisdom in self-destructive hysteria.‖121
In the final analysis, then, while there were certainly Americans advocating the
use of preventive action, and specifically preventive war against the Soviet Union,
there were also serious constraints on these individuals. Whether it was a concern at
the highest levels about American capability or moral restraint, from the above
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evidence it seems that the civilian leadership did not consider preventive war a viable
option against the Soviet Union. Instead, the policy of containment was seen as more
pragmatic. Containment is, of course, a form of preventive action in and of itself,
however.
We must conclude that had there been severe political constraints on Americans
who advocated preventive action, and specifically preventive war, there would have
been far fewer advocates and far fewer willing to express their views publicly. Since
we have multiple examples of fairly prominent individuals advocating preventive
action, an argument can be made that the political constraints were moderate. Given
this reasoning, the typology once again performs well, predicting a mix of strategies:
the use of incentives, coercion, and confrontational diplomacy.

Germany
In the case of Germany, there seems to have been much less talk about
prevention, both in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth century. Part of this is undoubtedly due to a rather militarily weak United
States during this period. Secretary Bayard‘s statement that the U.S. would not allow
any single country to gain a commercial monopoly in the Samoan islands is rather
vague. Despite the general lack of discussion regarding prevention, the U.S. did act
forcefully in the Samoan affair. Had it not been for a typhoon, it is possible that
military confrontation could have arisen between the U.S. and Germany. In this
instance, the typology does not seem to perform well. There seems to be severe
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political constraints and yet the United States engaged in confrontational diplomacy
and even a show of military force.
In the run-up to the Second World War, the United States at first did nothing.
Then during and after 1938, the United States started more openly supporting France
and Britain, and shoring up support in Latin America. Senator Norris‘ remarks
regarding preventive war and the recommendations of the American General Staff
suggest that the ideas of prevention were on the minds of some American decision
makers. Because there were at least some discussions of preventive measures, we can
conclude that there were moderate political constraints. In this case, the typology
performs somewhat well. While no incentives were really offered to Hitler, coercion
and confrontational diplomacy were eventually initiated by the United States.

Japan
As mentioned earlier, the rise of Japan in the 1860s and 1870s was not viewed by
most Americans as threatening, and therefore did not lend itself to thoughts of
preventive action. The rise of Japanese power in the 1930s, however, was seen as a
threat to American interests in Asia, but the United States was largely on a defensive
military footing and was unable or unwilling to take substantial economic and
diplomatic steps to curb Japanese ambition. There was, in fact, little discussion of
preventive action aimed at Japan before the late 1930s. It was only with the ending of
the commerce treaty and then later with the economic embargo of oil that the U.S.
became serious about preventing the further rise of Japan. This later event,
unfortunately, is outside the scope of this study. For the time period being examined
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here, American political constraints regarding preventive action against Japan seem to
have been rather severe. With the Neutrality Act of 1935, the United States really
turned its back on Asia. The typology is correct in predicting that under such
circumstances, the United States would do nothing to stop the rise of Japan.
In the post World War II environment, of course, the relationship between Japan
and the U.S. was quite different. During this period, the competition between the two
countries was purely economic. While there was some discussion of economic
retaliation against Japan during this period, it was not so much of a preventive nature
as a punishment for Japanese trading policy and an inducement to have those policies
changed. Again, in this case, my typology either fails or is not really applicable in the
first place.

United Kingdom
Again, the DPMP does not seem applicable in the relationship between Britain
and the United States. If it were applied, we would have to conclude that there have
been severe political constraints regarding any discussion of preventive action against
the United Kingdom. Therefore, as predicted by the typology, the U.S. did nothing to
stop the relative increase in British power either before or after World War II.

3) What is the nature of the ruler belief system?
Russia/Soviet Union
American leadership during the nineteenth century in regards to Russia can be
described as moderate-pragmatic or even moderate-acquiescent after the sale of

224

Alaska. Despite relatively minor issues of oil and human rights, Russia was much less
on the minds of American policymakers than were some of the other major powers.
The typology predicts that the American government should largely do nothing or
accommodate the Russians. In this instance, the typology seems to be correct.
The leadership of the Roosevelt administration during the 1930s also fits the
moderate-pragmatic mold. Roosevelt seemed willing to accommodate the Soviets and
even offer them incentives even when the Soviets seemed to move closer to Nazi
Germany. This behavior is accurately predicted by my typology, though not the
specifics of that behavior.
American-Soviet relations in the post World War II era also seem to fit well with
the typological predictions. President Truman and his advisors clearly were either
moderate-pragmatic or perhaps even pragmatic-militant in orientation. The policy of
containment, in its different variations, continued to cast this hardnosed shadow
across the rest of the Cold War. Successive administrations continued to straddle this
moderate-pragmatic/pragmatic-militant line. With these tendencies in mind, the
typology seems to predict accurately the form American foreign policy would take
during much of the Cold War.

Germany
While the ruler belief system was not significantly different in terms of its
orientation toward Germany than it was toward Russia in the nineteenth century—the
U.S. leadership took a pragmatic-militant approach—its view of the threat posed by
Germany was quite different. This had a significant impact on the foreign policy of
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the United States during this period. Because of the American perception that
Germany posed a threat to U.S. interests, the typology does not do a good job of
predicting the outcome of American foreign policy. I will address the issue of threat
in the next section.
It can be argued that the American leadership was moderate and pragmatic during
the run-up to World War II. The typology does a reasonable job in predicting
American foreign policy during this time. The U.S. did, in fact, accommodate the rise
of Nazi Germany, especially in the early years of the Third Reich. It then slowly
started to shift toward more of a carrot and stick diplomacy by arming the British and
the French.

Japan
The ruler belief systems of the American leadership towards Japan in the midnineteenth century would have to be classified as moderate-acquiescent to moderatepragmatic. It also helped that the Japanese, during this period, were seen as becoming
more like the United States in terms of ideology and development. The typology
accurately predicts that American leaders should acquiesce or accommodate the rise
of Japan during this period.
During the 1930s, because of the United States‘ own military weakness, the
Roosevelt administration maintained a moderate-pragmatic stance. The U.S. tended to
accommodate the ever more aggressive Japanese, especially until about 1938. Under
these circumstances, the typology predicts everything from accommodation to
rewards and penalties. After 1938, the Roosevelt administration began to shift to a
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more pragmatic-militant orientation. The typology does seem to predict fairly
accurately American foreign policy in the run-up to World War II, especially in the
later years of the 1930s when the United States started to take a more aggressive
stance in regards to Japanese maneuvers in Asia.
American leadership in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was largely moderateacquiescent to moderate pragmatic. The typology would suggest that the United
States should do nothing to stop the rise of Japan, or should at the most use a mixed
strategy of incentives and coercion in its relations with Japan. This is, in fact, what we
see when looking at the foreign policy of the United States. Even in the late 1970s
and early 1980s at the height of economic tensions between the two countries, talk of
economic retaliation against Japan was relatively mild.

United Kingdom
In both the decade before World War II, and the decades since, American
leadership regarding Britain has been moderate-acquiescent to moderate-pragmatic.
The typology has accurately predicted that the United States would either acquiesce
in the face of British growth or would accommodate the UK.

4) What is the nature of the threat (military, non-military)?
Russia/Soviet Union
Russia (at least since removing itself from the North American continent with the
sale of Alaska) and the Soviet Union have never posed an economic threat to the
United States. As mentioned earlier, with the sale of Alaska, the Russian threat to the
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United States was minimized for the remainder of the nineteenth century. Nor did the
Soviet Union really pose a military threat to the United States prior to the Second
World War. However, because the early Soviet Union was not seen as a military
threat, but an ideological one, my typology may be seen as accurately predicting that
the U.S. would accommodate the Soviet Union.122 Diplomatic recognition and
cooperation during World War II would seem to be in line with this prediction.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did pose a militarized threat to the United
States after the Second World War. However, it is clear from the thinking of George
Kennan and the authors of NSC-68 that the Soviet leadership was considered a
rational actor that would not be willing to take unreasonable military risks. They
believed that the Soviet Union could be contained and waited out. The Soviet Union,
then, was seen by the majority of American decision makers as a moderatemilitarized threat. This, as predicted by the typology in figure 6.1, resulted in
sustained coercive and confrontational diplomacy in the form of the containment
policy during the Cold War period.

Germany
During Bismarck‘s attempted incursion into Latin America and later during the
Samoan Crisis, Germany posed both a militarized and economic threat. The threat,
however, on both accounts was fairly moderate. Given this view of the threat, the
typology accurately predicts the use of confrontational diplomacy and a show of force
(in the case of Samoa).
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German remilitarization in the 1930s also presented a challenge to the United
States. This combined with the ideological differences between the two countries and
the human rights violations of the Third Reich created a tense atmosphere. The
rearming of Germany was clearly seen as a threat to American allies in Europe,
particularly Britain and France. President Roosevelt took steps to supply them with
arms in preparation for any conflict that might arise with Germany. He also
consolidated support in Latin America as a shield against possible German attempts
to gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. In this case, the typology does not
seem to fail completely, but there are clearly nuances in American foreign policy that
are not being captured by the typology.

Japan
During the 1860s and 1870s, Japan was seen as a possible competitor in Asia.
However, this was tempered by the general view that Japan was becoming
ideologically similar to the United States, and therefore any future conflicts were seen
as solvable through normal diplomatic and economic channels. Therefore, the threat
was low and non-militarized. The typology accurately predicts that the United States
would largely do nothing as Japan gained power.
The situation was different in the 1930s. As the decade progressed, Japan was
seen as more of a military threat to U.S. interests in Asia and a challenge to the
international order. As the 1930s wore on, American leaders came to see Japan as
first a moderate militarized threat, then perhaps even a high militarized threat. In this
case, the typology suggests that the U.S. should have taken more aggressive measures
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earlier than it did vis-à-vis Japan. Part of the reason for this discrepancy, as indicated
earlier, is that the U.S. was not in a strong military position to act more forcefully.
In the post World War II era, Japan presented a low to moderate non-militarized
threat to the United States. The challenge from Japan during this period was
economic. Therefore, the typology does a good job predicting the behavior of
American foreign policy during this time.

United Kingdom
The threat from the UK in the 1930s and after World War II, if there was any
threat at all, would have to be classified as low non-militarized. The typology
accurately predicts that American foreign policy should be acquiescent in these
circumstances. It is not surprising that the American government did nothing (or very
little) to prevent the relative rise in power of the United Kingdom.

5) To what extent is conflict seen as likely or inevitable?
Russia/Soviet Union
It is clear that conflict with Russia in the nineteenth century was perceived as
being unlikely. This would lead the DPMP to predict that non-militarized preventive
action would be unlikely. In this instance, our model is correct; no preventive action
was taken by the United States against Russia during this period.
In the years 1925 to 1933, it seems that the U.S. government did not view conflict
with the Soviet Union as likely. On the contrary, the policy of non-recognition would
suggest that the U.S. was willing to wait for isolation and time to take its toll on the
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Soviet regime. Between 1933 and 1938, however, we see a warming of relations
between the two countries, though strains were placed on the relationship because of
Stalin‘s overtures toward Hitler. Nonetheless, during this period, conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union was not seen as likely. In this instance, the DPMP
is correct; no preventive action was taken by the United States against Russia during
this period.
Finally, during the Cold War, it is clear that some Americans felt that conflict
with the Soviet Union was inevitable and pushed for preventive action. This view,
however, did not dominate the American foreign policy establishment. Instead,
containment suggested that if the U.S. were able to stop the spread of communism, its
internal contradictions would ultimately force the Soviet regime itself to change. War
was seen as possible, but not at all inevitable. I would classify the perceived
likelihood of war—at least for the key decision makers—as low. Given this (and
other factors mentioned below such as status quo and cost of militarized action), the
DPMP accurately predicts that preventive action was likely, but that non-militarized
preventive action might be preferred. Containment is a form of non-militarized
preventive action and was the preferred method of dealing with the Soviet Union after
World War II.

Germany
Germany in the nineteenth century actually presented both a militarized and nonmilitarized threat to the United States. While it is difficult, from the research done in
this project, to determine how the American leadership felt about the possibility of
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conflict with Germany, it seems reasonable, given German incursions into Latin
America and Samoa—and their relatively close proximity to the United States—that
some Americans would see conflict with Germany as at least somewhat likely. I
would rate this as high on the DPMP. However, given other factors such as cost
which will be discussed below, non-militarized preventive action may have seemed
the more prudent course as predicted by the model. For the most part, this is correct,
though militarized preventive action was certainly possible after the U.S. and
Germany sent warships to Samoa. Thanks to the typhoon, however, we will never
know if militarized conflict was in the cards.
Conflict with Germany from 1920 to 1933 was probably not a real possibility.
The Weimar Republic was not seen as a threat by the United States despite it growth.
After 1933, however, and the remilitarization of Germany under the Nazis, Germany
was increasingly seen as a militarized threat to America‘s allies. As the 1930s wore
on and Germany appeared increasingly aggressive, the likelihood of conflict also
increased. However, due to the likely cost of militarized action, non-militarized
preventive action may have been preferred. This is predicted by the DPMP.

Japan
Japan in the nineteenth century, as mentioned earlier, was not seen as a threat by
either the American public or the American leadership, though it was viewed as a
potential competitor. Japan in the 1930s, however, was increasingly perceived as a
militarized threat. Conflict was seen as increasingly likely as the 1930s wore on.
However, once again, because of the anticipated costs of such action, non-militarized

232

preventive action was chosen as the more prudent course of action, as predicted by
the DPMP.
Japan in the post World War II era has presented an economic challenge to the
United States. As predicted by our model, non-militarized preventive action would be
the preferred method to deal with such a circumstance. However, given that the
likelihood of conflict would have been low and that the general feeling in the U.S.,
particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was that the status quo was getting
worse for the United States, non-militarized preventive action should have been seen
as a possibility. The wave of ―Japan bashing‖ and discussion in the halls of Congress
would suggest that economic retaliation was indeed considered. However, the DPMP
also suggests that if the cost of non-militarized preventive action is high, then
preventive action is unlikely. This seems to have played out in American foreign
policy. A trade war with Japan would have certainly been expensive. As a result, we
see very little action taken by the U.S. government during the late 1970s and early
1980s.

United Kingdom
As mentioned earlier, conflict was not seen as likely between the United States
and the United Kingdom during the periods under consideration. Therefore, the
DPMP, as far as it can be applied, accurately predicts American foreign policy.
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6) To what extent do domestic elements believe that a war would not be costly?
Russia/Soviet Union
The cost of war does not seem to be a factor in determining American policy
towards Russia in the nineteenth century or the period 1925-1938. Since it was such a
remote possibility, there seems to have been very little emphasis placed on such
calculations. After World War II, however, there were many cost calculations, and the
costs were almost always considered very high, particularly after the Soviets
developed their own atomic weapons. However, it was also felt by many people,
particularly in the late 1940s and early 1950s that the cost of militarized conflict,
while high, would only increase as time went on and the Soviets increased their
military capability. Because of these two factors, the DPMP predicts that preventive
action is likely, and that non-militarized preventive action might be preferred. This
seems to be the thinking of the foreign policy establishment in the U.S. at the time.

Germany
War with Germany has always been viewed by the United States as being
costly. As early as 1885, Secretary of State Bayard warned that war with Germany
would be a terrible thing and that the Germans could possibly shell New York
City. This would have been as true in 1935 as it was in 1885. Given that
militarized preventive action in regards to Germany has always been seen as
costly, it is not surprising that the United States chose to use non-militarized
means to prevent the growth of German power.
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The DPMP does a decent job of predicting American foreign policy vis-à-vis
Germany, with the possible exception of the show of force in Samoa. Still, a show
of force is less than militarized preventive action. Had the Samoan Crisis evolved
into a militarized conflict, however, our model would have incorrectly predicted
the outcome.

Japan
War with Japan in the 1930s was seen as costly, especially given the weakness of
American military power at the time. This fact lent itself to non-militarized
preventive action, if any action was going to be taken at all. This is, in fact, what
occurred in American foreign policy during the period, and it is what is predicted by
the DPMP.
As mentioned earlier, war with Japan in the post Second World War environment
has not been presented as a viable option by any American administration. Japan has
been a close American ally for the past sixty years. However, should war occur
between the two countries, it would be unbelievably expensive since Japan is one of
the United States‘ main trading partners.

United Kingdom
As was the case with postwar Japan, war with the UK during the entire twentieth
century has been all but unthinkable from a U.S. perspective. The close alliance
between the two countries precludes any such calculations. The DPMP simply does
not apply to this case for this variable.

235

7) To what extent is there the belief that a war now would be less costly than a war
later?
Russia/Soviet Union
Since war was really only an option after the Second World War, I will not
discuss the other periods here. As seen earlier, there were Americans, particularly
some military officers, who felt that war with the Soviet Union would only become
more costly as time went on and the Soviets rebuilt their military. This calculation
probably permeated to the top of the American government, but the most powerful
decision makers clearly felt that the U.S. could not engage in preventive war for
moral and ideological reasons. The DPMP does not take into account moral and
ideological elements of decision making, but the fact that military action against the
Soviet Union was seen as costly suggests that the United States should have looked to
non-militarized means of dealing with the Soviet Union. This is predicted by the
model and it reflects reality very well.

Germany
From the evidence gathered in this research, there is no clear indicator of how the
American leadership felt about the cost of future war with Germany either in the
nineteenth century or in the run-up to World War II. It is clear, however, that war
with Germany was always seen as costly, and this was enough to preclude militarized
preventive action. The DPMP predicts that if any preventive action is to be taken, it
will be of a non-militarized nature. This is, in fact, how American foreign policy
proceeded in regards to Germany during the periods under investigation.
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Japan
There is evidence to suggest that by the late 1930s, American leadership felt that
the longer they could delay conflict with Japan, the better the chances for the United
States. It was only in 1938 that the U.S. began to earnestly rearm and to begin
rebuilding the U.S. Navy. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that American
leadership wished to postpone any war with Japan for as long as possible to give
these rearmament programs a chance to bear fruit. Therefore, since militarized
preventive action would be seen as more costly in the short term than it would be in
the longer term, the DPMP predicts that non-militarized preventive action, if any,
might be preferred. This seems to be reflected in American policy toward Japan in the
1930s.

United Kingdom

Since war was not a real possibility between the UK and the U.S., I will not
address this issue here.

8)

To what extent is there the belief that the chances of winning a war now would
be greater than the chances of winning a later war?
Russia/Soviet Union
Similar to calculations of the costs of war, for American policymakers after
World War II, it seemed that the odds of winning a war would decrease as the Soviets
rebuilt their military machine. However, as discussed earlier, the costs of war in the
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first place precluded most high-level discussions of preventive war against the Soviet
Union. This is accurately predicted by the DPMP.

Germany
There is no real evidence, other than the comments of Secretary of State Bayard,
that suggest the thinking of the American leadership regarding the probability of
winning a war with Germany. The costs seem to have been seen as prohibitive, so no
real discussion of a now-versus-later type took place. Nonetheless, because of the
perceived costs, according to the DPMP, non-militarized options would have been
preferred. This is reflected in reality.

Japan
As stated earlier, it is conceivable that by the late 1930s, American leadership felt
that the longer they could delay conflict with Japan, the better the chances for the
United States. Because of the relative late start in rearming, it is reasonable to assume
that American leadership wished to postpone any war with Japan for as long as
possible to give these rearmament programs a chance to bear fruit. Therefore, since
militarized preventive action in the short term would be seen as less likely to succeed
than it would in the longer term, the DPMP predicts that non-militarized preventive
action, if any, might be preferred, at least until the United States had sufficiently built
up its military power. This seems to be reflected in American policy toward Japan in
the 1930s.
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United Kingdom
Since war was not a real possibility between the UK and the U.S., I will not
address this issue here.

9)

To what extent do domestic elements think the status quo will get worse for their
state if the rising challenger is allowed to continue its ascendancy?
Russia/Soviet Union
In regards to Russia and then the Soviet Union, there does not seem to have been
a concern about the status quo prior to World War II. However, after the war, there
does seem to be this pervasive feeling that the status quo would get worse for the
United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet development of the atomic
bomb, communist gains in China, and then the outbreak of the war in Korea only
reinforced these concerns. However, given the cost of militarized conflict, the DPMP
accurately predicts that the U.S. would engage in non-militarized preventive action
during the Cold War.

Germany
It is difficult to extract American thoughts regarding the status quo vis-à-vis
Germany in the 1870s and 1880s. Germany was a rising power to be sure, but so was
the United States. The overall lack of discussion regarding the future of the status quo
would lead us to assume that this was not a major concern of American decision
makers. If this were correct, then the DPMP would assume that any preventive action
taken on the part of the United States would be of a non-militarized nature. This
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would be correct, with the possible exception of the potential outbreak of hostilities
over Samoa had nature not intervened.
Germany in the 1920s, as mentioned above, was not of particular concern to the
American foreign policy establishment. However, upon the ascendance of Adolf
Hitler and the remilitarization of Germany, there was increasing unease about the
rising power in Europe. Still, there does not seem to have been a lot of discussion
about a deteriorating status quo. Americans were more concerned about their crippled
economy than what was happening across the Atlantic Ocean. There does not seem to
be a perception that the status quo is worsening for the United States. If this is
accurate, then the DPMP correctly predicts that the United States, if it were going to
do anything, would engage in non-militarized preventive action.

Japan
The status quo was clearly deteriorating in relation to a rising Japan during the
1930s, but this did not seem to be a major concern of American leadership for most of
the decade. Americans, as mentioned before, were focused largely on the domestic
economy and were trying to avoid getting involved in international conflicts. The
American concern, at least until 1937, seems to have been more about fair access to
China than with the rise of Japanese power and Japanese militancy. Therefore, while
the status quo was objectively deteriorating, the American leadership and American
public do not seem to have noticed or cared until around 1938. Given this, we have to
answer ―no‖ to the question ―Will the status quo continue to worsen if no action is
taken?‖ It seems this is the way the American leadership would have answered the
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question at the time, had they asked it. Given this, the DPMP predicts that, at least
until 1938, preventive action of any kind was unlikely.
After 1938, the awareness of the deteriorating situation seems to have been more
clearly defined in the minds of American decision makers. However, there is little
direct evidence from the research here to suggest that the leadership was framing it in
terms of a deteriorating status quo projected into the future. This is problematic for
our model, since if we answer ―yes‖ to this question, the DPMP accurately predicts
U.S. foreign policy after 1938. If we answer ―no‖ to this question, our model
continues to predict no preventive action, which is incorrect. We must conclude,
therefore, that on this question, we simply do not have adequate information to
determine definitively the success or failure of the DPMP.
American leaders and the American public during the 1970s and early 1980s
certainly saw Japan as an economic challenge and did see the status quo as continuing
to worsen. This lead to ―Japan bashing,‖ but little else. Our model predicts that,
because non-militarized preventive action would have been costly given the important
trade that occurred with Japan, the U.S. should not take any preventive action. This,
in fact, is what occurred during the period under consideration.

United Kingdom
There is no discussion of the status quo vis-à-vis the United Kingdom during this
period. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that had the status quo been seen as
deteriorating, this would have made any difference in British-American relations
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during the periods being examined here. The United States has shown a tendency to
accommodate rising powers with which it has good relations.

10) What is the nature (polarity) of the international system?
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by
balanced multipolarity (war somewhat likely), while the period 1903-1918 was
characterized by unbalanced multipolarity (war most likely). The period 1919 to 1938
constituted a balanced multipolar system (war somewhat likely) while 1939 to 1945
was an unbalanced multipolar system (war most likely). Finally, the period 1947 to
1990 was bipolar (war most unlikely). According to his theory of offensive realism,
war was therefore somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and again from 1919 to 1938.
War was most likely during the periods 1903-1918 and 1939 to 1945. 123 One
question this theory does not answer is this: Why did war occur in 1914 and not, in
say 1910 when the structure was the same? Mearsheimer‘s model comes up short in
answering this puzzle.
The typology of preventive action developed in this study also incorporates
Mearsheimer‘s concepts of polarity (see table 6.1 above). Within the typology, a
―balanced multipolar‖ system suggests that the United States should have acquiesced
or have used a mixed strategy, which is at least partially correct. In the case of Russia
and then the Soviet Union, up until 1938, the typology accurately predicts American
foreign policy. It also accurately predicts American reaction to the increasing power
of the UK during the 1930s. In relation to Japan in the 1860s and 1870s, the U.S.
certainly acquiesced to its rise. In the 1930s, the U.S. acquiesced or accommodated
123

See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).
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Japan, again in keeping with our typology. The U.S. response to Germany in the
1870s and 1880s, as noted however, was more forceful. In the case of Germany, our
typology does not perform well on this variable. In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S.
largely did nothing as Germany rose, again suggesting our typology is correct.
However, this begins to break down after 1938 when the U.S. began to supply arms to
Britain and France. However, as Mearsheimer suggests, in 1939 the world became an
unbalanced multipolar system in which these actions would be completely
appropriate. Similarly, after 1938 the U.S. started to take a tougher stance against
Japan, again in conjunction with the shift toward an unbalanced multipolar system.
Our typology seems to hold up fairly well in all of these cases except Germany in the
1870s and 1880s.
The classification of a bipolar system in the post World War II era is less helpful.
Our typology predicts everything from acquiescence to accommodation to
confrontational diplomacy. It is no surprise, then that American foreign policy during
this time can fit into one of these three categories vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Japan,
and the United Kingdom. While accurate, the typology is not very instructive for
these cases during this period.

11)

What type of government exists in each state, i.e., are either or both
democracies?124
Between 1863 and 1867, the United States is classified as a democracy (it is
actually classified as a democracy for the entire period under investigation) while

124

See Ibid. See also Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More
Pacific?," World Politics 44, no. 2 (1992).
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Japan and Russia are both classified as autocracies. Therefore, according to
Schweller‘s model, the U.S. should have formed a defensive alliance against both. In
this case, Schweller‘s model does a poor job of predicting American foreign policy.
The United States actually tended to favor Japan during this period, and AmericanRussian relations were quite friendly during this period.
From 1868 to 1877, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies. At
the same time, Japan is classified as an anocracy. According to Schweller‘s model,
the United States should have formed a defensive alliance against all three. In this
instance, Schweller‘s model does better in predicting America‘s foreign policy
behavior against Germany. American-Russian relations also cooled during this
period, but not to the point where the United States was seeking alliances against
Russia. Japan continued to enjoy good relations with the United States during this
period, counter to the predictions of Schweller‘s model.
For the period 1878-1888, both Germany and Japan are classified as anocracies
and Russia is still classified as an autocracy. Schweller‘s model predicts that the
United States should form a defensive alliance against all three. Schweller‘s model
again does a decent job of capturing an overall negative relationship between the
United States and Germany, but it does less well in its prediction of RussianAmerican and Japanese-American relations.
Between 1920 and 1932, Germany and Japan continue to be classified as
anocracies and the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. The United Kingdom
emerged on the scene in 1930 as a new challenger to the United States, but it is
classified as a democracy. Schweller‘s model predicts that the United States should
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form a defensive alliance against Germany, Japan, and Russia; but it should
accommodate the rise of the UK. Schweller‘s model accurately predicts American
behavior to the relative rise in power of the United Kingdom. It does less well in its
prediction in regards to the other three.
From 1933 to 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany are classified as autocracies,
Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the United Kingdom is classified as a
democracy. Therefore, according to Schweller‘s model, the United States should have
formed a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan; and
should have accommodated the rise of the UK. Again, Schweller‘s model accurately
predicts American foreign policy behavior regarding the UK. His model also captures
the emerging alliance against Germany and Japan. However, there is no similar
alliance forming against the Soviet Union.
For the period 1946 to 1951, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy and the
United Kingdom is classified as a democracy. Schweller‘s model predicts that the
U.S. should form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, but it should
accommodate the rise of the UK. In this case, Schweller‘s model is completely
accurate.
Between 1953 and 1970, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as
democracies, while the Soviet Union continues to be classified as an autocracy.
Schweller‘s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the rise of both Japan
and the UK, but that it would form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union.
Schweller‘s model is completely accurate for this period.
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From 1971 to 1982, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as
democracies. Therefore, Schweller‘s model predicts that the United States would
accommodate their rise in power. Schweller‘s model is completely accurate for this
period.
Finally, from 1983 to 1996, the UK is classified as a democracy. Once again,
Schweller‘s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the UK‘s ascendance.
Schweller‘s model is completely accurate for this period.
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Regime Type
Predicted United States Action

Table 6.2 Mearsheimer‘s and Schweller‘s Predicted Outcomes

Time
Period

Power Distribution
Predicted Outcome

1863-1867
1868-1877
1878-1888
1920-1932
1933-1938
1939
1946-1951
1952-1970
1971-1982
1983-1996

Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Balanced Multipolar
War Somewhat Likely
Unbalanced Multipolar
War most likely
Bipolar
War Most Unlikely
Bipolar
War Most Unlikely
Bipolar
War Most Unlikely
Bipolar
War Most Unlikely

United
States

United Kingdom

Prussia/Germany

Japan

Russia/
Soviet Union

Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance

Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance
Anocracy
Defensive Alliance

Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy**
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance
Autocracy
Defensive Alliance

Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy

Democracy*
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation

Democracy
Accommodation
Democracy
Accommodation

* The UK began to ascend vis-à-vis the United States in 1930 and that rise continued until 1939.
** The Soviet Union began to rise vis-à-vis the United States in 1925 and that ascendance continued until 1938.
Blank boxes indicate that the United States was no longer in relative decline vis-à-vis the other power or the other power had surpassed the U.S. Either condition
is outside the scope of this research.
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Conclusion
American foreign policy is quite complex during the time periods under consideration in
this chapter. Two major questions should be asked in deciding whether the Domestic Politics
Model of Prevention is valid and worth further consideration: ―How well does it predict actual
American foreign policy?‖ and ―Does it do a better job at predicting American foreign policy
than other models?‖ I will attempt to answer these questions in this section.

Russia/Soviet Union
In the case of Russia and the early Soviet Union, the DPMP performs very well. For the
period of the nineteenth century, the model accurately predicts that the American government
should largely do nothing or accommodate the Russians during the 1860s and 1870s. In addition,
during the 1920s and 1930s, the DPMP is correct; no preventive action was taken by the United
States against Russia during this period.
The behavior of the Roosevelt administration vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the 1930s
is accurately predicted by my typology, though not the specifics of that behavior. Because the
Soviet Union prior to the Second World War was not seen as a military threat, but an ideological
threat, my typology may be seen as accurately predicting that the U.S. would accommodate the
Soviet Union.
The DPMP does a good job of predicting actual American behavior in relation to the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. During this period, political constraints were moderate for
American leaders. Given this condition, the typology once again performs well: predicting a mix
of strategies including the use of incentives, coercion, and confrontational diplomacy. The model
accurately predicts that preventive action was likely, but that non-militarized preventive action
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might be preferred. Containment is a form of non-militarized preventive action and was the
preferred method of dealing with the Soviet Union after World War II. This, as predicted by the
DPMP, resulted in sustained coercive and confrontational diplomacy during the Cold War
period.

Prussia/Germany
The DPMP struggles with American-German relations in the 1870s and 1880s. In this
case, the model seems to have a split personality. On the one hand, there seems to be severe
political constraints, and therefore the typology suggests that in this case, the United States
should have acted defensively and acquiesced in the face of German aggression. Yet the United
States engaged in confrontational diplomacy and even a show of military force. While the U.S.
did act defensively for the most part, it did not acquiesce to German demands. In this case, the
DPMP also does not perform well on the variable of polarity of the international system. On the
other hand, because of the American perception that Germany posed a threat to U.S. interests
during the 1870s and 1880s, the typology accurately predicts the use of confrontational
diplomacy and a show of force (in the case of Samoa) during the 1870s and 1880s.
The model is redeemed somewhat, though, regarding American-German relations on the
eve of the Second World War. In the decade before the Second World War, the typology does
not fail completely, but there are clearly nuances in American foreign policy that are not being
captured by the typology. During and after 1938, the typology performs reasonably well. While
no incentives were offered to Hitler, coercion and confrontational diplomacy were initiated by
the United States.
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Japan
As mentioned earlier, the rise of Japan in the 1860s and 1870s was not viewed by most
Americans as threatening, and therefore did not lend itself to thoughts of preventive action. The
typology accurately predicts that American leaders would acquiesce or accommodate the rise of
Japan during the 1860s and 1870s.
Unfortunately, the DPMP does not perform as well in all instances. One variable, the
perception of a deteriorating status quo vis-à-vis Japan prior to the outbreak of World War II,
provides a real challenge for our model. On this variable, we simply have insufficient evidence
to draw a definitive conclusion.
However, the DPMP does seem to predict accurately American foreign policy vis-à-vis
Japan in the run-up to World War II. This is especially true for the later years of the 1930s when
the United States started to take a more aggressive stance in regards to Japanese maneuvers in
Asia. However, the model does suggest that the U.S. should have taken more aggressive
measures earlier than it did vis-à-vis Japan. Part of the reason for this discrepancy, as indicated
earlier, is that the U.S. was not in a strong military position to act more forcefully.
In terms of the nature of the threat from Japan in the post World War II era, the DPMP
does an overall good job predicting the behavior of American foreign policy during this time.
However, some variables for this period cause trouble for our model. The measurement of
offensive/defensive military strategy does not seem to apply to Japan during this period given
that Japan was an important ally and trading partner to the United States. In fact, the American
desire in the early 1980s to see Japan rebuild its military runs counter to my preventive action
theory. The one redeeming feature in this instance, however, is that since Japan—during this
period—represented an economic challenge not a military one, the U.S. had little to fear from a
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rebuilding of Japan‘s military capacity. In addition, some of the variables in the DPMP simply
do not seem particularly applicable in this instance. For example, in looking at the cost of war or
the chances of being successful in a war, the American-Japanese relationship in the post World
War II era does not lend itself to this analysis.

United Kingdom
The American-British relationship also poses problems for the DPMP on some variables
such as internal power constraints, political constraints, the cost of war, and the chances of being
successful in a war. They simply do not seem to be particularly applicable to US-UK relations.
Nonetheless, the model does accurately predict American foreign policy vis-à-vis the United
Kingdom on some of the other variables. Fore instance, in both the decade before World War II,
and the decades since, American leadership regarding Britain has been moderate-acquiescent to
moderate-pragmatic. The DPMP has accurately predicted that the United States either would
acquiesce in the face of British growth or would accommodate the UK. Similarly, the threat from
the UK in the 1930s and after World War II, if there was any threat at all, would have to be
classified as low non-militarized. The typology accurately predicts that American foreign policy
should be acquiescent in these circumstances.

Alternative Models
Mearsheimer‘s classification of international polarity, as mentioned above, failed to
predict American-German relations during the 1870s and 1880s. The classification of a bipolar
system in the post World War II era is also problematic. It predicts everything from acquiescence
to accommodation to confrontational diplomacy. It is no surprise, then that American foreign
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policy during this time can fit into one of these three categories vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. While accurate, the polarity of the international system is not
very instructive for some these cases.
Schweller‘s model also has a mixed record in its performance for these cases. For the
period 1863 to 1867, Schweller‘s model does a poor job of predicting American foreign policy.
Schweller‘s model also performs only moderately well when looking at Prussia/Germany,
Russia, and Japan between 1866 and 1877. His model accurately predicts American behavior
toward Prussia/Germany, but it misses the mark in terms of American foreign policy towards
Russia and Japan. It has similar problems in the period 1878-1888. However, Schweller‘s model
does a good job in predicting American reaction to the relative rise of the UK during the 1930s.
His model also does a good job predicting an American defensive alliance against Germany and
Japan, but it does not predict an alliance with the Soviet Union during the Second World War.
On the upside, Schweller‘s model is completely accurate in its predictions for the Cold War
period.

Final Thoughts
None of the models—the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention, Mearsheimer‘s model
of offensive realism, or Schweller‘s democratic peace model—accurately predict American
foreign policy in every instance examined in this chapter. However, it is clear that my model
performs at least as well as Mearsheimer‘s model, and considerably better than Schweller‘s
model for all instances except the Cold War. This would suggest that the DPMP has some value
in the study of international relations.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to answer the basic question of why dominant
declining states act the way they do regarding rising challengers. In chapter one, two
basic goals were established concerning the overall framework of this study: 1)
broadening the concept of preventive action to include non-militarized events, and 2) a
focus on leaders’ perceptions of the rising challenger and the workings of domestic
politics. The purpose of this approach was to capture more subtle instances of preventive
action—moving beyond the traditional view of a dichotomous relationship of war-nowar—and to help us understand the domestic inputs that go into preventive action
decisions.
In order to determine what causal mechanisms or variables might have a dominant
influence on the process, a model was developed that captured some important factors in
this decision making process. The Domestic Politics Model of Prevention, presented in
chapter three, incorporates aspects of prospect theory and includes the basic causal
mechanisms of internal power constraints, domestic political constraints, and ruler belief
systems. The performance of this model is then compared to the performance of two
well-established structural models: offensive realism and Schweller’s democratic peace
model.
In order to test the DPMP against the other two models, this dissertation utilizes
three case studies: the decline of the United Kingdom (chapter four), the decline of
Russia and the Soviet Union (chapter five), and the decline of the United States (chapter
six). Within each case study, a standardized set of questions are asked of each case—in
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accordance with the method of process tracing—to determine the importance of each
causal mechanism as well as the importance of the structure of the international system.
As was stated at the outset, the idea was to see how my model, based largely on domestic
factors, would perform in relation to the more established structural models. The hope, of
course, was that the DPMP would outperform the other two models in predicting the
behavior of dominant but declining states.
The purpose of this last chapter is to answer this grand question: which of these
competing models does the best job of explaining how dominant declining states actually
behave vis-à-vis a rising challenger? In looking at this question, several possibilities must
be considered. First, it could be that only one of these models presents the best
explanation for the behavior of dominants states when faced with decline and a rising
challenger. Second, it could be that two of the models, when combined, provide the best
explanation for this behavior. Third, it is possible that all three models provide equally
adequate explanations of why dominant declining states respond to challengers the way
they do.
The goal of this chapter is to tie together all the loose ends of the preceding
chapters and provide an overall look at how the models performed. In order to
accomplish this, each model will be reviewed in the context of each case, and their
conclusions will be briefly presented again. Then, the empirical merits of these findings
and their relevance to dominant declining state behavior will be discussed. Finally, it will
be determined which model—or models—most convincingly explains the behavior of
these dominant declining states. Finally, the implications will be mentioned and the study
concluded.
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The Models: Reviews and Evaluations
In this section, I once again go through the cases in the context of each model. In
order to refresh the reader’s memory regarding each case, this section recaps the findings
from the previous three chapters. All of these findings are summarized in Table 7.1 in the
following section.

Alternative Model 1: John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism Model
John Mearsheimer, with his theory of offensive realism, suggests that major
variations of balance in the international system can affect a nation’s calculations
regarding the efficacy of war. Mearsheimer proposes a variety of systemic possibilities
ranging from balanced bipolar systems to unbalanced multipolar systems.1 He suggests
that war is most likely to occur in a system in which a potential hegemon is emerging,
what he calls an unbalanced multipolarity. On the other hand, war is least likely in a
bipolar system in which two powers have roughly equal amounts of power. In between
these two extremes is what he calls balanced multipolarity in which several states have
roughly equal power, and there is no superior state. He suggests that in such a case, war is
more likely than in a bipolar system, but less likely than in an unbalanced multipolar
system.2 Mearsheimer lists the polarity of the system as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Napoleonic era I, 1792-93 (1 year), balanced multipolarity
Napoleonic era II, 1793-1815 (22 years), unbalanced multipolarity
Nineteenth century, 1815-1902 (88 years), balanced multipolarity
Kaiserreich era, 1903-18 (16 years), unbalanced multipolarity
Interwar years, 1919-38 (20 years), balanced multipolarity

1

Kenneth Waltz points out that stability and peace do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. See Kenneth N.
Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993).
2
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2001), 42-46.
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6) Nazi era, 1939-45 (6 years), unbalanced multipolarity
7) Cold War, 1945-1990 (46 years), bipolarity3

One of the shortcomings of the offensive realism model is its tendency to
categorize relations between states only as peaceful or not peaceful. In order to overcome
this problem, I have modified the predictions of this model as such: if preventive actions
are initiated at a higher rate during periods of unbalanced multipolarity, less so during
balanced multipolarity, and still less during bipolarity, the offensive realism model will
be strengthened. This modification is in keeping with Mearsheimer’s original intent. If
the offensive realism model is able to predict accurately whether preventive action
occurs, the importance of the DPMP will be weakened. On the other hand, if the
offensive realism model proves inadequate in its predictions, and the DPMP proves more
accurate, my ideas should be given more importance.

***United Kingdom***
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by
balanced multipolarity, while the period 1903-1918 was characterized by unbalanced
multipolarity. According to his theory of offensive realism, war was therefore somewhat
likely from 1816 to 1902 and most likely during the period 1903-1918.4
According to this model, a “balanced multipolar” system suggests that Britain
should have acquiesced, which is largely correct. However, in the later “unbalanced
3

Ibid. (New York and London), 348. Dale Copeland also suggests that the polarity of the system and the
relationship of the declining state’s military power in comparison to its economic and potential power
largely determine the extent to which decline leads to war. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major
War, ed. Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 21.
4
See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

256

multipolar” system, the typology predicts that Britain should have used
coercive/confrontational diplomacy. On this point, offensive realism does not do a good
job of accurately predicting the outcome of its foreign policy decision vis-à-vis rising
powers. As we have seen, British foreign policy vis-à-vis rising states from 1816 to the
second decade of the twentieth century was largely acquiescent and accommodating. In
essence, the UK allowed the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia to rise relative to
it, and in some cases to surpass it, with little or no effort to check their ascendance.

***Russia/Soviet Union***
John Mearsheimer suggests that the period 1816-1902 was characterized by
balanced multipolarity (war somewhat likely), while the period 1903-1918 was
characterized by unbalanced multipolarity (war most likely). 1919 to 1938 constituted a
balanced multipolar system (war somewhat likely) while 1939 to 1945 was an
unbalanced multipolar system (war most likely). According to his theory of offensive
realism, war was therefore somewhat likely from 1816 to 1902 and again from 1919 to
1938. War was most likely during the periods 1903-1918 and 1939 to 1945.5
A “balanced multipolar” system suggests that Russia should have acquiesced or
have used a mixed strategy, which is at least partially correct. However, in the later
“unbalanced multipolar” system, the offensive realism model predicts that Russia should
have used coercive/confrontational diplomacy, which it did not. The Soviet belief that
time was on their side and that they would only continue to get stronger led to a
conviction that conflict with other great powers should be avoided whenever possible.

5

Ibid.
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The model, therefore, does not do a good job of accurately predicting the behavior of
Russia/the Soviet Union in this later instance.

***United States***
Mearsheimer’s classification of international polarity failed to predict AmericanGerman relations during the 1870s and 1880s. The classification of a bipolar system in
the post World War II era is also problematic. It predicts everything from acquiescence to
accommodation to confrontational diplomacy. It is no surprise, then that American
foreign policy during this time can fit into one of these three categories vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. While accurate, the polarity of the
international system is not very instructive in this instance.

Alternative Model 2: Schweller’s Democratic Peace as a Model of Preventive
War/Action
The second alternative model I use to test the DPMP is based on Schweller’s
predictions about the domestic structure of states and proclivity to initiate preventive war.
Schweller argues that it is the internal domestic structure—whether democratic or not—
that determines how a declining dominant power responds to a rising challenger. He
concludes that when faced with a democratic rising challenger, democracies do not
initiate preventive war, but instead accommodate the challenger. When it comes to nondemocratic challengers, however, democratic states attempt to form defensive alliance
systems. Also of interest, though, is that he leaves open the possibility that a democracy
may initiate preventive war against a non-democratic challenger if the dominant
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democratic state believes that such a war would not be long or costly. Meanwhile, nondemocratic states, when faced with a challenger (whether democratic or not), will either
form a defensive alliance or will initiate preventive war. Accommodation is not in their
nature. In all, Schweller suggests that there are four possible responses by a dominant
state facing a challenger: 1) accommodation, 2) internal balancing, 3) alliance formation,
and 4) preventive war.6 If Schweller’s model accurately predicts the behavior of states in
my cases, the importance of the DPMP will be weakened. I predict, however, that my
model will outperform both Schweller’s model and the offensive realism model.

***United Kingdom***
The most striking aspect of British foreign policy vis-à-vis rising states from 1816
to the second decade of the twentieth century is its acquiescence and accommodation. In
essence, it allowed the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia to rise relative to it,
and in some cases to surpass it, with little or no effort to check their ascendance. The
periphery was increasingly left to powerful, but for the moment at least, friendly nations.
Whether the threat was economic or financial, as in the case of the United States and
Germany, or primarily military—as in the case of Russia, Japan, and Germany—the
United Kingdom did little to stop the rise of the threatening power. British public
officials came to accept a geographically constrained form of naval superiority in which
England could maintain its two-power standard only in European waters. This strategy
implied coming to some accommodation with the peripheral powers and perhaps, as the
European states increased their naval strength, with one or more of them as well.

6

Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?," World
Politics 44, no. 2 (1992).
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Between 1816 and 1879, the United Kingdom was an anocracy. During this
period, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies and Japan as an
anocracy. The United States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore,
according to Schweller’s model, the United Kingdom should have either formed a
defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia,
and the U.S.7 Of course, what we have seen is that Britain was moving toward a
defensive alliance with Japan and acquiesced to American demands in the Western
Hemisphere. Schweller’s model does not provide an adequate explanation for this.
From 1880 to 1896, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia were
autocracies, Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the U.S. was a full democracy.
Schweller’s model predicts that the UK should have formed a defensive alliance against
Germany, Russia, and Japan and should have accommodated the rise of the United States.
While the UK did accommodate the rise of the U.S., it did not form a defensive alliance
against Japan, but instead moved still closer to accommodation with Japan.
From 1897 to 1902, the UK was a full democracy. Germany and Russia, on the
other hand, were autocracies during this period and Japan is classified as an anocracy.8
Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, the UK should have formed a defensive
alliance against Germany, Russia, and Japan. Contrary to this model, however, in 1902
Britain and Japan formally signed a defensive alliance. This is not explained by
Schweller’s model.

7

All statements about the level of democracy are based on the Polity IV rating. If a state is rated 7 to 10,
then I consider it a full democracy. If it is rated a 1 to 6 it is an anocracy, and I treat it as a non-democracy.
States receiving a zero or negative rating are considered autocracies by Polity IV. See Appendix C for
selected Polity IV scores.
8
Japan was undergoing an “adverse transition” from 1860 to 1867, and then it was an anocracy.
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During 1903 and 1904, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Germany and
Japan were anocracies and Russia was an autocracy during this period. Schweller’s
model predicts that the United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against
Germany, Russia, and Japan during this period. Instead, Britain and Japan were allied.
Germany and Russia, however, were still seen as adversaries by British political leaders.
Between 1905 and 1913, the United Kingdom was a full democracy. Japan, on the
other hand, was an anocracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller, the
United Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Japan during this
period. Finally, from 1914 to 1918, the United Kingdom was a full democracy while
Russia and Japan were anocracies. Therefore, according to Schweller, the United
Kingdom should have sought a defensive alliance against Russia and Japan during this
period. Of course, as has been seen above, this did not occur. Furthermore, it does not
explain why Britain was willing to enter into a defensive alliance with Japan but not with
the anocratic Germany (after 1903).
Clearly, Schweller’s model has some problems when examining the case of
British decline. Repeatedly, the model fails to predict accurately the United Kingdom’s
response to rising challengers. This casts real doubt on its usefulness as a comprehensive
model in regards to preventive action.

***Russia/Soviet Union***
Russian and Soviet leadership had a largely optimistic view of the future for their
state. Despite chronic economic and military weakness, leaders of both Imperial Russia
and the Soviet Union saw their state as a great power at least equivalent to the most
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powerful states in Europe, Asia, and North America. Moreover, their belief that time was
on their side and that they would only continue to get stronger led them to conclude that
conflict with other great powers should be avoided whenever possible. This was taken to
an extreme in communist ideology, which suggested that the capitalist nations would
fight amongst themselves, and a neutral Soviet Union would be the true beneficiary of
such a conflict.
This optimism about the future precluded a strong preventive school of thought
from taking root in either Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. Russia and the Soviet
Union both largely accommodated rising powers, in much the same way that Britain had
done, though for very different reasons. British leadership was largely resigned to a fate
of declining power, while Russian and Soviet leadership were optimistic about their
power potential.
Between 1816 and 1879, Russia is classified as an autocracy as is
Prussia/Germany. During this period, Japan is classified as an anocracy. The United
States was a full democracy during this period. Therefore, according to Schweller’s
model, Russia should have either formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war
against Germany/Prussia, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.9 Many of the agreements reached
during this period could be viewed as defensive alliances, so Schweller’s model seems to
hold up during this time. However, Russia did not engage in preventive war, or
militarized preventive action of any kind during this entire period. Schweller’s model
seems to be at least partially correct during this period.

9

All statements about the level of democracy are based on the Polity IV rating. If a state is rated 7 to 10,
then I consider it a full democracy. If it is rated a 1 to 6 it is an anocracy, and I treat it as a non-democracy.
States receiving a zero or negative rating are considered autocracies by Polity IV. See Appendix C for
selected Polity IV scores.
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From 1880 to 1896, Russia and Germany were classified as autocracies. The UK
is classified as a full democracy and Japan is classified as an anocracy. Therefore, Russia
should have, according to Schweller’s model, formed a defensive alliance or initiated
preventive war against Germany, Japan, the UK and the United States. Russia continued
to be involved in European affairs, but not in an overly aggressive way. Defensive
agreements were made, but no real preventive action was taken. Therefore, we must
conclude that Schweller’s model does not perform well in this instance.
From 1897 to 1902, Russia and Germany were still autocracies. Japan was still
classified as an anocracy while the United States and the United Kingdom are classified
as full democracies.10 Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, Russia should have
formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Germany, Japan, the UK
and the United States. Again, Schweller’s model somewhat predicts what Russia did
during this time. Russia did not engage in preventive war, but its agreements at The
Hague and elsewhere could be seen as entering into defensive alliances with other
powers.
During 1903 and 1904, Russia is classified as an autocracy while Japan is
classified as an anocracy. Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, Russia should have
formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Japan. In reality, Russia
did neither. It attempted to continue its expansion in Asia, but Russia was humiliated
when Japan launched a war against it in an attempt to put a halt to its expansionist dreams
in Asia.
Between 1906 and 1918, Russia and Japan are classified as anocracies. Therefore,
Russia should have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against Japan.
10

Japan was undergoing an “adverse transition” from 1860 to 1867, and then it was an anocracy.

263

What we really see, though, is a turning inward and westward by Russia during this time.
With the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea, there was less incentive for Russia to
continue attempted expansion in Asia. In any case, the events in Europe began to demand
more attention than events in Asia.
Between 1932 and 1946, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. Germany
is classified as an anocracy in 1932, but then is classified as an autocracy between 1933
and 1944. Japan is classified as an anocracy between 1932 and 1944. The United
Kingdom is classified as a democracy between 1932 and 1946. Therefore, Russia should
have formed a defensive alliance or initiated preventive war against all of these powers.
Of course, this did not happen. The Soviet Union did not engage in preventive action
during this period, and several of the agreements that it entered into were not defensive
against these powers. The Soviet-German non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 was not a
defensive alliance against Germany, as would be predicted by the Schweller model.
Overall, Schweller’s model seems to fail at predicting Russian Soviet behavior.
Despite being autocratic for most of past 190 years, Russian and Soviet strategy has
largely been defensive. Only rarely has it engaged in preventive action, despite the
prediction by Schweller that autocracies should be the most bellicose form of
government.

***United States***
Between 1863 and 1867, the United States is classified as a democracy (it is
actually classified as a democracy for the entire period under investigation) while Japan
and Russia are both classified as autocracies. Therefore, according to Schweller’s model,
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the U.S. should have formed a defensive alliance against both. In this case, Schweller’s
model does a poor job of predicting American foreign policy. The United States actually
tended to favor Japan during this period, and American-Russian relations were quite
friendly during this period.
From 1868 to 1877, Prussia/Germany and Russia are classified as autocracies. At
the same time, Japan is classified as an anocracy. According to Schweller’s model, the
United States should have formed a defensive alliance against all three. In this instance,
Schweller’s model does better in predicting America’s foreign policy behavior against
Germany. American-Russian relations also cooled during this period, but not to the point
where the United States was seeking alliances against Russia. Japan continued to enjoy
good relations with the United States during this period, counter to the predictions of
Schweller’s model.
For the period 1878-1888, both Germany and Japan are classified as anocracies
and Russia is still classified as an autocracy. Schweller’s model predicts that the United
States should form a defensive alliance against all three. Schweller’s model again does a
decent job of capturing an overall negative relationship between the United States and
Germany, but it does less well in its prediction of Russian-American and JapaneseAmerican relations.
Between 1920 and 1932, Germany and Japan continue to be classified as
anocracies and the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy. The United Kingdom
emerged on the scene in 1930 as a new challenger to the United States, but it is classified
as a democracy. Schweller’s model predicts that the United States should form a
defensive alliance against Germany, Japan, and Russia; but it should accommodate the
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rise of the UK. Schweller’s model accurately predicts American behavior to the relative
rise in power of the United Kingdom. It does less well in its prediction in regards to the
other three.
From 1933 to 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany are classified as autocracies,
Japan is classified as an anocracy, and the United Kingdom is classified as a democracy.
Therefore, according to Schweller’s model, the United States should have formed a
defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan; and should have
accommodated the rise of the UK. Again, Schweller’s model accurately predicts
American foreign policy behavior regarding the UK. His model also captures the
emerging alliance against Germany and Japan. However, there is no similar alliance
forming against the Soviet Union.
For the period 1946 to 1951, the Soviet Union is classified as an autocracy and the
United Kingdom is classified as a democracy. Schweller’s model predicts that the U.S.
should form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, but it should accommodate the
rise of the UK. In this case, Schweller’s model is completely accurate.
Between 1953 and 1970, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as
democracies, while the Soviet Union continues to be classified as an autocracy.
Schweller’s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the rise of both Japan and
the UK, but that it would form a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union. Schweller’s
model is completely accurate for this period.
From 1971 to 1982, both the United Kingdom and Japan are classified as
democracies. Therefore, Schweller’s model predicts that the United States would
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accommodate their rise in power. Schweller’s model is completely accurate for this
period.
Finally, from 1983 to 1996, the UK is classified as a democracy. Once again,
Schweller’s model predicts that the U.S. would accommodate the UK’s ascendance.
Schweller’s model is completely accurate for this period.

The Domestic Politics Model of Prevention
This dissertation suggests that a model based largely on domestic factors will
yield better predictions than models based on systemic mechanisms. Causal mechanisms
such as internal power constraints, domestic political constraints, and ruler belief systems
will allow us to predict not only whether preventive action is likely to occur, but also
what form that preventive action is likely to take. In determining the reliability of the
DPMP, I examine the same cases and ask the same questions addressed in the previous
two models.

***United Kingdom***
On some dimensions such as internal power constraints and ruler belief systems,
the DPMP performed very well in this case study. On other dimensions such as perceived
likelihood of conflict, the model failed to predict accurately British behavior. This
suggests that while the DPMP is far from perfect, with some modifications it may
become a valuable tool in predicting the likelihood of different forms of preventive
action.
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***Russia/Soviet Union***
Overall, the DPMP performs well regarding the case of Russia and the Soviet
Union. Where the model does fall short (nature of threat, expected cost of war, perceived
chances of winning a war), it does not fail completely. Unfortunately, because it is
correct some of the time while missing the mark at other times, we must conclude that on
these dimensions, it performs poorly as a predictor of Russian/Soviet behavior.
Nonetheless, when compared against the other two models, the DPMP continues to
perform admirably.

***United States***
Prussia/Germany
The DPMP struggles with American-German relations in the 1870s and 1880s. In
this case, the model seems to have a split personality. On the one hand, there seems to be
severe political constraints, and therefore the typology suggests that in this case, the
United States should have acted defensively and acquiesced in the face of German
aggression. Yet the United States engaged in confrontational diplomacy and even a show
of military force. While the U.S. did act defensively for the most part, it did not acquiesce
to German demands. On the other hand, because of the American perception that
Germany posed a threat to U.S. interests during the 1870s and 1880s, the DPMP
accurately predicts the use of confrontational diplomacy and a show of force (in the case
of Samoa) during the 1870s and 1880s.
The DPMP performs even better regarding American-German relations on the eve
of the Second World War. Though the model fails to capture all of the nuances in
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American foreign policy in the decade prior to World War II, it does a good job of
predicting overall American strategy; and during and after 1938, the DPMP performs
very well.

Japan
As mentioned earlier, the rise of Japan in the 1860s and 1870s was not viewed by
most Americans as threatening, and therefore did not lend itself to thoughts of preventive
action. The DPMP accurately predicts that American leaders would acquiesce or
accommodate the rise of Japan during the 1860s and 1870s.
Unfortunately, the DPMP does not perform as well in all instances. One variable,
the perception of a deteriorating status quo vis-à-vis Japan prior to the outbreak of World
War II, provides a challenge for our model. On this variable, we simply have insufficient
evidence to draw a definitive conclusion.
However, the model does seem to predict accurately American foreign policy visà-vis Japan in the run-up to World War II. This is especially true for the later years of the
1930s when the United States started to take a more aggressive stance in regards to
Japanese maneuvers in Asia. However, the DPMP does suggest that the U.S. should have
taken more aggressive measures earlier than it did vis-à-vis Japan. Part of the reason for
this discrepancy, as indicated earlier, is that the U.S. was not in a strong military position
to act more forcefully.
In terms of the nature of the threat from Japan in the post World War II era, the
DPMP does an overall good job predicting the behavior of American foreign policy
during this time. However, some variables for this period cause trouble for our model.
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The measurement of offensive/defensive military strategy does not seem to apply to
Japan during this period given that Japan was an important ally and trading partner to the
United States. In fact, the American desire in the early 1980s to see Japan rebuild its
military runs counter to the preventive action theory. The one redeeming feature in this
instance, however, is that since Japan—during this period—represented an economic
challenge not a military one, the U.S. had little to fear from a rebuilding of Japan’s
military capacity. In addition, some of the variables in the DPMP simply do not seem
particularly applicable in this instance. For example, in looking at the cost of war or the
chances of being successful in a war, the American-Japanese relationship in the post
World War II era does not lend itself to this analysis.

United Kingdom
The American-British relationship poses problems for the DPMP on some
variables such as internal power constraints, political constraints, the cost of war, and the
chances of being successful in a war. They simply do not seem to be particularly
applicable to U.S.-UK relations. Nonetheless, the model does accurately predict
American foreign policy vis-à-vis the United Kingdom on some of the other variables.
For instance, in both the decade before World War II, and the decades since, American
leadership regarding Britain has been moderate-acquiescent to moderate-pragmatic. The
DPMP has accurately predicted that the United States either would acquiesce in the face
of British growth or would accommodate the UK. Similarly, the threat from the UK in
the 1930s and after World War II, if there was any threat at all, would have to be
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classified as low non-militarized. The typology accurately predicts that American foreign
policy should be acquiescent in these circumstances.

Russia/Soviet Union
In the case of Russia and the early Soviet Union, the DPMP performs very well.
For the period of the nineteenth century, the model accurately predicts that the American
government should largely do nothing or accommodate the Russians during the 1860s
and 1870s. In addition, during the 1920s and 1930s, our model is correct; no preventive
action was taken by the United States against Russia during this period.
The behavior of the Roosevelt administration vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during
the 1930s is accurately predicted by the DPMP, though not the specifics of that behavior.
Because the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War was not seen as a military
threat, but an ideological threat, my model may be seen as accurately predicting that the
U.S. would accommodate the Soviet Union.
The DPMP also does a good job of predicting actual American behavior in
relation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During this period, political constraints
were moderate for American leaders. Given this condition, the model once again
performs well: predicting a mix of strategies including the use of incentives, coercion,
and confrontational diplomacy. The DPMP accurately predicts that preventive action was
likely, but that non-militarized preventive action might be preferred. Containment, as a
form of non-militarized preventive action, was the preferred method of dealing with the
Soviet Union after World War II. This, as predicted by the model, resulted in sustained
coercive and confrontational diplomacy during the Cold War period.
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Which Model—or Models—Works Best?
This is a difficult question to answer. In this chapter, the three models were
briefly reviewed in an effort to sort out the merits of each. All three models attempt to
present information that can be useful in trying to answer the grand question of when
preventive action is likely to occur, and what form it is likely to take.
This dissertation has considered the decline of three major powers and their
responses to rising challengers. None of the models—the Domestic Politics Model of
Prevention, Mearsheimer’s model of offensive realism, or Schweller’s democratic peace
model—accurately predict the three states’ foreign policy in every instance examined in
this dissertation. However, as shown in Table 7.1, the DPMP performs considerably
better than the other two models. The offensive realism model, Schweller’s model, and
my model accurately predict the form preventive action is likely to take, one-third of the
time, one-half of the time, and three-quarters of the time, respectively. In all fairness, the
two alternative models used here were not originally designed for this type of prediction,
and this may account for their relatively poor showing. Nonetheless, the high rate of
accurate prediction of the DPMP suggests that domestic factors play a large part in
determining what if any preventive action a state is likely to take.
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Table 7.1 Summation of Model Performance

UK
Russia/Soviet
Union
Soviet Union
U.S.-Germany
U.S.-Soviet Union

Democratic
Peace

Democratic
Peace

Offensive Realism
1816-1902 Accurate
1903-1918 Fail
1816-1938
1939-1945
1870s1880s
Post
World
War II

Accurate
Fail
Fail

UK
UK-Japan
UK-U.S.
UK-Germany
UK-Russia
Russia

Fail
Russia-Japan
Russia/Soviet
Union-Japan
Soviet Union
U.S.-Japan
U.S.-Russia
U.S.-Germany
U.S.-Japan
U.S.-Russia
U.S.-Germany
U.S.-Japan
U.S.-UK
U.S.-Germany
U.S.-Japan
U.S.-Soviet
Union
U.S.-Germany

1816-1879
1860-1904
1880-1906
1897-1904
1897-1904
1816-1879
1880-1896
1897-1902
1903-1904

Fail
Fail
Accurate
Accurate
Accurate
Accurate
Fail
Accurate
Fail

1906-1918
1932-1946
1863-1867
1863-1867
1868-1877
1868-1877
1868-1888
1878-1888
1878-1888
1920-1932
1920-1932
1920-1932

Fail
Fail
Fail
Fail
Fail
Accurate
Fail
Accurate
Fail
Accurate
Fail
Fail

1920-1932 Fail
1933-1939 Accurate
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U.S.-Japan
U.S.-Soviet
Union
U.S.-UK
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

1933-1939 Accurate
1933-1939
1933-1939
1946-1951
1953-1970
1971-1996

Fail
Accurate
Accurate
Accurate
Accurate

Domestic
Factors
UK (Power
Constraints)
UK (PA
Elements)
UK (Ruler
Beliefs)
UK (Nature of
Threat)
UK
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
UK (Cost of
War)
UK (Expected
Cost of Future
War)
UK (Chance
of Winning
War)
UK (Status
Quo)
Russia/Soviet
Union (Power
Constraints)
Russia/Soviet
Union (PA
Elements)

1895-1905 Accurate
1895-1905 Accurate
1895-1905 Accurate
1895-1905 Fail

1895-1905 Fail
1895-1905 Accurate

1895-1905 Accurate

1895-1905 Accurate
1895-1905 Fail

1816-1914 Accurate

1816-195

Domestic
Factors

Domestic
Factors

Russia/Soviet
Union (Ruler
Beliefs)
Russia/Soviet
Union (Nature
of Threat)
Russia/Soviet
Union
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
Russia/Soviet
Union (Cost of
War)
Russia/Soviet
Union-Japan
(Cost of War)
Russia/Soviet
Union
(Expected Cost
of Future War)
Russia/Soviet
Union (Chance
of Winning
War)

Russia/Soviet
Union (Status
Quo)
U.S.Russia/Soviet
Union (Power
Constraints)
U.S.-Germany
(Power
Constraints)
U.S.-Japan
(Power
Constraints)
U.S.-Japan
(Power
Constraints)
U.S.-UK
(Power
Constraints)
U.S.Russia/Soviet
Union (PA
Elements)
U.S.-Germany
(PA Elements)

1816-1946 Accurate

1816-1938 Fail

1816-1938 Accurate

1816-1938 Accurate

1904

Fail

1816-1938 Fail

1816-1938 Fail

Accurate
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1816-1938

Accurate

1863-1970

Accurate

1870s1930s

Fail

1865-1939

Accurate

1952-1982

N/A

1946-1996

N/A

1946-1970
1870s1880s

Accurate
Fail

Domestic
Factors

Domestic
Factors

U.S.-Germany
(PA Elements)
U.S.-Japan (PA
Elements)
U.S.-Japan (PA
Elements)
U.S.-UK (PA
Elements)
U.S.-Russia
(Ruler Beliefs)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Ruler
Beliefs)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Ruler
Beliefs)
U.S.-Germany
(Ruler Beliefs)
U.S.-Germany
(Ruler Beliefs)
U.S.-Japan
(Ruler Beliefs)
U.S.-Japan
(Ruler Beliefs)
U.S.-Japan
(Ruler Beliefs)

U.S.-Soviet
Union (Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-Germany
(Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-Germany
(Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-Japan
(Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-Japan
(Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-Japan
(Nature of
Threat)
U.S.-UK (Nature
of Threat)
U.S.-Russia
(Likelihood of
Conflict)

1933-1939 Accurate
1930-1939 Accurate
1952-1982 Fail-N/A
Accurate
1946-1996 N/A
1860s1870s
Accurate

1925-1938 Accurate

1946-1970 Accurate
1870s1880s
Fail
1920-1939 Accurate
1865-1876 Accurate
1930-1939 Accurate
1952-1982 Accurate
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1925-1938 Accurate

1946-1970 Accurate
1870s1880s

Accurate

1933-1939 Accurate
1860s1870s

Accurate

1930-1939 Fail

1952-1982 Accurate
1930-1939
1946-1996 Accurate

1863-1875 Accurate

Domestic
Factors

Domestic
Factors

U.S.-Soviet
Union
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
U.S.-Soviet
Union
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
U.S.-Germany
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
U.S.-Germany
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
U.S.-Japan
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
U.S.-UK
(Likelihood of
Conflict)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Cost of
War)
U.S.-Germany
(Cost of War)
U.S.-Japan (Cost
of War)

U.S.-UK (Cost
of War)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Expected
Cost of Future
War)
U.S.-Germany
(Expected Cost
of Future War)
U.S.-Japan
(Expected Cost
of Future War)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Chance
of Winning War)
U.S.-Germany
(Chance of
Winning War)
U.S.-Japan
(Chance of
Winning War)
U.S.-Soviet
Union (Status
Quo)
U.S.-Germany
(Status Quo)
U.S.-Japan
(Status Quo)
U.S.-Japan
(Status Quo)

1925-1938 Accurate

1946-1970 Accurate
1870s1880s

Accurate

1933-1939 Accurate
1865-1876
1930-1939
1952-1982 Accurate
1930-1939
1946-1996 Accurate

1946-1970 Accurate
1873-1888
1933-1939 Accurate
1930-1939
1952-1982 Accurate

The following shows the ratio of accurate predictions for
each model:
Offensive Realism: .33 (2/6)
Schweller’s Democratic Peace Model: .48 (14/29)
Domestic Factors Model: .78 (51/65)
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1930-1939
1946-1996 N/A

1946-1970 Accurate
1873-1888
1933-1939 Accurate

1930-1939 Accurate

1946-1970 Accurate

1873-1888 Accurate

1930-1939 Accurate

1946-1970 Accurate
1873-1888
1933-1939 Accurate
1930-1938 Accurate
1939

Fail

Implications
What does this imply for the future of the study of preventive action? First, it
indicates the importance of further study, and the disaggregating of causal mechanisms
and key variables that drive preventive action decisions. Determining when states are
likely to engage in preventive action is difficult enough, but predicting what form that
preventive action is likely to take further complicates the issue. The DPMP developed
here is a good start.
This study also revealed the importance of looking inside the black box of the
state and understanding the preventive motivation of various actors and decision makers
within the state. Understanding the perception of key decision makers is essential in
successfully determining the direction of national strategy. Decision makers’ perceptions
about the nature of the threat posed by a rising challenger, and the concern about a
worsening status quo seem particularly significant. Also of importance in understanding
the calculations that go into preventive action decisions is the concern about the cost of
war now versus the cost of war in the future. Much of this, of course, hinges on the
perceived likelihood of conflict.
Finally, this study reveals that these different variables are very difficult to
separate. They are intertwined, especially variables such as the costs of future wars and
the likelihood of winning future wars. George and Bennett suggest that the case study
method is particularly useful in specifying and measuring complex qualitative variables.
Complex causal relations involve interacting causal variables that are not independent of
each other. This is important in explaining instances when preventive action does not
occur, even though some criteria suggests a particular form of preventive action is likely.
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For example, in any given case, the military status quo might be deteriorating—which
would suggest some form of militarized preventive action is likely. However, if the costs
of militarized preventive action are already high, the country might shy away from
militarized preventive action and towards non-militarized preventive action. Because of
the complexity of these causal mechanisms, this study is necessarily concerned with the
probability of a given form of preventive action. It might be possible, in future iterations
of this research, to combine some of these variables and to dissect others. Nonetheless,
this dissertation has shown a path to future research of preventive action.

Conclusion
This dissertation has sought to answer the basic question, “When is preventive
action likely to occur, and what form is it likely to take?” In the examinations of internal
power constraints, domestic political constraints, and ruler belief systems, it has become
apparent that perceptions and domestic politics are very influential in determining the
probability of preventive action. This is an important finding since it provides the crucial
variables and causal mechanisms that go into the preventive action decision-making
process.
Also of interest in this research are its implications regarding tangential fields of
study. For example, prospect theory suggests that states are risk acceptant when it comes
to possible losses—whether those losses are something tangible such as territory or
whether they are less tangible such as international ranking or prestige—and states will
likely engage in preventive action to avert those losses. What this research shows is that
leaders make calculations based on a variety of variables, and quite often nations decide
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they are better off not taking any action at all; the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union
provide clear examples. While not disproving prospect theory, findings like these suggest
that prospect theory needs to be examined more closely.
This research has also called into question one of the issues raised earlier in this
dissertation. Charles Kupchan has suggested that relatively declining states have allowed
rising challengers to surpass them, even though elites have a good understanding of the
balance of power.11 I argued in chapter three that if it were true that elites had an
understanding that the balance of power was shifting against their state, they would not
voluntarily allow a rising challenger to eclipse their state. This research has shown that
repeatedly, decision makers have actually allowed this to occur. The answer usually lies
in the elites’ perceptions of threat posed by the rising challenger or the possibility of a
future change in the trend that will ultimately put their state back in a superior position.
Both of these are important findings.
Another important finding of this research is that outbreaks of preventive general
war, at least among great powers, are exceedingly rare. More research is needed in this
area, but it seems that general preventive war against a challenger—who is seen as
somewhat equal or possibly becoming equal in power—is not a good option for the
dominant declining power. I would suggest that this calculus will not hold for preventive
action against states that are far from equal with the dominant declining power. This
could be a fascinating area of study in the future.
As I was concluding the final substantive chapter of this project, I began to think
about ways in which the DPMP could be improved in future iterations or expanded

11

Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, ed. Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt,
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), fn. 22, 15-16, 36.
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beyond the current parameters. One of the limitations of this project was a self-imposed
one: I wanted to have a systematic way of picking my cases, or at least have a common
set of parameters to make my cases as comparable as possible. Because of this decision, I
limited my cases to ones that I could objectively (as much as possible) determine which
states were rising and which states were declining. I chose the Composite Index of
National Capability (CINC) score as the barometer for rising and declining power. While
I believe this accomplished the goal of creating a systematic method for looking at my
cases, it also proved very limiting. One of the first limitations this placed on this project
was restricting my cases to those covered in the Correlates of War database, meaning I
could only look at the years 1816 to 2001. Unfortunately, this meant that some cases that
might be of interest were necessarily omitted. For example, one interesting case would
have been Great Britain’s early reactions to the rise of the United States even before the
American Revolution. Robert Kagan argues that perceptive Britons like James
Harrington, William Burke, and Adam Smith understood that the colonies would
eventually rise up against the mother country.12 British, Spanish, and French containment
of the United States during the 1780s would also be of interest.13
I am also unsure that using the CINC score is necessarily the best measurement
available for understanding leadership perceptions of the rise of adversaries. Using this
score is certainly an objective way to look at the rise and fall of nations from a distance,
but it might not capture the important perceptual shifts that occur at the time. However,
having said that, developing a reliable index of leader perceptions during times of crisis
was well beyond the scope of this research project.
12

Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of
the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 30-38.
13
Ibid., 53-56.
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Despite some of these concerns, the research presented in this dissertation has
provided new insights into the decision making process that can lead to preventive action.
We have gotten closer to being able to answer the question of whether preventive action
is likely to occur, and what form it is likely to take. The causal mechanisms, concepts,
and variables developed here are instructive when determining what type of response
declining dominant powers are likely to have vis-à-vis rising challengers. Furthermore,
understanding the interaction of the various parts of the DPMP helps us understand the
complexities behind these processes. Now that we have moved beyond the simple
dichotomous view of relations between declining states and rising challengers, it will be
possible to further refine the model of preventive action and develop more concise causal
mechanisms. Ultimately, we will be able to gain a better understanding of the preventive
motivation and the variables that drive leaders to make the decision they do.

281

Bibliography
Brown, Benjamin H. The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain 1881-1895. New York:
Colombia University Press, 1943.
Bush, George W. “The National Security Strategy of the United States.” 2002.
Cohen, Warren I. America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991, edited by Warren I. Cohen.
Vol. IV of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Copeland, Dale C. The Origins of Major War. Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis and Stephen
M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
2000.
Correlates of War. National Material Capabilities v. 3.02. http://www.correlatesofwar.org
Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. New York: Harper Perennial, 1996.
DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy. “The Power Transition Research Program.” Progress in
International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam
Fendius Elman. The MIT Press, 2003.
Dictionary of World History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Doran, Charles F. “Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle: Changing Systems Structure,
Expectations, and War.” Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000.
Emmerson, John K. and Harrison M. Holland. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and
Japan in the Twentieth Century, edited by Miriam Miller. Stanford, California: Stanford
Alumni Association, 1987.
Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: The Price of America's Empire. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.
———. Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global
Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 1905. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Freeze, Gregory L. "Reform and Counter Reform 1855-1890." In Russia: A History, edited by
Gregory L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Fuller, Thomas. The History of the Holy War. London: William Pickering, 1840.

282

Fuller, William C., Jr. "The Great Fatherland War and Late Stalinism 1941-1953." In Russia: A
History, edited by Gregory L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Gacek, Christopher M. The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign
Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
———. The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations,
Provocations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Gilpin, Robert. War & Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Geller, Daniel S. “Status Quo Orientation, Capabilities, and Patters of War Initiation in Dyadic
Rivalries.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1, 2000.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press, 2005.
George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational
Decision Making." In Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, 21-58.
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985.
Hagan, Joe D. "Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring: A
Framework for Comparative Analysis." In Foreign Policy Restructuring: How
Governments Respond to Global Change, edited by Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan and
Martin W. Sampson, III, 138-63. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina
Press, 1994.
———. "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness." Mershon International Studies
Review 38 (1994): 183-207.
———. "Oppositions, Ruling Strategies, and the Domestic Road to War: Political Explanations
of Foreign Policy and the Great Powers since 1815." Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20 2004.
Hinsely, F. H., ed. The Cambridge Modern History: Volume Xi Material Progress and WorldWide Problems 1870-1898. Edited by G. N. Clark, J. R. M. Butler, J. P. T. Bury and E.
A. Benians. XIV vols. Vol. XI, The New Cambridge Modern History. London:
Cambridge University Press, 1962.
Hunt, Michael S. Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1996.
283

Husband, William B. "The New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Revolutionary Experiment
1921-1929." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Iriye, Akira. The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, edited by Warren I. Cohen. Vol. III of The
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993.
Kadera, Kelly M. The Power-Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry. Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 2001.
Kagan, Robert. Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the
Dawn of the Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books, 1987.
Kim, Woosang and James D. Morrow. “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” American
Journal of Political Science 36, no. 4, 1992.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1994.
Krasner, Stephen D. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S.
Foreign Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Kugler, Jacek and A.F.K. Organski. “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective
Evaluation. Handbook of War Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin
Hyman, 1989.
Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke, eds. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War
Ledger. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996.
———. “The Power Transition Research Program: Assessing Theoretical and Empirical
Advances.” Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 2000.
Kupchan, Charles A. The Vulnerability of Empire. Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis and
Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1994.
———. The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994.

284

LaFeber, Walter. The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, edited by Warren I. Cohen.
Vol. II of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1993.
Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
———. “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?” International Security 9,
no. 1, 1984.
Levy, Jack S. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no.
1 (1987).
———. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." International Studies
Quarterly 41 (1997): 87-112.
Levy, Jack S. and Joseph R. Gochal. “When Do Democracies Fight „Preventive Wars‟?: Theory
and Evidence.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies
Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20 2004.
Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. Edited by Harry Hearder, Origins of Modern Wars.
New York: Longman, 1986.
Lund, Michael S. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy.
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
Mallet, Bernard. British Budgets 1877-88 to 1912-13. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited,
1913.
Maoz, Zeev. Paths to Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982.
Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the
World. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001.
Modelski, George and William R. Thompson. “Long Cycles and Global War.” Handbook of War
Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. New
York: Knopf, 1967.

285

Niou, Emerson M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook. “Preventive War and the Balance of Power: A
Game Theoretic Approach.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, September, 1987.
Organski, A.F.K. World Politics, 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1968.
Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1980.
———. “The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor.” The Scientific Study of Peace and
War: A Text Reader, editors John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan. Lanham: Lexington
Books, 1999.
Orlovsky, Daniel. "Russia in War and Revolution 1914-1921." In Russia: A History, edited by
Gregory L. Freeze, 523. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Otte, T.G., ed. The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher. London: Palgrave,
2002.
Oxford English Dictionary Online. http://dictionary.oed.com
Perkins, Bradford. The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, edited by Waren I. Cohen.
Vol. I of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007. Monty G.
Marshall, Director. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Ransel, David L. "Pre-Reform Russia 1801-1855." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory L.
Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Rubin, Barnett R., ed. Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action. New York: The Century
Foundation Press, 1998.
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York
and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.
Schroeder, Paul W. The Transformation of European Politics 1763 - 1848. Edited by Lord
Bullock and William Deakin, Oxford History of Modern Europe. New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1994.
Schweller, Randall L. "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More
Pacific?" World Politics 44, no. 2 (1992): 235-69.
Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire 1801-1917. Edited by Alan Bullock and F. W. D.
Deakin, Oxford History of Modern Europe. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967.
286

Siegelbaum, Lewis. "Building Stalinism 1929-1941." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory L.
Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Snyder, Jack. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of
1914. Edited by Robert Jervis, Robert J. Art and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984.
———. “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914.” Psychology and Deterrence, edited by
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1985.
———. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Edited by Robert
Jervis, Robert J. Art and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Strassler, Robert B., ed. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the
Peloponnesian War. New York: Touchstone, 1996.
Tammen, Ronald L., et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York:
Chatham House Publishers, 2000.
Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1954.
Vagts, Alfred. Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations. New
York: King's Crown Press, 1956.
Van Evera, Stephen. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I.” International
Security 9, Summer, 1984.
———. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1999.
———. Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Vasquez, John A. The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." International Security 18,
no. 2 (1993): 44-79.
Ward, A.W., and G.P. Gooch. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919. 3
vols. Vol. III. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
Williams, E. E. Made in Germany. Sussex, England: The Harvester Press, 1973.
287

Zelnik, Reginald E. "Revolutionary Russia 1890-1914." In Russia: A History, edited by Gregory
L. Freeze, 523. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

288

Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)

Non-military

Nature of
threat?

Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Low
Likelihood
of conflict?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

No

High
Yes

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?

Yes

Likelihood
of conflict?

No
Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?
No
Yes

Is non-militarized
preventive action now
less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely
than if PEDA delayed?

No

No

Yes
Yes

Preventive action
unlikely
Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Non-militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

Yes
Militarized
preventive action
likely

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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No
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UK-U.S. Military Threat
Nature of
threat?

United States

Military

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

Yes

Militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

No
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UK-U.S. Economic Threat
Non-military
United States

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Economic
Threat

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Likelihood
of conflict?

High
No
Yes

No

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?
Yes

Is non-militarized
preventive action now
less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely
than if PEDA delayed?

No

Yes

Preventive action
unlikely
Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

No

Yes
Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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UK-Russia Military Threat
Military
Threat

Russia

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

No

Yes

Preventive action
unlikely
Yes

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

Yes
Militarized
preventive action
likely

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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UK-Japan Military Threat
Military
Threat

Japan

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

Yes

Militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

No
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UK-Germany Military Threat
Military
Threat

Germany

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

No

Yes

Preventive action
unlikely
Yes

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

Yes
Militarized
preventive action
likely

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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UK-Germany Economic Threat
Non-military

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority
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Threat

Germany

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Likelihood
of conflict?

High
No
Yes

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?

No

Yes

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is non-militarized
preventive action now
less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely
than if PEDA delayed?

No

No

Yes

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

Preventive action
unlikely
Yes

Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

Yes
Militarized
preventive action
likely

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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UK-France: Military Threat
Military
Threat

France

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

No

Yes

Preventive action
unlikely
Yes

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

Yes
Militarized
preventive action
likely

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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Soviet Union–United Kingdom Threat
United
Kingdom

Nature of
threat?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

No

Preventive action
unlikely
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
Russia-US Threat
United
States

Nature of
threat?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

No

Preventive action
unlikely

298

Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
Russia/Soviet Union-Prussia/Germany Threat
Nature of
threat?

Prussia/
Germany

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Likelihood
of conflict?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

Likelihood
of conflict?

High

No

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

No
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
Russia-Japan 1913-1944
Japan

Nature of
threat?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

No

Preventive action
unlikely
Non-militarized
preventive
action likely
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
Russia-Japan 1860-1904
Nature of
threat?

Japan

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

No

Likelihood
of conflict?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Militarized
preventive action
likely
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-UK Economic Threat 1930-1939 and 1946-1996
Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Nature of
threat?

Non-military

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Low
Likelihood
of conflict?

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

No

Yes

Yes

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?

Preventive action
unlikely

Non-militarized
preventive action
unlikely
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Germany Military Threat 1920-1939
Non-military

Nature of
threat?

Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Low
Likelihood
of conflict?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

No

High

Yes

Likelihood
of conflict?

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?
No

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is non-militarized
preventive action now
less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely
than if PEDA delayed?

No

Yes

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

No

Preventive action
unlikely
Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Non-militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?*

No

Yes

* Difficult to Determine

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred

303

Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Germany Economic and Military Threat 1873-1888
Non-military

Nature of
threat?

Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Low
Likelihood
of conflict?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

No

High

Yes

Likelihood
of conflict?

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?
No

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is non-militarized
preventive action now
less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely
than if PEDA delayed?

No

Yes

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

No

Preventive action
unlikely
Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Non-militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

No

Yes

This model is indeterminate

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Soviet Union Military Threat 1946-1970
Nature of
threat?

Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

Yes

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

Yes
Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Soviet Union Military Threat 1920s-1938
Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Nature of
threat?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

Likelihood
of conflict?

Low

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

No

Preventive action
unlikely
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Japan Military Threat 1930-1939
Nature of
threat?

Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Likelihood
of conflict?

Military
All levels
considered, but
militarized
responses given
more weight

High

High

Yes

Likelihood
of conflict?

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?
No

Is non-militarized
preventive action now
less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely
than if PEDA delayed?

Yes

Is
militarized
action now
costly?

Yes

No

Preventive action
unlikely
Non-militarized
preventive
action likely

Non-militarized
preventive action
unlikely

Is militarized preventive action
now less costly than it would
be later, or a favorable
outcome more likely than if
military action is delayed?

No

Yes

This model is indeterminate

Preventive action likely--non-

militarized preventive action
may be preferred
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Japan Economic Threat 1952-1982
Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Nature of
threat?

Non-military

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Low
Likelihood
of conflict?

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

Yes

Yes

Is nonmilitarized
preventive action
now costly?

Preventive action
unlikely
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Appendix A: The Decision Making Process in the Domestic Politics Model of Prevention (DPMP)
US-Japan Economic Threat 1865-1876
Rising
Challenger
Perceived

Nature of
threat?

Non-military

Non-militarized
preventive action
given priority

Low
Likelihood
of conflict?

Will status quo
continue to
worsen if no
action is taken?

No

Non-militarized
preventive action
unlikely
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Appendix B: A Typology of Preventive Action

Causal Mechanisms

Containment

Outcomes

Systemic
Structure/
Polarity

Internal
Power
Constraints/
Offense vs.
Defense
Severe/
Defensive
Strategy

Domestic
Political
Constraints/
Pressures

Ruler Belief
Systems/
Perception of
Threats

Severe Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Moderate Acquiescent/
Low – NonMilitarized
Moderate Pragmatic/
Moderate –
NonMilitarized

Acquiescence/
Do Nothing

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Accommodation/
Mix of Strategies/
Carrot and Stick

Bipolar/
Balanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
DefensiveOffensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Initiate Sustained
Coercive/
Confrontational
Diplomacy
Initiate
Militarized
Preventive Action

Bipolar/
Unbalanced
Multipolar

Moderate/
OffensiveDefensive
Strategy
Minimal/
Offensive
Strategy

Moderate
Political
Constraints/
Pressure
Minimal Political
Constraints/
Pressure

Unbalanced
Multipolar
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Pragmatic Militant/
Moderate Militarized
Militant Radical/
High Militarized

Appendix C: Selected Polity IV Scores
A negative or 0 score means that a state is considered an autocracy. A score of 1 to 6
suggests an anocracy. For the purposes of this study, I count these as non-democratic
regimes. A score of 7 to 10 suggests a full democracy.
UK: 1816-1836: 4
UK: 1837-1879: 6
UK: 1880-1900: 7
UK: 1901-1918: 8
UK: 1919-1921: 8
UK: 1922-1989: 10
Prussia: 1816-1866: 0
Prussia: 1867: -66 (adverse transition)
Germany: 1868-1870: -88 (adverse transition)
Germany: 1871-1877: 0
Germany: 1878-1879: 1
Germany: 1890-1904: 4
Germany: 1919-9132: 6
Germany: 1933: 0
Germany: 1945: -66 (adverse transition)
West Germany: 1945-1948: -66 (adverse transition)
West Germany: 1949-1989: 10
Japan: 1860-1867: -88 (adverse transition)
Japan: 1868-1944: 5
Japan: 1945-1951: -66 (adverse transition)
Japan: 1952-1961: 10
Russia: 1816-1904: 0
Russia: 1914-1918: 1
Russia: 1919-1920: 1
USSR: 1924-1926: 0
United States: 1816-1844: 9
United States: 1845-1849: 10
United States: 1850-1853: 9
United States: 1854-1864: 8
United States: 1865-1870: 9
United States: 1871-1896: 10
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